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ABSTRACT 
This abstract is written on the 11 th of September 2006 - the fifth anniversary of 
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by AI-Qaeda. 
These attacks are taken to be a turning point in the relationship between Islam 
and the West. For the author, these attacks, the overwhelming counter-attacks 
by some of the western states on some Islamic states, as weil as the endless 
Palestinian-Israeli disputes, are the result of misunderstanding and 
misconceptions that Islam and the West have of each other. 
While politics and politicians are destroying means of communication amongst 
these nations by the creation of such a state of war, scholars should exert their 
best efforts to build bridges of understanding and tolerance. 
This thesis is but a single brick in the much needed bridge of communication and 
understanding between the great civilisations of west and east. It seeks to show 
how the world's various legal traditions can benefit from each other. It attempts to 
do so by introducing the Islamic system of diyah and showing how it can interplay 
with and impact on the interpretation of international law. The example chosen is 
the existing set of air carrier liability conventions. 9/11 reminds us that attacks on 
air transport have been a chosen means of sowing conflict. 
Yet peaceful use of air transport is among the most practical ties that bind the 
world together. Air carrier liability conventions render international air transport 
possible. The thesis shows how Islamic diyah can productively interact with these 
conventions. It can act as a median point at which the two extremes of the 
Warsaw System prescribing limited liability and the Montreal Convention 
prescribing unlimited liability can meet. The thesis shows as weil how diyah can 
provide a useful methodology for integrating air carrier contractual and extra-
contractualliability regimes. 
To assist the reader unfamiliar with Islamic-fiqh, the thesis it is divided into two 
parts. The first is devoted to an introduction to Islamic-fiqh, and the second treats 
the interaction of diyah with the air carrier liability conventions. 
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ABRÉGÉ 
L'auteur rédige cet abrégé le 11 septembre 2005, soit au moment du cinquième 
anniversaire des attaques contre le World Trade Center et le Pentagon par AI-
Qaeda. Ces attaques sont perçues comme un point tournant dans les relations 
entre l'Islam et l'Occident. Selon l'auteur, ces attaques, les contre-attaques 
massives, et res conflits palestino-israéliens sans fin sont le résultat des 
malentendus entre l'Islam est l'Occident. 
Pendant que la politique et les politiciens détruirsent les moyens de 
communication entre ces nations en créant un état de guerre, les universitaires 
devraient concentrer leurs efforts sur la construction des ponts de 
compréhension et de tolérance. 
Cette thèse se veut une simple brique dans la construction de ce pont, si 
nécessaire, de communication et de connaissance entre les grandes civilisations 
de l'ouest et de l'est. Elle cherche à montrer comment les traditions juridiques du 
monde peuvent bénéficier mutuellement de leur rencontre. Elle essaie de le faire 
en présentant le système islamique du diyah pour illustrer comment ce système 
peut interagir avec le droit international et influencer son interprétation. 
L'exemple choisi est la constellation existante de conventions sur la 
responsabilité des transporteurs aériens. Le 11 septembre nous rappelle que 
une attaque contre le transport aérien a été le moyen choisi pour semer le conflit. 
Pourtant, l'utilisation pacifique du transport aérien constitue un des meilleurs 
liens pratique pour réunir le monde. Les conventions sur la responsabilité civile 
des transporteurs aériens rendent le transport aérien international possible. La 
thèse démontre que le diyah islamique peut co-exister de façon productive avec 
ces conventions. Le diyah peut se positionner comme point médian auquel les 
deux extrêmes de la Convention de Varsovie, qui édicte la responsabilité limitée, 
et la Convention de Montréal, qui édicte la responsabilité illimitée, peuvent se 
rencontrer. Cette thèse établie également que le diyah peut fournir une 
méthodologie utile pour intégrer la responsabilité contractuelle et 
extracontractuelle des transporteurs aériens. 
Pour aider le lecteur non familier avec le fiqh islamique, la thèse est divisée en 
deux parties. La première présente une introduction au fiqh islamique pendant 
que la et deuxième traite de l'interaction entre le diyah et les conventions sur la 
responsabilité civile des transporteurs aériens. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Civil aviation is an area in which there is a clear need for concrete working rules 
of international law that can function within various legal traditions, including 
Islamic and western traditions. One of the major areas which need such a 
concrete regulatory framework is civil liability for the obvious reason that people 
flying between countries, including Islamic and non-Islamic countries, need to 
know on what basis they might be compensated for loss. 
Civil liability pertaining to international carriage of passengers by air has been 
regulated by the Warsaw Convention of 19291 and its supplementary instruments 
collectively ca lied Warsaw System. 2 The Warsaw Convention has received a 
significant number of ratifications in a manner which made it applicable to almost 
every state in the world including a majority of Islamic states. The Montreal 
Convention of 1999, which is gradually superseding the Warsaw Convention, has 
already been ratified by many states, including Islamic states, and has the 
prospect of being ratified by many more.3 Whereas the Warsaw and Montreal 
Convention both address contractual liability of air carriers, the Rome Convention 
of 19524 addresses their extra-contractualliability. While it has received relatively 
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 12 
October 1929, IeAO Doc. 7838 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. 
2 See Section 6.1, below, for more on Warsaw System 
3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Carriage by Air, 28 May 1999, IeAO Doc. 9740 
[hereinafter Montreal Convention]. 
4 Convention on the Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, 7 October 1952, 
IeAO Doc. 7364 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
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few ratifications, several Islamic countries, including Egypt and Aigeria, have 
ratified the Rome Convention. 
Despite ratification of the Warsaw System, the Montreal Convention and the 
Rome Convention [collectively referred to in this thesis as the "air carrier liability 
Conventions"] by Islamic states, it would be accurate to say that Islamic Shan-ra 
did not play any role whatsoever in their creation. This does not mean, however, 
that they are inconsistent with Sharfa. 
There are various reasons for such limited involvement by Sharfa in this regard. 
A major part of the currently known Islamic world was ruled by the Ottoman 
Empire until it was dissolved in 1924. One cannot say that any of the post-
Ottoman Islamic states had played any major role in air carriage and its 
regulation before the early 1960s. Until that point in time, most of the currently 
known Islamic states were under colonization or were newly formed. 
The first Islamic state5 to rat if y the Warsaw Convention was Indonesia on the 2nd 
of February 1952. It was followed by Egypt, which ratified the Warsaw 
Convention on the 6th of September 1955 and the Hague Protocol on the 26th of 
April 1956. Three years later Morocco ratified the Warsaw Convention on the 5th 
of January 1958. 
5 The term Islamic State is used here in its broadest meaning as it refers to states where majority of (i.e. 
more than 50% of its population) are Muslims. 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the first state to ratify the Warsaw Convention 
and the Hague Protocol while applying Islamic Sharfa as its law. This ratification 
took place on the 27th of January 1969.6 It took a long time before most other 
major Islamic states, such as Iran, joined the Convention. 7 The timing of 
ratification of the Rome Convention was similar. In short, neither the Warsaw 
Convention nor the Rome Convention were negotiated with the active 
participation of explicitly Islamic states. 
Nonetheless, most of Islamic states that ultimately ratified Warsaw and Rome 
were present at the Diplomatie Conference held in May 1999 for the adoption of 
the Montreal Convention. They did have influence on the drafting of the Montreal 
Convention. These States were mostly led and represented at the Conference by 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The latter lead a consortium of sorne 50 other African 
States, while Saudi Arabia represented the rest of the Persian Gulf region. 
Such participation and involvement of the Islamic states in the drafting process of 
the Montreal Convention may be enough to suggest that Sharfa was sufficiently 
represented at the Conference. It may also lead to a comfortable conclusion that 
the Montreal Convention is in essence coherent with Islamic Sharfa. Such 
coherence, should not, however, preclude the hypothesis that the introduction of 
certain principles of Islamic Sharfa such as the principle of diyah8 in the manner 
6 Pakistan ratified the Hague Protocol on 16/1/1961 before ratifying the Convention on 26/12/1969. 
7 Iran ratified the Convention in 1975. 
8 See Section 2.1.1, below, for more on diyah. 
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followed in this thesis, would lead to further thoughtful suggestions and enhance 
the Warsaw, Montreal and Rome Conventions with a third dimension in addition 
to the dimensions or perspectives of the Common and Civil Law traditions. 
By introducing the principle of diyah and considering its impact on the concepts 
and principles relating to the liability regime adopted by the Warsaw Convention 
and the Montreal Convention of 1999, this thesis explores the intersection of 
western schools of legal thought with Islamic schools of legal thought in a domain 
that has clear overlapping significance - international civil aviation. The thesis 
seeks not only to show how Islamic-fiqh would work within the air carrier liability 
Conventions, but also to explore what light Islamic-fiqh can cast on their 
elaboration and further development. 
To comprehend the role diyah can play, we need to keep in mind that the 
Warsaw Convention was created to unify the ru les relating to international 
carriage by air. The Convention has nevertheless always been subject to 
paradoxical views amongst the states that are party to it. Much ink has been 
spilled about the reasons behind conflicts over interpretation of the provisions of 
the Warsaw Convention. One of the major reasons relates to the fact that soon 
after the inception of the Warsaw Convention, victims and their heirs realized that 
the amount of compensation prescribed by the Convention was insufficient. They 
therefore kept on trying to overcome the limits of liability as defined by the 
13 
Warsaw Convention through litigation. The struggle against liability limits led to 
the various amendments to the Warsaw Convention. 
While the Warsaw Convention has been repeatedly described as overprotective 
in favour of air carriers as against passengers, the author does not endorse this 
statement in full. Taking into consideration the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 9 of 
the value of the limits of liability as prescribed by the Warsaw Convention at the 
time of inception, we would find that it was roughly equal to US$93,000 in 2006.10 
The thesis argues that the actual problem with Warsaw in this regard is that it did 
not adopt a flexible methodology, which would take into consideration any 
alterations to the value of currencies. Such inflexibility coincided with rapid 
inflation of currencies through 1930s - 1950s. Another problem the Warsaw 
Convention had is that it based air carriers' liability on the contract of carriage 
and adopted stringent formalities the absence of which would render void any 
agreement with regard to limits of liability. This is why a spectacular number of 
cases address the matter of formalities through which plaintiffs are usually trying 
to escape the limits of liability enjoyed by air carriers. 
The seventy years of such difficulties, adjustments and developments of the 
Warsaw Convention resulted in the birth of the Montreal Convention. To avoid 
some of the problems associated with the Warsaw System, the Montreal 
9 For more on on this topic, see United States of America, Department of Labor Homepage 
<http://www.bIs.gov/news.reIease/cpi.nrO.htm> (date accessed 20/612006). 
10 See the Economic History Service Homepage in association with Miami University and Wake Forest 
University <http://eh.netlhmitlcompare/> (date accessed 20/612006); the American Institute for Economic 
Research <http://www.aier.orglcgi-aier/co1ca1culator.cgi> (date accessed 20/6/2006). 
14 
Convention adopted a two-tier liability regime. It adopted strict liability for claims 
up to 100,000 Special Orawing Rights (SORs)11 and equipped air carriers with 
the right of defence for amounts exceeding 100,000 SORs. The thesis argues 
that the Montreal methodology was an extreme reaction to the limits of liability 
adopted by the Warsaw Convention. Such methodology overly favours 
passengers against air carriers. 
The Montreal Convention adopted another important innovation as it provides 
that the limits of liability as prescribed by the Convention shall be reviewed every 
five years. The thesis argues that in the absence of a methodology for assigning 
limits of liability for bodily in jury , periodic review could simply open a Pandora's 
box. 
ln addition to the above, both the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention 
base air carriers' liability on the contract of carriage. This has resulted in the 
exclusion of air carriers' liability towards those who get injured or killed in air 
accidents while not being aboard the aircraft. The extra-contractual liability 
regime adopted by the Rome Convention concentrates on the air carrier rather 
than on the persons suffering from the damage. To limit the liability of air carriers, 
it puts the persons suffering from the damage or their heirs in a pool and 
distributes the limited amount of compensation to them equally. As a result of 
Il SDR's value is detennined on a daily basis by averaging a basket of leading currencies ( The Euro, 
Japanese Yen, Pond Sterling and U.S. Dollar): See the Official Website of International Monetary Fund, 
<http://www-imf.orglexternallnp/exr/facts/sdr.HTM> (date accessed: 21 January 2005). 
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these various regimes people killed on board an aircraft and those killed on the 
ground by the same accident may weil be compensated differently. 
Through this thesis, the author tries to shed light on the principle of diyah 
adopted by Islamic Sharfa and introduce it as a median solution between the 
three variant regimes adopted by the Warsaw System, the Montreal Convention 
and the Rome Convention. One of the most important criteria of diyah as a 
median point is that it does not rely on contract but yet cannot be taken as a pure 
extra-contractual regime. This is so because the limits of diyah are not based on 
contract, but such limits can be raised by virtue of a contract. 
T 0 introduce the principle of diyah, the author devotes the first part of the thesis 
as an introduction to Islamic Sharfa. This part introduces sorne basic concepts 
and terminology without which the rest of the thesis would be hard to 
comprehend. The author presumes that both readers who have deeper 
knowledge of Sharfa and those who are unfamiliar with Sharfa require 
disclosure of the standpoint from which the author reaches to his conclusions. 
The first Chapter of Part 1 seeks to clarify the misleading interchangeable use of 
the terms Islamic Sharfa and Islamic Law. This Chapter begins with a brief 
illustration of the impact of translation on such misconceptions, suggesting that 
transliteration would be a much better approach to reflect on the exact meaning 
of each of the terms. The first Chapter then elaborates on how the author 
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understands the terms Sharfa, Maqasid AI-Sharfa, Islamie-fiqh, Usul Fiqh and 
Islamie Law. These four terms become key to the subsequent analysis. 
Chapter Il addresses the matter of accidents and compensation under Islamic-
fiqh. The introduction to the chapter notes that liability, be it contractual or extra-
contractual, is usually covered under the subject of damân in conventional 
Islamic-fiqh literature. However, unlike in the conventional Western legal 
literature, liability arising out of wrongful death and injuries is usually addressed 
in Islamic-fiqh literature under criminal acts, Ginâyât. 
Chapter Il then elaborates on the matters of both contractual and extra-
contractual liability resulting from accidents causing loss of life or bodily injuries. 
The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the subject of diyah and irsh as extra-
contractual liability and the second part elaborates on the issue of contracts and 
contractual liability. 
Chapter III discusses how international convention and treaties are treated 
according to Sharfa. It provides a brief chronological presentation of the nature 
of the relationship between the Islamic State and surrounding States. The 
chapter then explores some of the most important treaties and conventions 
concluded by the Prophet (PBUH), as weil as some others concluded by the 
ensuing caliphs. 
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These three chapters comprising Part 1 of the Thesis are designed to provide a 
solid ground for addressing the main subject matter of the thesis, which is the 
interplay between Shatf'a and the air carrier liability Conventions. 
Part 2 begins with a review of the ordinary interpretation of the air carrier liability 
Conventions as informed by civil law and common law traditions. Using the 
analysis from Part 1 of the thesis, Part 2 then illustrates how Sharï'a and the 
ordinary interpretation can benefit from each other. 
The air carrier liability Conventions evolved in a pure common and civil law 
environ ment without taking into consideration the principle of diyah adopted by 
Sharï'a, which asserts that wrongdoers' liability is limited but may be raised by 
virtue of agreement or penalty. Diyah, the author contends, provides a middle 
way between the Rome and Warsaw lower limits and the unlimited liability 
agreed in Montreal. Part 2 of the thesis emphasizes that because diyah does not 
rely on contract in limiting liability, it could have had an immense impact on the 
drafting of the Warsaw Convention. The resulting legal framework would not 
have evolved in the way it has today. Bearing this analysis in mind, the author 
formulates a number of proposais based on grounds that were not taken in 
consideration at the time of adopting the existing regimes. 
Chapter IV of Part 2 reviews the evolution of the air carrier liability Conventions. It 
includes a brief discussion of each of the instruments composing the Warsaw 
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System and an overview of the Rome and Montreal Conventions. Chapter V 
delves more deeply into the Rome Convention and the extra-contractual liability 
of air carriers. The discussion is designed to establish a contrast with the relevant 
principles of Islamic Shari'a. Chapter VI undertakes more detailed discussion of 
the nature and formation of the contract of carriage. Chapters VI sets the stage 
for Chapter VII, which discusses contractual liability under the Warsaw System 
and the Montreal Convention, and how this compares with Islamic Shari'a. 
It is important to emphasize that although the principle of diyah, which is the 
central concept to this thesis, originates in the Holy Qur'ân and Sunnah of the 
Prophet,12 the author's purpose is to present the methodology of diyah and to 
apply it rather than to interpret and apply the theology behind it. The author is 
seeking to write as an objective jurist rather than with a view to advancing any 
particular theological standpoint. 
It is also worth noting that the author has faced three systematic difficulties while 
drafting this thesis: scarcity of sources, the translation of Arabie terms, and the 
range of methodologies among Islamic schools of thought. Each of these is 
discussed briefly in turn. 
Although sources on Islamic Shari'a and other Islamic related topics are readily 
available in Arabie and English languages, and although McGiII's aviation law 
12 See Sections 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2, below, for more on Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. 
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library has a wide range of sources on air carrier liability Conventions, there are 
only three texts that consider Warsaw together with Islamic Sharfa. These are: 
1. An Article written by Kairas N. Kabraji entitled "Damages and forum and 
jurisdiction considerations - multiple jurisdictions, forum shopping and 
widely diverse damages awards complicate the speedy resolution of 
aviation claims - in an Islamic jurisdiction." 13 
2. Air Carrier's Unlimited Liability Under the Warsaw System, an unpublished 
thesis submitted in 1990 by Asmatullah Khan to the Faculty of Graduate 
Studies and Research at McGili University. 
3. Tahdïd Mas'ûliat AI-Naqil AI-Gawi Fi Oaw' Ittifaqiyât Warsaw 1929 Wa AI-
Protocolat AI- Mo'adila Laha, 14 an unpublished Master's degree thesis 
written in Arabic and submitted by Mamdouh AI-Hodhaili15 to The Faculty 
of Economics and Administration, Law Department at King Abdul-Aziz 
University in 1996. 
Despite the valuable information contained in each of these texts, such a small 
inventory of references posed a challenge for the author. In particular, this thesis 
addresses subjects that are not really addressed by any of these texts. For 
example, none of these texts addresses the two-tier regime adopted by the 
Montreal Convention. None of the texts addresses the Rome Convention. 
Although such gaps created an extra burden on the author, they have allowed 
this thesis to explore uncharted territory. 
13 (1984) IX:4 Air Law Journal 216. 
14 The title of the Thesis is translated to "Limitation of Air Carrier's Liability under the Warsaw 
Convention 1929 and its Amending Protocols". 
15 Mamdouh AI-Hodhaili is an IASL graduate. 
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As regards translation, knowing the importance and delicacy of the subject 
matter of the thesis, the author is very keen to present his work to an English-
language audience while preserving Arabic terms in their original meaning and 
with an understanding of their original context. After long consideration, the 
author decided to use Arabic terms throughout the thesis and avoid translation as 
much as possible. While appreciating and understanding the difficulties resulting 
from adopting this approach especially for those who are not familiar with the 
Arabic language and Islamic terminology, the author suggests that this approach 
results in a more accurate and precise presentation. Indeed, Part 1 of the thesis 
is in large part designed to define and contextualize the terminology deployed in 
Part 2. 
As regards Islamic methodology, the subject matter of the thesis made it almost 
impossible to proceed without reference to the significant diversity amongst 
Islamic schools of fiqh. However, the author tried to avoid adopting what would 
be called in the context of Islamic studies comparative jurisprudence (fiqh 
muqâran). A detailed comparative approach would have taken the thesis away 
from its central focus on the air carrier liability Conventions and would have made 
it unnecessarily lengthy. Bearing in mind that this is a legal text rather th an a text 
in Islamic studies, the author has attempted to maintain in the background a 
comparative understanding of the doctrinal approach to the provisions of the 
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Qur'ân and Sunnah without taking the reader too deeply into diverse analyses of 
Islamic- fiqh. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the thesis does not intend to magnify the 
differences between Islamic-fiqh and the western schools of law, nor does it try to 
make a compromise between them. Rather, it offers the perspectives of the two 
schools on an 'as is' basis. This is grounded on the belief that Islamic-fiqh and 
Western Schools of law have two distinct personalities despite the numerous 
similarities between them. Following such a methodology in the exploration of 
such new fields as e-ticketing offers the prospect of fruitful future studies. It can 
also contribute to de-mystifying the encounter of Islamic-fiqh and western law -
something that is sadly needed in today's world. 
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PART 1: PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW RELEVANT TO 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON AIR CARRIER LlABILITY 
23 
Chapter 1: An Introduction ta Sharra and Islamic Law 
1.1 Introduction 
ln the West, the term 'Sharfa' often connotes a rigid code of law and is frequently 
used interchangeably with the term 'Islamic Law'. This has praduced a bleak 
image of Sharfa, with the rules pertaining thereto viewed as inflexible and given 
rise to a foreign body of law incompatible with a modern legal architecture. Such 
perceived detachment fram contemporary international legal systems gave ri se 
to a metaphorical barrier preventing Sharfa and international laws fram 
interacting with each other. 
This thesis focuses on the interplay of Sharfa and the laws pertaining thereto 
with the international norms of law and seeks to clarify the relationship between 
Sharfa and air carrier liability Conventions. This introduction, therefore, has three 
objectives: 
First: it will define sorne basic concepts central to the thesis as a whole, focusing 
specifically on the relationship between the terms Sharfa, Fiqh, Usûl Fiqh and 
Islamic Law. 
Second: it will sketch the historical foundation of Islamic Law so as to pravide a 
basic account of the interplay of sources and traditions that characterize law in 
the contemporary Islamic world. 
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Third: it will show how Islamic law and internationallaw interact with each other 
through international conventions. This will prepare the ground for the remainder 
of the thesis, which will turn to the specifie case of air carriers' contractual and 
extra-contractual liability for damage caused to persons on the ground or on 
board as a result of international air transport and the role that Sharfa and the 
laws pertaining thereto can play in its interpretation and implementation of 
international norms. 
The central concept of this introduction is that although the conceptions of 
Islamic Law and Sharfa are linked to each other like a body to the soul, they are, 
nevertheless, distinct, unlike how they are frequently perceived in the West. 
This Chapter begins with a discussion of the impact of translation on current 
common misconceptions of the terms Sharfa and Islamic Law. An understanding 
of the impact of translation is necessary to comprehend the rest of this Part. 
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1.2 The Impact of Translation 
Paradigms are the way we visualize or conceptualize things. We interpret terms 
and incidents on the grounds of the paradigm we have built throughout our life 
experiences. This notion has even entered popular literature. For example. 
Stephen R. Covey asserts in The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, "It is 
not what happens to us that affects our behaviour, it is the way we interpret it". 
An incident may be interpreted differently according to the paradigms deployed 
by the person. Similarly, we interpret terms differently due to our diverse 
paradigms. 
The paradigms through which the West and Muslims generally perceive each 
other is affected by their different cultures, the problem of inaccurate or literai 
translation, the complex historical backdrop and the conflicting shared desire to 
lead the world. Sadly, perhaps, the relationship between Christianity and Islam 
can be analogized to a sports game between two highly competitive teams in 
which the triumph and celebrations of one team means that the match was a 
disaster for the other.16 
16 See generally K. Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (New York: HarperCollins, 1992) 
at 22-44; R.W. Southern, Western views of Islam ln the Middle Ages, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962) at 21. See also E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978); R. Fletcher, The 
Cross and the Crescent: Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 2004). 
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Translation plays a major role in exposing cultures to each other. When it cornes 
to translation from one semantically wealthy language like Arabie or French to 
another semantically wealthy language like English, literai translation risks 
influencing mutual understanding. 
It is beyond doubt that the roots of the contemporary image of Islam and Muslims 
in the West is linked to the effects of translation. Many terms in a language 
convey a hue of inspiration that the corresponding translation cannot transmit. 
Rather, a translation may infer a meaning that is never intended in the original 
text. This hue of inspiration may be termed metaphor.17 
A metaphor, like Adam Smith's "invisible hand", may sometimes create a 
translation problem, since literai rendering hardly captures the functional 
significance of the original text. 18 Translation can get close to the image of a 
specifie term. In the Warsaw Convention, for instance, the French term 
"établissement" of Article 28 is translated as "place of business" although the two 
terms do not precisely correspond, since the French connotes the business itself 
as weil as the main meaning - its location. 
17 For a detailed account of the role of metaphor in law, see M. Prémont, Tropismes du droit: logique 
métaphorique et logique métonymique du langage juridique (Montréal: Liber, 2003). 
18 S.S. Ali, "Euphemism In Translation: A Comprehensive Study of Euphernistic Expressions in Two 
Translations of The Holy Qur'iin" (1999) XLIII:2 The Islarnic Quarterly 100 at 100. 
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The usual translation of the Arabie term Sharf'a as Islamic Law19 inspires and 
emphasizes the link between religion and law, a concept that is interpreted 
differently in the West.20 ln the West, the relationship between religion and law is 
of an "either or" nature. As Winnifred Fallers Sullivan very accurately describes 
it: 21 
[a]t the same time, however, while acknowledging the tremendous 
influence [religion and law have] had in shaping the other in [the United 
States] and in the Western tradition generally, the two are caught in 
opposition. It is an opposition that might be traced in the Western 
conversation from Paul's preoccupation with the opposition of faith and 
law ... 
ln this context, no doubt a term like Islamic Law would carry a negative 
connotation.22 
On the other hand, Muslims' faith is that God is the only true lawgiver and 
consequently the rejection of the link between Law and Religion is inherently 
inapplicable. 
It is essential to consider diverse socio-ethical contexts when translating from 
one language to another, especially exposure to other civilizations is 
19 See generally, J. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trans. A. Hamori & R. Hamori 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); W.M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1985). 
20 See Sections 1.3 & 1.6, below, for more on this topic. 
21 W.F. Sullivan, HA New Discourse and Practice" in S. M. Feldman, ed., Law & Religion: A Critical 
Anthology (New York and London: New York University Press, 2000) 35 at 45. 
22 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1971); County of AUegheny v. American Civil 
Libenies Union 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Employment Division; 
Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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concerned. 23 Transliteration often offers a rich solution to the problems 
associated with literai translation. For example, in the early days of the Islamic 
Righteous Caliphate, Muslims adopted Persian terms with an Arabie accent. 
From there, words like Diwan and Eiwan entered the Arabie dictionary. Of 
course, this has also occurred in the West. For example, the Arabie name Ibn 
Rushd was taken up in European languages as Averroes and the name Ibn 
Siena became Avicenna. Nevertheless, some words are transliterated after being 
translated, and in such cases transliteration may cause an even more 
complicated problem than translation. A good example is again the term Sharfa 
which is labelled as Islamic Law. The generalized labelling of Sharfa as Islamic 
Law has led to a sense of confusion in the literature with respect to the actual 
meaning of the two terms. The following excerpts attest to this: 
The Sharia'h, as Islamic law is called in Arabie, is the complex of divinely 
revealed ru les which the faithful Muslim must observe if he seeks to perform 
the duties of religion. The crucial difference between Islamic and Western 
law is immediately apparent from this description. The unique ground of 
validity of Islamic Law is that it is the manifested will of the Almighty: it does 
not depend on the authority of any earthly lawgiver. The consequences of 
these differences are manifold. One of these consequences is that Islamic 
Law is in principle immutable.24 
... [A] new compromise must be found between the basic and categorical 
demands of the Islamic re§!ion and the need in a changing world for law 
which is capable of change 
23 M.1. Okpanachi "Islam And the English Language: Between Liguistic Imperative & Cultural 
Contradiction" (1999) XLIII:2 The Islamic Quarterly 114 at 117. 
24 K. Zweigert & H. Kotz, Introduction ta Comparative Law, trans. T. Weir, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) at 373. 
25 Ibid. at 382. 
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The point was eventually accepted by the whole community in the form of 
the doctrine that ail social and political lite must be based on the Shari'a or 
revealed divine law.26 
[H]e memorized the Qur'ân and he studied the Shari'a or revealed law.27 
ln addition to the examples above, in his book Introduction to Islamic Theology 
and Law, Iganz Goldziher mixes the terms Law and Shari'a in a manner that 
leaves no room for uncertainty that both are the same despite the fact that he 
sometimes refers to Shan .... a as the "Religious Law". 
ln contrast to such labelling, Arabic Islamic legal literature usually conducts 
comparisons between the terms Shari'a and Law considering the latter as 
departure from the path of God to the effect of calling it AI-Quanûn AI-Wad7 or 
the human made law.28 
After the decolonization era, in the second hait of the 20th century, sorne Muslims 
denounced the application of Shari'a in courts and considered it a backward 
practice. They opined that the application of Shari'a is the main reason for Arab 
States not keeping pace with the advancement in the West, where progress is 
linked to its secular methodology. Such trends caused these Muslims to be 
26 See Watt, Supra note 19 at 12. 
2? See ibid at 73. 
28 See generally A Owdah, AI-Tashri' AI-Gina'e Al-Islam; Muqiiranan Bel-Quanün AI-wa4'e, 8th ed. 
(Beirut: AI-Risalah, 1986) at 4 - 76; M. Al- Aqeel, Al-lfaq AI-Tabi' e Wa Quawanfnuh (Ibn Hazm, 1996) at 
37; AS. AI-Humaid, AI-Tashrf' AI-Gina'e Al-Islam;: BaIJth Fi AI-Tashrf' AI-Gina'e AL-Islami AI-
Muqiiran Bel-Quawanfn AI-Wa4'eyah, 4th ed. (1:waiq, 1993); S. Yal1ya & M. Omar & N. Sa'ad, Mabiide' 
AI-Quanün: Al-madkhal /lii AI-Quanün Wa Nazariyat AI-/ltizam, 2nd ed. (Okaz, 1990) at 19; See contra A 
Al-Sanhori, Masader AI-lJaq Fi Al-Fiqh AI-Islami (Beirut: Dar Il1yaa' Alturath AL-Arabi, 1997). 
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labelled as seculars, Westernizers or even as non-believers. 29 Indeed, some 
Islamic governments, in order to keep up with the perceived advancement of the 
West, have adopted secular legislation that may sometimes not be in accordance 
with the main provisions and basic principles of Sharfa. 
Thus, a battle of terminology is inevitable without an understanding between the 
two sides. The diverse paradigms need to meet on neutral ground, so to speak. 
Hence, the author suggests that it is crucial to understand the terms employed in 
this thesis as they are defined below, in order to convey the arguments of the 
thesis with some precision. 
The main terms to reflect upon are Sharfa, Maqâsid AI-Sharfa, Fiqh, Usûl AI-
Fiqh, Law and Islamic Law. The following explanations will attempt to carry the 
transliterated word to the reader with its hue, avoiding any direct translation. To 
understand the metaphor of these terms, an elaboration on what the author calls 
Basic Philosophy is needed. 
1.3Shari'a 
ln the archaic Arabic language, the term Sharfa means a "water ho le" (where 
animais gather to drink) or, alternately "the straight path". In Islamic context, 
however, there is a very wide range of definitions. One possible definition, which 
29 See generally M.Qutub, Waqe 'ana Al-Mo 'a~er, 3rd ed. (Almadinnah, 1990) at 324 -351. 
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the author does not endorse, is that the term Sharfa refers to the sum total of 
divine laws, which were revealed to the Prophet Mohammad PBUH, which are 
recorded in the Qur'ân, and are derived from the prophet's divinely guided 
lifestyle (ealled the Sunna).30 Another definition that the author does not endorse 
refers to Sharfa as the totality of divine categorizations of human acts?1 These 
two foregoing definitions mix together Sharfa, Fiqh and Law. 
A better definition refers to Sharfa as the creed, actions of worship, behaviour, 
transactions and socialization systems in its various aspects that God had 
prescribed to his servants for the sake of their welfare and happiness in the 
earthly life and the heavenly life.32 This definition keeps a distinction between the 
three overlapping terms Sharfa, Fiqh and Islamie Law. It, moreover, clarifies that 
Sharfa is not a Code of Law but, rather, a manifestation of generic forms to 
attain welfare and happiness in our earthly and heavenly lives. This definition 
also denotes three different aspects of human lives that Sharfa covers; namely 
creed, acts of worship and acts of transaction. 
The term Sharfa and its derivatives; Shara'a and Sher'atan are mentioned in the 
Qur'ân once each in three different verses: 
30 B. Philips, The Evolution of Fiqh: (Isalmie Law & The Madhabs), 3rd ed. (International Islarnic 
Publishing House, 1999) at 1. 
31 B. G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamie Law (Athens, Georgia 1998) at 17. 
32 M.K. Al-Qattan, Tareekh AI-Tashri' AI-Islami, 2nd ed. (Maktabat Al-ma'aref Lelnashr Waltawzi', 1996) 
at 3. 
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· .. we have ordained a law and assigned a path (Sher'atan) for each of 33 you ... 
He has ordained (Shara'a) for you the faith which He ordained on Noah, 
and which We have revealed to you; which We enjoined on Abraham, 
Moses and Jesus saying: 'Observe the Faith and do not divide yourselves 
into factions.34 
And now we have set you on the ri~ht path (Sharfa). Follow it, and do not 
yield to the desires of ignorant men3 
Such references to Sharfa as the right path betokens its importance for Muslims, 
as the right path of life. It also implies its comprehensiveness as a system of life. 
This right path is the path Muslims recite seventeen times a day in their daily 
prayers calling upon God "guide us to the straight path".36 Besides, Muslims 
believe that the reference to Sharfa as "water hole" entails its ability to satisfy 
various human needs across beliefs and time. To evaluate the 
comprehensiveness of Sharfa, it is not wrong to say that Islam means 
submission to God, and Sharfa is the divine delineation of the life of 
submission.37 
Sharfa combines three interacting aspects of human life, the creed '''Aqïdah'', 
acts of worship ""Ibâdât (pl.) 'Ibâdah (sing.)" and transactions "Mu'âmalât (pl.) 
33 The Holy Qur'an 5:48. 
34 The Holy Qur'an 42:13. 
35 The Holy Qur'an 45:18. 
36 The Holy Qur 'an 1 :6. 
37B. G. Weiss supra note 31 at 18. 
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Mu'âmalah" (sing.).38 The broad scope of Sharfa makes it impossible to compare 
with the term Law as used and understood in much contemporary legal 
terminology. If law is thought of as the body of binding rules for a community, 
Sharfa includes law and much else besides law, and it is misleading to equate 
Sharfa and law.39 
Whilst 'Ibâdât and Mu'âmalât are the subject matter of Fiqh and Usûl Fiqh as is 
discussed below, the branch of knowledge that addresses 'Aqïdah is called 
Tawhïd, or "science of monotheism". It studies the aspects of Muslims' beliefs in 
God. Its main the me is to stop Muslims from attributing to God what does not 
belong to Him and from worshiping gods or goddesses, along with or other than 
God Himself. Tawhïd is based on the literai interpretation of the stipulations of 
Qur'ân and Sunna. Its main objective is to purify the understanding of the Islamic 
belief that there is no god but God. While Tawhïd tries to identify God on the 
grounds of the Qur'ân and Sunna (Naq~, Islamic philosophy and Kalâm40 tries to 
do the same through mental exercise ('Aq~. Philosophy and Kalâm are to a 
great extent responsible for dividing Muslims into sects like Mu'tziliet and 
Asha 'eriet. 41 
38 See generally I.M. AI-Shatibi, Al-Muwiifaqiit Fi U~ul Al- Shari'a, vol. 4 (Beirut: AI-Maktaba AI-
'A~riyah, 2002). Arabic terms are hereafter sometimes transliterated in singular (sing.) and plural (pl.) 
forms since these forms are often quite dissimilar. 
39B. G. Weiss, supra note 31 at 17. 
40 Lexically Kaliim means "talk" but '/lm Al-kaliim or the science of kaliim means that part of Islarnic 
knowledge which deals with the philosophical aspects ofIslarnic theology. 
41 See 1, Goldziher, supra note 19 at 85 and 167 - 229. 
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As regards 'Aqïdah (creed), the foundational text of Sharfa is detailed, specifie 
and complete and does not accept any additions or alterations. A major part of 
the immense literature relating to Aqïdah, however, is concerned with arguments 
between the 'Aql and Naql schools concerning heart purification and 
philosophizing on the ramifications of the Sharfa's stipulations in this regard. 
The author suggests that one of the main causes of the confusion between 
Sharfa and Law is that Muhammad (PBUH), besides being the Prophet, was the 
political leader and ruler of his day. This meant that he had to legislate, and 
although the rules were unwritten, they were to be followed by his people. 
Bearing in mind that Sharfa is understood to be the totality of the foundational 
stipulations of the Qur'ân and the Prophet, Sharfa and Law were in tandem as 
one concept throughout the Prophet's life. 
After the death of the Prophet, Sharfa and Law had to detach. The Caliph had to 
legislate for people according to the intentions of Sharfa or Maqâsid AI-Sharfa, a 
subject addressed by the following section. 
1.4 Maqâsid AI-Sharï'a 
The term Maqâsid (pl.) Maqsûd (sing.) means "intention behind an act or word". 
ln Islamic context, although Maqâsid AI-Sharfa is the subject matter of an 
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elaborate literature,42 Islamic jurists including AI-Shatibi did not paya great deal 
of attention to its definition. Nevertheless, it may be best defined as the reasons 
or rationale for which the foundational text of Shari'a was revealed.43 
The study of Maqâsid AI-Shan-ta relates directly to the question of whether the 
foundational text of Shari'a (Le. Qur'ân and Sunna) has a rationale behind it or, 
rather, whether it is a series of dos and don'ts beyond human reasoning to which 
obedience is due as an act of pure religious worship and submission to God. 
The majority of the Qur'ânic verses and Sunna provisions that lay down a generic 
rule or a specific law onto humans identify a rationale behind the rules. For 
example, with regard to 'Ibâdât (acts of worship), after prescribing prayer, the 
Qur'ân states that the rationale behind prayer is that "[p]rayer fends off lewdness 
and evil,,,44 and after prescribing fasting (Sawm) for the month of Ramadan, the 
Qur'ân states that, "perchance you will guide yourselves against evil". 
Another example is the general principle that "God does not wish to burden 
you,,45 and the correlating prescriptions that "God wishes to lighten your burdens 
42 See generally I.M. AI-Shatibi, supra note 38; M.I. AI-Boukhary, Al-Adah Al-Mufrad (Beirut: Dar AI-
Basha'er AI-Islamiyyah, 1409/1989); M.M. AI-Ghazali, AI-Mu~!asfa Fi 'Ilm AI-Usûl, 2vols. (Cairo: AI-
Maktaba AI-Amiriyya, 1324/1906); A.A. AI-Juwaini, AI-Burhan fi U~ul Al-Fiqh (Cairo: Dar AI-Anssar, 
1400/1980). 
43 A. AI-Raysooni, Nazariyat Al-maqiisid Ind Al-Imam Al-Shatibi (AI-Dar AI-Alarneyah Lelketab AI-
Islami, 1992) at 7. 
44The Holy Qur'iin, 29:45. 
45 The Holy Qur 'iin,5:6. 
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for human was created weak,,46 and "God does not charge a soul with more than 
it can bear.,,47 To these is jointed joined as an explanation of the Prophet (PBUH) 
"when 1 ordain upon you an action, you should adhere to it only within the limits 
of your personal ability." The message is that at both the subjective and objective 
levels, laws should not burden people with what they can not bear like, for 
example, heavy taxes. 
Another important example in the field of Mu'âmalât is verse 2:282, the longest 
verse of the Qur'ân, which reads: 
o you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it 
down. Let a scribe write it down in justice between you. Let not the scribe 
refuse to write as Allâh has taught him, so let him write. Let him (the debtor) 
who incurs the liability dictate, and he must fear Allâh, his Lord, and 
diminish not anything of what he owes. But if the debtor is of poor 
understanding, or weak, or is unable to dictate for himself, then let his 
guardian dictate in justice. And get two witnesses out of your own men. And 
if there are not two men (available), then a man and two women, such as 
you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them (two women) errs, the other 
can remind her. And the witnesses should not refuse when they are called 
(for evidence). Vou should not become weary to write it (your contract), 
whether it be sm ail or big, for its fixed term, that is more just with Allâh; 
more solid as evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among 
yourselves, save when it is a present trade which you carry out on the spot 
among yourselves, then there is no sin on you if you do not write it down. 
But take witnesses whenever you make a commercial contract. Let neither 
scribe nor witness suffer any harm, but if you do (such harm), it would be 
wickedness in you. So be afraid of Allâh; and Allâh teaches you. And Allâh 
is the AII-Knower of each and everything.48 
46 The Holy Qur'an,4:28. 
47 The Holy Qur 'an,2:286. 
48 The Holy Qur'an, 2:282. 
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This verse encourages people to put their agreements in writing and makes an 
exception for commercial transactions due to their nature. 49 It is important, 
however, to notice that although the verse touches on the means of writing and 
witnessing, it nevertheless emphasizes that they are not prescribed as the only 
means of evidence but rather as examples, which could be replaced by any other 
means that have similar or higher evidentiary values.50 
The rationale behind this verse is the attainment of the three values of "It is juster 
in the sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent 
doubts among yourselves. " 
As such, Sharfa has a rationale, will and intention behind its provisions (Maqâsid 
AI-Sharfa). In his valu able book AI-Mowâfaqât, The Andalusian jurist Abu Ishaq 
AI-Shatibï, concludes that Sharfa is ordained by God to attain the welfare 
(Masâleh (pl.) Maslaha (sing.)) of people. The attainment of this welfare is 
achieved through the prohibition of that which is harmful and the promotion of 
that which is beneficial to people in this world and in the hereafter.51 This welfare 
is of three categories, namely Darûrât (pl.) Darûrah (sing.) viz. indispensable or 
vital, Hâgiyât (pl.) Hâgf (sing.) viz. necessary and Tahsiniyât (pl.) Tahsinf (sing.) 
viz. (complementary or favouring improvement). 
49 When the verse is read with the one that directly follows it, the conclusion is that it is encouraging rather 
than obliging. 
50 This is deduced from the part of the verse that stipulates "it is juster in the sight of Allah, more suitable as 
evidence, and more convenient to prevent doubts among yourselves". 
51 See W.B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni U~ul al-fiqh 
(Cambridge, 1999) at 89. 
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Belonging to Darûrât are, respectively, the protection of one's religion (Hifz AI-
din), protection of life (Hifz al-nafs), protection of private property (Hifz AI-Mâ~, 
protection of mind (Hifz AI-tAq~ and protection of offspring (Hifz al-Nas~. Most of 
the stipulations of the foundational text in relation to these five central points of 
human life are detailed and specific. To protect lives, for example, murder is 
sanctioned by the most severe penalty: execution. Likewise, to protect the mind, 
intoxication by wine or other substances is prohibited. Furthermore, as the need 
to protect one's lite is more vital than the need to protect one's mind, if 
consumption of wine is the only means to protect the life of a person, this would 
be permitted within the limits of achieving the aim of protecting life. 
Hâgiyat are the substances or means needed to render Darûrât possible. Hâgiyât 
are needed to ease humans' life, keep it in order and lighten their burdens and 
difficulties.52 We can differentiate between Darûrât and Hâgiyat by determining 
whether the existence of a substance, rule, or norm would or would not be linked 
directly to the five central points belonging to Darûrât. An example of Hâgiyat is 
that lease of accommodation must be possible, since a prohibition of this would 
force people to buy, which may not be affordable to everybody. Thus, the 
permission of the lease is necessary to ease the life and lighten burden. 
52 See A.M. AI-Garny, Al-Mukhtasar Al-wagi'z fi Maqiïsid Al-tashrf' (Jeddah: AI-Andalus AI-khddraa', 
1999) at 35. 
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Tahsinât are what would enhance and improve human lives. For example, 
ticketing may be considered necessary (hâgiyat) for travel but electronic ticketing 
may be considered an enhancement (tahsiniyat). 
It may thus be suggested that Shari'a has a horizontal and vertical set of 
categories. Horizontally it is categorized according to 'Aqïdah, 'Ibâdât and 
Mu'âmalât, which characterize the nature of the norms, and vertically it is 
categorized according to Darûriyat, Hâgiyat and Tahsiniyat, which characterize 
the intention behind the noms. 
It is the author's opinion that Maqâsid AI-Shari'a is very much the spirit of the 
foundational text which inspires the learned Jurists' intellectual efforts to deduce 
or found rulings upon which the foundational text is silent or not explicit. Such 
intellectual efforts are called Igtihad which is the essence of the evolution of 
Islamic-fiqh. 
1.4.1 Igtihad and Ikhtilaf 
Semantically, Igtihad means 'utmost-effort'. 53 Within Islam, Igtihad is the 
intellectual activity or the reasoning of the legal scholars, whose teachings are 
endowed with religious (or quasi-religious) authority. 54 
53R. w. Maqsood, A Basic dictionary of/siam (Goodword Books, 1999) at 103. 
54 W. B. HalIaq, supra note 51 at 15. 
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Igtihad falls into two categories. First it is the application of Igtihad to an 
ambiguous, absolute or general provision of the foundational text. Second is the 
application of Igtihad to elaborate a rule in matters about which the foundational 
text is silent.55 There is no room for Igtihad, on the other hand, when it cornes to 
a definite and explicit ruling of a foundational text. For example, there is no room 
for Igtihad to the rule that prayer is obligatory. 
Whereas Igtihad is based on the intellectual capabilities of the scholars, it is 
possible that the opinion of scholars may vary. It is even possible that a scholar 
may adopt an opinion in a case, which may vary or be repudiated subsequently. 
Imam Shafi'i, for example, produced two Mad'hab or schools of Islamic-fiqh of 
which one was adopted while being in Iraq and the other was adopted when he 
moved to Egypt. 
Although Igtihad is the core of the evolution of Islamic-fiqh, it nevertheless has 
had a period of suspension when sorne scholars thought that the gate of Igtihad 
was closed. This period of suspension aftected the evolution of Islamic-fiqh in a 
manner that resulted in its contemporary image in the West, which this thesis 
tries in part to reverse. 
SS See A. Khallaf, Ma$iider Al-tashr;' Al-Islam; Fi Ma La Na$ Fm, 5th ed. (Dar Al-qalam, 1402-1982) at 7 
- 8. 
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For example, according to Prof. A. M. Serajuddin:56 
The principle of Igtihad had a great role in shaping and determining Islamic 
Jurisprudence in its formative phase. Any expert jurist was then free to go to 
the roots of Shari'a and interpret them himself. With the crystallization of 
legal thought and setting up of the schools of law the scope of igtihad was 
gradually curtained by the beginning of the 10th century there was a 
consensus among the jurists that the principles of law as settled by 
recognized schools were sacrosanct and immutable and that there was no 
longer any necessity for new legal principles to be deduced. This closure of 
the gate of Igtihad had sad results. On account of this, Islamic law and 
society largely sterile and stagnant for the next one thousand years and the 
great age of science and technology which revolutionized men's thinking 
and action quietly passed the Muslim societies different parts of the world 
by. 
On the contrary, the author suggests that the door of Igtihad was open to jurists 
at the order of God. Besides, Sunna attempts to open wide the door of Igtihad, as 
is made clear in the famous Hadith (the reported sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet (PBUH» of Mu'âdh Ibn Jabal, the companion of the Prophet, who was 
sent by the Prophet (PBUH) as an ambassador to Yemen. In this Hadith, Mu'âdh 
got the approval and commendation of the Prophet (PBUH) when he decided to 
conduct his personal Igtihad "Agtahidu ra'yr' if he faced a situation about which 
the Qur'ân and the Sunna are silent. In addition, it is reported that the Prophet 
(PBUH) ordained "If a Mugtahid is right he receives two rewards, and if he is 
mistaken he receives one reward". 
Nevertheless, a Mugtahid (a jurist who conducts Igtihad) has to comply with 
certain conditions and qualifications to conduct Igtihad. A Mugtahid has to have a 
56 A. M. Serajuddin, Shari' ii Law and Society: Tradition and Change in south Asia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
42 
comprehensive knowledge about the textual sources (foundational text of 
Sharfa) pertaining to the matter in question. Furthermore, a Mugtahid should be 
acquainted with the Arabic language in a manner that enables him or her to 
understand the reflections of the textual sources according to which Igtihad 
should be conducted. 
It is worth noting that the admission of Igtihad gives rise to the possibility of 
Ikhtilaf (disagreement among the scholars). Ikhtilaf is a natural offspring of giving 
the lead to human reasoning in interpreting the foundational text or elaborating 
ru les about which the foundational text is silent. 
Imam ShafiT in his valuable book AI-Risala replied to the question of the 
permissibility of Ikhtilaf among the Islamic jurists as follows: 
On ail matters concerning which GOD provided clear textual evidence in His 
Book or a Sunna uttered by the Prophet's Tongue, disagreement among 
those to whom these texts are known is unlawful. As to matters that are 
liable to different interpretations or derived from analogy, so that he who 
interprets or applies analogy arrives at a decision different from that arrived 
at by another, 1 do not hold that disagreement of this kind constitutes such 
strictness as that arising from textual evidence57 
Permissible Ikhtilaf is the outcome of the variation in the methodology of 
deduction and Usûl AI-Fiqh followed by the various Mugtahid in addition to the 
natural and cultural variation in their intellectual capabilities. Disagreement may 
57 Imam Al-shafi'i, Al- Risala, Trans. Khadduri, M., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961) at 334. 
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also result from the divergence among jurists in the ranking and prevalence of 
the sources of jurisprudence other than the Qur'ân and Sunna. 58 
This kind of Ikhtilaf is a source of great richness in Islam and reflects the capacity 
of Islamic SharTa to accommodate ail nations, races, cultures and advancements 
of human beings. SharTa is not only a manifestation of orders and laws 
prescribing actions to abide by or to refrain from. Rather SharTa provides us with 
a framework of intentions and goals and gives scholars ail the tools needed and 
the freedom necessary in order to draw their own portrait of laws that reflect 
those intentions and goals. 
1.5 Fiqh and Usûl Fiqh 
As noted previously, SharTa intervenes in Muslims' lives in three aspects namely 
'Aqïdah, 'Ibadât and Mu'âmalât. It will be recalled that Tawhïd is the part of the 
knowledge that deals with 'Aqïdah or creed. 
As an offspring of the belief in submission to God, Muslims would want to make 
sure that the other two aspects of their life, 'Ibadât and Mu'âmalât also are in li ne 
with God's wishes. Fiqh and Usûl Fiqh are responsible for this conformity and 
purification. 
58 See generally A. Mohamed, "Principles of Islarnic Jurisprudence According 10 Imam Muhammad Idris 
Al-Shafi'i" (1999) XLIII:4 The Islamic Q. al 279-287. 
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Fiqh literally means "the true understanding of what is intended" Usûl Fiqh 
means the roots of this understanding. In their totality, Fiqh and Usûl Fiqh 
compile the Islamic Jurisprudence. In Islamic terms Usûl Fiqh refers to the part of 
jurisprudence that is concerned with deducing Islamic rules from their sources.59 
Fiqh is the body of rules thereby deduced as weil as the part of Jurisprudence 
that is concerned with the articulation of actual rules as deduced by the jurists.60 
Ali humans' acts whether they come within 'Ibadât or Mu'âmalât are labelled 
under one of five categories, namely Wagib (obligatory), Mandûb 
(recommended), Mubâh (permissible), Makrûh (repugnant) and Harâm 
(prohibited). The role of Islamic jurists or Fuqahâ' (pl.) Faqïh (sing.) is to ascribe 
human acts to one of these categories in order to ensure its classification 
according to Sharfa. This role played by the Faqïh is called Fatwa. Fatwa is not 
so much a law as it is an interpretation. Fatwa iS,best understood as a personal 
opinion of a jurist or group of jurists with which a person may comply. Jurists 
build their opinions on the grounds of the Our'ân and Sunna in addition to other 
sources namely Igmâ' (consensus), Oiyâs (reasoning by analogy) and some 
other means such as Masâleh Mursalah, Istihsân, and Shar o-Man-Oablanâ 
which are the subject matter of Usûl AI-Fiqh discussed in the next subsection 
59 Y. AI-Qaraqawi, Madkhal Lederasat Al-Shar'i'a Al-Islamiyah, 2nd ed. (Mo'assasat AI-Resalah, 1997) at 
10. 
6OB. G. Weiss, supra note 31 at x. 
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We may observe that Fiqh was never intended to look the way it does today. 
When the first few generations of jurists appeared, they were responding to the 
questions of their contemporaries and studying their deeds and actions for the 
purpose of ensuring conformity with what God has ordained. As such, the 
methodology through which Fiqh was established and flourished was to describe 
and respond to factual circumstances rather than to apply any general theory. 
The first few manuscripts of Islamic-fiqh attest to this. Imam Shafi'i wrote his 
wonderful manuscript AI-Risâlah as a reply message to the caliph. Similarly, 
Muhammad b. Alhasan AI-Shaiybâni wrote his AI-Kharâg as a reply to questions 
raised by the caliph Harûn AI-rashid. The manuscripts of Fuqahâ' until the third 
generation, such as Imam Malik, Ibn Gurayg, Awzâ'ï, Sufyân AI-thawri and 
Hammâd ibn Salamah concentrated on manifestation and verification of Hadith 
rather th an Fiqh. 61 Even AI-Muwata', the famous book of Imam Malik which 
reflects sorne of his fatwa is considered as a book of Hadith rather th an a book of 
Fiqh, since it is essentially an interpretation of certain sayings of the Prophet 
(PBUH) .. 62 
Although this illustration shows that Fiqh and Shari'a are not the same, it is wise 
nevertheless to emphasize that Shari'a and Fiqh are not completely separate or 
independent of each other in the sense that Fiqh is itself an offspring of Shari'a. 
61 See M. K. AI-Qattan, supra note 32 at 287. 
62 Ibid. 
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As an example of the interaction between SharTa and Fiqh, the Our'ân refers to 
Muslims in one verse, as " ... those who conduct their affairs by mutual 
consultation ... ,,63, and in another verse an order is given to the Prophet, the 
superior example for ail Muslim rulers, to " ... consult them in the affairs ... ,,64 Thus, 
as a rule of SharTa, Muslim rulers or governments should seek consultation 
before arriving at decisions. Nevertheless, the methods and procedures of 
consultation are to be devised by the means of Fiqh in a manner that accords 
with the intention of the Our'ânic verses (Maqâsid AI-SharTa). Consultation may 
therefore take place in a parliament, congress, Maglis AI-shûrâ (board of 
consultation) or through any means that accords with both the intention of SharTa 
and the advancement of humanity. 
The basic principles of Usûl Fiqh were founded by Imam Shafi'i.65 It flourished as 
a science later however, when the followers of a particular school of fiqh or 
madhab started studying the methodology followed by the founders of the 
madhab they follow. 
Usûl Fiqh is the main tool for Islamic jurists to conduct Igtihad, viz. the intellectual 
activity or the reasoning of the legal scholars, whose teachings are endowed with 
63 The Holy Qur'iin, 42:38. 
64 The Holy Qur'iin, 3:159. 
65 See M. K. AI-Qattan, supra note 32 at 369. 
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religious authority.66 It manifests the sources of Islamic-fiqh and the methodology 
through which they should be understood and evaluated. 
One point should be emphasized here before discussing the sources of Islamic-
fiqh in somewhat greater detail. Although Islamic-fiqh was established and 
flourished with very powerful links to theology, it has now developed as an 
independent legal methodology. It is thus available to be deployed in the 
braadest range of social contexts, including air carrier liability, which is the 
subject-matter of this thesis. 
1.5.1 The Sources of Islamic-Fiqh 
The sources of Islamic-fiqh are of two categories; divine and human.67 The first 
and most important is the revealed divine sources, namely Qur'ân and Sunna. 
The second is the other sources which include Igmâ', qiyâs (Reasoning by 
analogy), Istihsân (Juristic preference) and Istishâb (Presumption of continuity).68 
The second set of sources is not detached however, fram the revealed sources 
since they rely on them. Nevertheless they are based on the reasoning and 
understanding of the human intellect applied to the divine sources. The author, 
however, is of the opinion that the second category of sources might best be 
66 See w. B. Hallaq, supra note 51 at 15. 
67 For a rich discussion of the sources ofIslamic-fiqh, see Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World 
(Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2000) at 159-162. 
68 See M.H. Kamali, "Sources, Nature and Objectives of Sharee'aa" (1989) XXXIII:4 Islamic Law 
Quarterly 219 al 219. 
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understood as methodologies for deducing a ruling from the foundational text 
rather than true sources of Fiqh. 
1.5.1.1 The Holy Qur'ân 
The Qur'ân is the primary and most important source of Islamic-fiqh. It is 
considered by Muslims to be the divine words of GOD (ALLÂH) which were 
revealed by the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad (PBUH) and which have been 
conveyed to us by continuous testimony (Tawâtor) of worship to ALLÂH through 
the recital of its verses and the adherence to its rules.69 
It was revealed in verses and portions in response to the needs of the Islamic 
community or nation (Ummah) in the days of the Prophet. The first verses or 
Ayah (pl.) Ayat (sing.) revealed to the Prophet (PBUH) were 
"Read! ln the Name of your Lord Who has created (ail that exists). He has 
created man from a clot (a piece of thick coagulated blood). Read! And 
Your Lord is the Most Generous. Who has taught (the writing) by the pen. 
He has taught man that which he knew not.,,70 
The last verse of Qur'ân was revealed twenty-three years later. It states 
" ... [T]his day 1 have perfected your religion for you, completed my favour 
upon you and have chosen for you Islam as your religion ... ,,71 
69 See M. K. AI-Qattan, supra note 32 at 39· 
70 The Holy Qur'an, (96:1-5). 
71 The Holy Qur'an (5:3). 
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The Qur'ân, is composed of thirty Juzo' (parts), 114 Sûrah (Chapters) and 6,235 
Âyât (Verses). There are some 500 Âyât in connection with Legal matters. 72 
These Âyât are called Âyât AI-Ahkâm (Verses of rulings). The vast majority of 
other Âyât deal with moral and religious aspects of Sharfa in addition to 
devotional matters and remembrance of the hereafter. Therefore the Qur'ân 
refers to itself as Hudâ (the book of Guidance) and Dhikr (The book of 
remembrance) rather than as a code of law.73 ln this regard, it is noteworthy that 
the verses of the Qur'ân are a source of legislation and must not be read in 
isolation from each other. On the contrary, each and every verse of the Qur'ân 
should be read as an integral part of one whole. Many of the Qur'ânic stipulations 
are interpretations of each other and some other verses are interpreted by 
Sunna. 
1.5.1.2 The Sunna (Tradition of the Prophet) 
Sunna is what is reported and conveyed to us from the sayings, actions and 
approvals of the Prophet PBUH?4 The authority of Sunna as a source of Islamic-
fiqh is based on the Qur'ân which provides that: 
Say: obey Allah and obey the messenger, but if you turn away, he 
(Messenger Muhammad PBUH) is only responsible for the dut y placed on 
72 See M.H. Kamali, supra note 68 at 219. 
73 Ibid. al219. 
74 See Y. AI-Qaraqawi, supra note 59 at 44. 
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him (Le. to convey Allah's message) and you for that placed on you. If you 
obey him, you shall be in the right guidance. The Messenger's duty is only 
to convey the message in a clear way. 75 
" ... [A]nd whatsoever the messenger (Muhammad PBUH) gives you, take it; 
and whatsoever he forbids you, abstain from it...,,76 
Sunna interacts with the Qur'ân in various manners. It may reiterate and 
incorporate a ruling which originates in the Qur'ân. It may also explain or interpret 
Qur'ânic verses by clarifying the ambiguous, qualifying the absolute and 
specifying the general. Lastly, it may establish a rule in matters about which the 
Qur'ân is silent. 77 
The authenticity of Sunna is based on the way it is reported and conveyed to us. 
The most authentic is AI-Hadith AI-Mutawâter which is conveyed by continuous 
plural testimony back to the Prophet.78 With a lower degree of definitiveness and 
authenticity comes Hadith AI-Âahâd which is conveyed to us by continuous 
singular testimony. 
Sunna is collected and laid down in several voluminous manuscripts that include 
Sahih AI-Bokhârï and Sahih Muslim which are considered by Sunnï Muslims to 
be the most authentic and infallible books after the holy Qur'ân. They were 
compiled and collected following a very detailed and accu rate scientific 
75 The Holy Qu, 'an, (24:54). 
76 The Holy Qu, 'an, (95:7). 
77 See M.H. Kamali, supra nole 68 al 219-222. 
78 See Y. AI-Qara<fâwi, supra nole 59 al 46. 
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methodology in order to verify the authenticity of each Hadith contained therein. 
Such a collection and verification of Sunna had enormous ramifications in the 
schools of Fiqh which tended to rely on and refer to them before resorting to the 
other sources of Islamic-fiqh. 
The Qur'ân and Sunna, the foundational texts, are the two divine sources which 
are agreed upon unanimously among Islamic jurists. However if a ruling is not 
prescribed explicitly in either the Qur'ân or the Sunna, recourse is usually given 
to Igmâ' and to the other sources which in their totality combine the main tools for 
a jurist to conduct Igtihad. 
1.5.1.3 Igmâr 
Igmâ' is the third source of Islamic-fiqh to which we may turn when there is no 
explicit and definite command of GOD in the foundational text. Igmâ' literally 
means unanimity. In Islamic terminology, it is defined as "the general consensus 
among Islamic scholars of a particular age in relation to the legal rule correctly 
applicable to the situation.,,79 
The authority of Igmâ' is based upon the Qur'ân and Sunna. The former 
stipulates:80 
And whoever contradicts and opposes the Messenger (Muhammad 
PBUH) after the right path has been shown clearly to him, and follows 
79 See c.G. Weermantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Hampshire & London: 
MacMillan, 1988) at 39. 
80 The Holy Qur'ân, (3:115). 
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other than the believers' way, We shall keep him in the path he has 
chosen ... " 
Moreover, in the context of ordering Muslims to attach themselves to Jamâ'ah 
(the majority of the Islamic Community) the Prophet (PBUH) stated "Only those 
who seek the pleasure of paradise will follow the community, for the devil can 
pursue one person, but stands far away from two,,81 and in assurance of its 
freedom from error he said "My community will never unite in error." 
According to A. Khallaf, Igmâ' is linked, moreover, to the principle of Shûrâ 
(consultation) whereby the ruler is requested to consult others before concluding 
a resolution. According to this principle of Shûrâ, the Prophet (PBUH) used to 
consult his companions on major decisions. Abû Bakr and Omar, the first and the 
second caliphs of Islam used to follow the same method of consultation before 
reaching a conclusion with regard to matters which would affect the whole nation. 
Such a link between the principles of Igmâ' and Shûrâ, which the author fully 
endorses, is an Islamic mirror to the contemporary legislative bodies in modern 
states. 
The authenticity of Igmâ' varies, however, according to the principles followed by 
the various schools of Islarnic-fiqh. According to sorne schools of Fiqh, Igmâ' is 
not taken as a source of Fiqh. Some other schools of Fiqh, on the other hand, 
would consider the Igmâ' of the scholars on a case at any time enough to take 
81 See Imam Al-shafi'I, supra note 57at 286. 
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the decision to be an immutable ruling. An intermediate approach is that Igmâ' 
may be rectified by another reliable Igmâ'. 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that in spite of the discord over the authority of 
Igmâ', it cornes third in the ranking of the sources of Islamic-fiqh. 
1.5.1.4 Qiyâs 
When the foundational text is silent about a case and no Igmâ' is concluded in 
relation thereto, a jurist may resort to reasoning by analogy (Qiyâs). Qiyâs 
literally means to measure or to compare. In the context of Fiqh, Qiyâs is the 
verdict given by a jurist (mugtahid) who considers a case in comparison with a 
case judged by the Prophet PBUH.82 Such a verdict is pronounced on the basis 
of corn mon or effective causes ('il/ah) which were kept in view in laying down the 
text. If a mugtahid determines the rationale ('il/ah) behind the text; then he/she 
may apply the rule of that text, on the basis of analogy, in another case which 
shares the same rationale.83 The principles of ratio decidendi of common law and 
'il/ah of Islamic-fiqh are very much alike. That is true also with regard to the 
principle of stare decisis of common law and Qiyâs. 
82 Glossary of the translation of the meanings of the holy Qur 'an, (King Fahad Complex For the Printing of 
the Holy Qur'an 1417H 1997) Appendix I, at 880. 
83 See generally B.R. Verma, Mohammedan Law in India and Pakistan, 4th ed. (Law publishers, 1970) at 
15. 
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However, the authority of the three other sources (Qur'ân, Sunna and Igmâ) will 
prevail if there is any contradiction between them and Qiyâs, which constitutes a 
lower level of authority.84 
1.5.1.5 Other sources of Islamic-fiqh 
The recognition of Qiyâs by Islamic Jurists paved the way for the introduction of 
sorne other equitable doctrines, such as istihsân (Juristic preference), istishab 
(the inferring of one thing from another) and istislah (the Common welfare). 
Although these principles are vastly inferior sources of Fiqh when compared to 
the three original sources (Qur'ân, Sunna and Igmâ), they are powerful tools in 
the hands of formai Islamic legislative bodies in developing laws which conform 
with both the intention of Sharfa and the evolution of the community. 
1.6 Islamic Law 
As shown above, the author suggests that the term Islamic law in its 
contemporary understanding in the West and in many Islamic states does not 
reflect what it ought to. To the contrary, the widespread introduction of this term 
as a direct translation of the Islamic term Sharfa, which has its roots in the 
84 Ibid. at 14. 
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Arabie language, has resulted in the ambiguity and misunderstanding that the 
most Western scholars and lay people seem to have encountered.85 
However, the author suggests that the term Islamie law may be correctly 
understood in various ways. It may refer to those laws which are derived from 
Sharï'a as opposed to those which have their roots in the Civil law systems, 
Common law systems or any other legal systems. It may also be understood as 
that group of laws, which are applied by Islamic states in accordance with 
Sharï'a. Finally, Islamic law may refer to those laws which do not contradict the 
spirit and teachings of Sharï'a. For example, the Warsaw Convention can be 
seen as Islamic law provided that it does not contradict Sharï'a. Thus, any laws, 
whether constitutional, civil, commercial or otherwise shall be considered Islamic 
so long as they do not conflict with Sharï'a. 
One of the roles of the fiqh, in relation to laws, is to establish whether a law is 
Islamic (Le. it does not conflict with Sharï'a). The author takes the view, however, 
that an opinion of fuqahâ' should not be considered as a formai law unless it is 
approved by the legislative body of the government. Moreover, while laws 
generally relate only to human interaction, fiqh includes rules which apply to both 
worship and human interaction. Therefore the opinions of fuqaha' are labelled as 
fatwa and not Law. 
85 1t should be said, however that neither Bernard Weiss nor Wael Hallaq fall prey to this problem. Patrick 
Glenn, following Coulson, is careful to specify thatfiqh "extends not only to civil and criminallaw as they 
are known in the west but a)so to etiquette, food, hygiene and prayer": see supra note 67 at 171. 
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Accordingly, the erroneous reference to Sharf'a and Fiqh as "Islamic Law" should 
be corrected through the creation of a more accu rate translation or through 
restricting ourselves to transliteration. 
1.7 Conclusion 
As explained, SharTa is not Islamic Law. It is, rather, a rich source of law and of 
much else.86 SharTa is a comprehensive system that covers and inspires the 
three aspects of human life namely 'Aqïdah (creed), 'ibadât (acts of worship) and 
mu'âmalât (acts of interaction among humans). 
Islamic Law, on the other hand, is an artificial term created through the process 
of translation of the Arabic term SharTa, which gained widespread translation as 
Islamic Law. Such a translation gave an erroneous image of SharTa and Islamic 
Law as a rigid inadaptable code of rules. 
SharTa is both a white canvas as weil as a limitless spectrum of colours and a 
broad panoply of tools for the jurist to paint on. Ali he or she has to do is to make 
sure that the painting does not go out of the frame. Ali laws, be they derived from 
Common or Civil law traditions or constitutional, commercial, or criminal law in 
86 It should be acknowledged that there is debate within Western schools oflegal theory about the 
definition of the terrn "law". Thus, for example, the narrow positivistic conception of John Austin must be 
constrasted with the broader, pluralistic conception of Lon Fuller. To align Shari'a with "Islamic law" 
under a broad conception of the terrn "law" is less problematic than to do so under a narrow, positivistic 
conception. 
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subject matter, are Islamic so long as the painting is kept within the broad frame 
of Sharfa. Having such a distinction between these two terms is of essence to 
this thesis which contends that the introduction of Sharfa as a legal system 
would provide ail jurists, not only Muslims, with a third dimension of 
understanding with regard to Private International Air Law. 
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Chapter Il: Accidents and Compensation under Islamic-fiqh 
Having reviewed the foundational principles, sources and methodologies of 
Islamic-fiqh in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter to review how 
Islamic-fiqh treats liability and compensation for accidents. Such a discussion is a 
necessary prelude to a consideration of how Islamic-fiqh interacts with air carrier 
liability Conventions. 
The traditional literature of Islamic-fiqh address the subject of liability, be it 
contractual or extra-contractual, under the subject of damân. This is sometimes 
used alternatively with the term Kafâla.87 The subject of damân is itself scattered 
through various subjects which come under Fiqh AI-Mu'âmalât. Despite the 
diverse categorization of damân by Islamic jurists, they ail agree to divide it into 
two categories damân al-'aqd (contractual liability) and daman al-fi'! (extra-
contractualliability).88 
Although liabilities arising out of wrongful death and injuries are usually 
addressed as a subject of civil law by conventional legal literature, usually 
addressed in Islamic-fiqh literature under criminal acts, ginâyât. This notion of 
compensation in lieu of bodily injuries or loss of life is admitled by the 
foundational text of Sharfa under the name of diyah and irsh. 
87 Sheikh A. Alkhafif, Ak!amiin Fi AI-Fiqh AI-Islami (Dar Alfikr Alarabi, 1997) at 4. 
88 M. AI-Mousa, Nadzariyat AI-Qamiin AI-Shakhsi (AI-Kafala) (Riyadh: AI-Obaikan, 1999) at 33. 
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Diyah is, by nature, an extra-contractualliability with an extraordinary nature as it 
is sometimes considered a form of punishment in addition to being an ordinary 
remedy. 
This chapter will elaborate on the matters of both contractual and extra-
contractual liabilities resulting from incidents and accidents causing loss of life or 
bodily injuries fram the perspective of Islamic-fiqh. The first part of this chapter 
will be dedicated to the subject of diyah and irsh as extra-contractual liability and 
the second part will elaborate on the issue of contracts and contractualliability. 
2.1 Extra-contractual Liability 
Like the contemporary western legal systems, Islamic-fiqh differentiated between 
liabilities on the graunds of the original legal bond between the wrangdoer and 
the victim. When liability arises out of breach of contract, then it is considered a 
contractual liability damân al-'aqd. Extra-contractual liabilities damân al-fi'! are 
those arising coincidently without linkage to a contract. Liability arising out of 
wrongful death is usually addressed as an extra-contractual or tortious liability 
under the title of diyah. 
2.1.1 Definition of Diyah 
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ln her "A Basic Dictionary of Islam", R. W. Maqsood translates the definition of 
diyah as ''financial compensation (or blood-money) for injuries or death". This 
definition accords with the definition given by Imam AI-Jurajani in his AI-Ta'rifât 
and most of the other Islamic-fiqh literature. 
Sorne other scholars concentrate in their definition on the cause of diyah rather 
th an its nature to define it as ''the compensation made obligatory as a result of an 
offense which shall be paid to the victim or his heirs"S9 
The term diyah is used alternatively with the term irsh. However it is now almost 
conventional that diyah is undestod to be the financial compensation for death, 
while irsh is the financial compensation for injuries. 
2.1.2 Historical Preview 
Long before Islam evolved, Arabs used to indulge in wars of revenge, sorne of 
which lasted many years.90 The sufferings and hostilities that such battles caused 
to Arabic tribes encouraged them to find beUer alternatives to circumvent the 
endless chain of revenge.91 The alternative was the compensation of the victim's 
heirs with money which should be pa id not only by the offender but also by his 
tribe ('âqilah). This, however, did not solve the problem where the victim of a 
89 See s. Sabiq, Fiqh Al-Sunnah, Vol. 3 (AI-Fath Lel-e'ilam Al-arabi 1416H-1995) at 52. 
90 The war of Dal}is and Alghabra', whieh was a war of revenge between two Arabie tribes, lasted more 
than 40 years. 
91 See A.F. Bahnasi, Al-Diyahfi Al- Sharf'a Al-Islamiyah (Dar AI-Shorooq 1404H-1984) at 16-17. 
61 
high ranking tribe or his heirs were seeking the killing of a free man for the killing 
of one of their slaves or a master of the other tribe in place of the regular victim. 
The Qur'ân, therefore, introduced the rule of qisas which may be interpreted as 
'an eye for an eye' rule. It also encourages, in the same verse, the victim and 
his/her heirs to forgive the offender as it provides: 
o you who believe ! AI-qisas (the Law of Equality in punishment) is 
prescribed for you in case of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the 
slave, and the female for the female. But if the killer is forgiven by the 
brother92 of the killer against blood-money, then adhering to it with fairness 
and payment of the blood-money to the heir should be made in fairness. 
This is an allevation and a mercy from your Lord. So after this whoever 
transgresses the limits (i.e. kills the killer after taking the blood-money) he 
shall have a painful torment93 
This verse is, as such, not revealed to encourage qisâs but rather to restrict it or 
at least to regulate it and avoid exaggeration. 
Islam, moreover, adopted the principle of diyah and invested it with considerable 
legal signicance. The Qur'ân provides: 
It is not for a believer to kill a believer except (that it be) by mistake; and 
whosoever kills a believer by mistake, (it is ordained that) he must set free a 
believing slave and a diayh be given to the deceased's family unless they 
remit it. If the deceased belonged to a people at war with you and he was a 
believer, the freeing of a believing slave (is prescribed); and if he belonged 
to a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual alliance, diyah must be 
paid to his family, and a believing slave must be freed. And whosoever finds 
92 In the context of Islamic terminology, relations amongst ail Muslims are expressed as brotherhood. The 
verse, therefore, refers to victim's heir as the killer's brother in remembrance of the original powerfullink 
between them as brothers in Islam so as to encourage forgiveness. 
93 The Holy Qur'iin, (2: 178). 
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this beyond his means, he must fast for two consecutive months in order to 
seek repentance from ALLAH. And ALLAH is ever all-knowing, all-wise94 
The Prophet (PBUH) described the value of diyah in camels which was the 
market indicator at that point of time. As reported by Abudawûd, diyah was 
designated as one hundred camels which was equivalent to eight hundred 
golden coins (dinar) or eight thousand silver coins (dirham). Another hadith 
narrated by 'Amr Ibn Sho 'ayb and reported by Abudawûd and Nasâ'j provides 
that the Prophet PBUH ruled that diyah in the case of wrongful death is one 
hundred camels. Thirty of these should be bint makhâd (a female camel about to 
deliver), the second thirty should be bint labûn (a female camel that can 
breastfeed), the third thirty should be huqa (mature female camel capable of 
getting pregnant) and ten should be ibn labûn (a two year old male camel). 
The Second Caliph, Omar Ibn AI-Khatâb raised the value of diyah to one 
thousand golden dinar or twelve thousand silver derham on the grounds of an 
increase of the value of camels. The action taken by Omar opened the door for 
jurists and rulers to evaluate the appropriate value of diyah and to fulfill the 
intention underlying its prescription. 
2.1.3 The Nature Of and Rationale Behind Diyah 
94 The Holy Qur'iin, (4:92). 
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Amongst the goals of diyah is the compensation of the victim or his/her heirs for 
the loss they sustained and the suffering they encountered. But is it a mere 
compensation or remedy? Ooes it not act as a punishment or even a sanction 
against the offender? 
Sanctions and penalties under Islamic-fiqh are persona!. Only the offender and 
nobody else shall be sanctioned for his deeds. This princip le is deduced from the 
Holy Qur'ân which repeatedly provides that "No soul shall bear another's 
burden,,95 ln addition to this established rule of the Qur'ân, AI-Nassa'ï reported on 
the authority of Ibn Mas'oûd that "No man shall be punished for the act of his 
father or brother". In the case of diyah, however, it is not the offender who shall, 
always, take the whole burden of diyah. It is, sometimes, obligatory, as weil for 
the 'âqilah96 of the offender. This rule of diyah is linked directly to the nature of 
the act that caused the death. 
The author considers it necessary to elaborate on the causes of death before 
elaborating on whether diyah is a sanction or mere compensation. 
Islamic jurists categorize acts causing death of another person into three 
categories; it may be intentional (al-qat! al-'amd), quasi intentional (AI-qatl Shibh 
'Amd)97 or wrongful death (al-qatl al-khata). 
95 See verses (6:164), (17:15), (35:18), (39:7) and (53:38) of the Holy Qur'iin. 
96 'Aqilah is the group of people, tribe or family to which the offender belongs. 
97 The school ofImam Malik does not admit the category of Al-Kati Shibh AI-Arnd. 
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As an explicit ruling of Qur'ân, al-qat! al-'amd, the intentional waste of another's 
life, is sanctioned by qisas unless one of the heirs decides to forgive the 
aggressor. Diyah is, hence, obligatory onto the aggressor himself not the 'âqilah. 
ln the case of al-qat! shibh al-'amd and al-qat! al-khata', where both lack the 
intention to kHI, the offender is not subject to any corporal penalties. In addition to 
the offender, the offender's 'âqilah must pay diyah to the victim's heirs. 
It is very clear that such categorization is based on the presence of intention in 
the act. Such a presence is deduced from the facts of and tools used in the 
incidents that caused the death. If the offender shoots the victim with a gun, the 
intention to kHI is presumed. However if he/she hits the victim with a piece of 
wood, this ordinarily would not cause death hence the intention to kill does not 
exist, rather death is caused by gross negligence. The killing is in this case shibh 
'amd. Thirdly, if a soccer player kicks the bail hitting the goalkeeper in the chest 
and causing his death, intention is not even probable and the killing is in this 
case qatl khata '. 
Consequently, when the offender causes the death intentionally, diyah is a 
punishment besides being compensation. It is, therefore, obligatory to the 
offender himself and nobody else. When the deed lacks intention, on the other 
hand, diyah is a mere compensation for the victim or his/her heirs. T 0 avoid it 
being a punishment or rather to ease the burden of such compensation, it is 
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spread over a wide spectrum of people called 'âqilah. This spreading alerts the 
community and heightens their level of care. The author suggests that this 
spreading of liability may be considered an early form of insu rance. 
It is clear that although the role of diyah is to prevent people from wasting others' 
lives and to compensate victims or their heirs for the loss they sustained, the 
author is of the opinion that although it is in principle not always a punishment,98 
it must always be evaluated in a manner that keeps it effective and efficient. This 
is achieved by letting the payers fear and feel the burden of such 
compensation.99 
2.1.4 Conditions of Diyah 
There are certain conditions pertaining to the offender and others pertaining to 
the victim of an incident that must be fulfilled for diyah to be ordered in favour of 
the victim or his/her heirs. 
2.1.4.1 Conditions Pertaining to the Offender 
The offender has to have legal capacity (rushd) in the case of al-qat! al-'amd. 
Legal capacity under Islamic-fiqh requires physical puberty and mental maturity. 
98 See contra A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 48. 
99 See S. Sabiq, supra note 89 at 53. 
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Bulûgh (physical puberty) is the age when a male voluntarily or involuntarily 
emits seminal fluid100 and a female has her first menstruation. However, there 
are other indicative signs of bulûgh such as the appearance of coarse hair 
around the sexual organs, this sign is however not given any significance by the 
Hanafies.101 ln the absence of any of these physical signs of puberty, a fixed age 
is applied to determine puberty. The Maliki and Hanafi Schools consider 
seventeen as the age of puberty for both males and females. 102 
Most of fuqahâ' agree that a person is rashïd when, in addition to physical 
puberty, he/she is mentally mature ('âqi~. Bulûgh is in principle a prima-facie 
evidence that the person is rashïd. 
Accordingly, if a minor wilfully kills a person, he/she shall not be subjected to any 
corporal penalty. Nonetheless, heirs of the victim are still entitled to diyah as a 
form of compensation and relief. It is, however, disputed among fuqaha'whether 
diyah should be paid by the minor offender or by his 'âqila. Sorne provide that so 
long as qisas is not applied against the minor, then diyah will also not be a 
punishment against the minor. 'Âqilah shall, therefore, bear the burden of diyah. 
Sorne, on the other hand, provide that so long as the act is wilful ('amd), the 
offender shall pay the diyah from his own money despite being a minor. 
100 See N. Saleh, "Definition and Formation of Contract Under Islamic Laws" (1990) Arab Law Q. 110. 
101 See S.Sabiq, supra note 89 at 453. 
102 Ibid. 
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It is the responsibility of minors' guardians to supervise and control their actions. 
Moreover minors, usually, don't own enough money or assets to compensate the 
heirs. The author is, therefore, of the opinion that in the case of an offense by a 
minor, 'âqilah should pay the diyah, not the minor. This is in the interest of both 
the heirs and the minor. 
2.1.4.2 Conditions Pertaining To the Aggrieved 
The Qur'ân is explicit with regard to the fact that there should not be any 
difference in the value of diyah amongst Muslims and non-Muslims. It states: 
... and if he belonged to a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual 
alliance, diyah must be pa id to his family, and a believing slave must be 
freed. And whosoever finds this beyond his means, he must fast for two 
consecutive months in order to seek repentance from ALLAH. And ALLAH 
is ever all-knowing, all-wise.103 
Nonetheless, jurists interpret the captioned verse in different ways. The Hanafi104 
School considers that the value of diyah does not vary according to whether the 
victim is Muslim or non-Muslim due to the explicit provision of the captioned 
Qur'ânic verse. The Hanafi School does not even differentiate between dhami 
(Non-Muslims who reside in an Islamic state) and harbi (Non-Muslim who 
belongs to a state in warfare with the state of the aggressor). 
103 The Holy Qur'iïn, (4:92). 
104 The author agrees with the opinion of the Hanafi School. 
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The other three major schools differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims. 
For the Shafi'i' School, the diyah for Christians and Jews is one third of the diyah 
for Muslims, and the diyah for atheists or polytheists is two thirds of one tenth of 
the diyah of Muslims. Shafi'i' recounts that 'Omar and 'Othmân (the 2nd and 3rd 
Caliphs) have ruled as such. 
The Maliki School rules that the diyah of non-Muslims is one half the diyah of a 
Muslim on the grounds of a ruling by 'Omar Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz.105 Malikis did not 
have any authentic text of Sharfa that provides as such, but they believe that 
'Omar Bin 'Abdul 'Aziz would not decide something without there being an 
authentic textual provision of Sharfa. 
Lastly, the Hanbali School considers that if the non-Muslim is a Christian or a 
Jew, and is dhami or mo'âhed (from aState not in warfare with the Islamic State) 
and has been killed intentionally, the diyah is identical to the diyah for Muslims. 
However if he/she is killed mistakenly, the diyah is then one half of the Muslims' 
diyah. 
2.1.5 'Âqilah 
As previously discussed, diyah is sometimes borne by the 'âqilah instead of, or in 
addition to the offender. The term âqila therefore needs further explanation as to 
105 'Omar Ibn 'Abdul'Aziz is the 8th Umayyades Caliph. He is weil known amongst Islamic historians as 
the 5th righteous caliph for his good deeds and just rulings. 
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its precise meaning and how it could be dealt with in the contemporary legal 
relations. 
Lexically, 'âqila is the person's paternal relatives. 106 Nonetheless, it is not 
interpreted as such in the Islamic-fiqh literature, since jurists have various 
opinions as to who is the 'âqilah of a person. 
For the Hanafi School, the offender's 'âqilah are those free, adult and mature 
males belonging to the same diwan as the offender.107 However, if the offender 
does not belong to any diwan, his tribe shall bear the burden of diyah. The Maliki 
School shares the same view but with the condition that any of the 'âqilah 
members who are unable to afford the money shall be excluded therefrom. 
Sahfi'i and Hanbali Schools provide that 'âqilah is the tribe of the offender. 
If the offender does not have any 'âqilah, the State bears the burden of diyah as 
a replacement according to one opinion adopted by AIShafiT. 108 The Hanafi 
School however rejects this opinion on the grounds that females and children 
have rights to the public money of the State, and as such paying diyah from such 
public money means that they also are sharing indirectly the burden of diyah 
where they ought not to. 
106 See A.F. Bahnasi, supra note 91 at 61. 
107 The early Islamic states used to segregate peoples into areas each of which were called diwan. The 
people of each diwan were paying a sort of monetary social aid according with their needs and occupations. 
108 See A.F. Bahnasi, supra note 91 at at 67. 
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The four schools of fiqh share the view that 'âqilah is, however, paying this 
amount as a form of relief for the victim or his/her heirs. Therefore they should 
not be overburdened with the payment of such an amount. The ruler shall divide 
the shares amongst the 'âqilah individuals while bearing in mind this concept. 
2.1.6 AI-Irsh 
Irsh is the obligatory compensation imposed against the aggressor for bodily 
injuries that do not cause death.109 This term is sometimes used interchangeably 
with the term diyah. 
Irsh is divided into two categories as follows: 
• Predetermined Irsh: Sharfa has prescribed a specifie amount to be paid in 
certain events, for example the irsh due in the case of loss of a part of the 
body, such as the hands or legs. Islamic jurists, usually, use the term irsh 
to refer to this category. 
• Undetermined Irsh: For which Sharfa did not prescribe any am ou nt, but 
rather it is left to the judge to determine each case independently 
according to specifie rules. This category of irsh is usually called hokumat 
'adl. 
109 A. M. AI-Jurjani, Al-Tarifat (Dar AI-Kitab Al-Arabi 1423-2002) at 22. 
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The basic rule for determining the quantum of irsh may best be expressed by the 
following equation: 
Irsh =( The lost organ/ number of similar organ in the body) Diyah 
As such, if, due to an accident, a person loses a hand then he/she shall get one 
half of the amount prescribed for diyah. But if he/she loses his/her nose then 
he/she shall be entitled to the whole diyah. A person shall deserve irsh if the 
accident results in losing an organ or the function thereof, an example being the 
loss of vision. 
Such a rule may not be applied in the case of injuries that do not result in loss of 
organs, such as breaking an arm or causing bleeding. 
2.1.7 The Quantum of Diyah and Irsh in the Contemporary Islamic Legal 
Systems 
As iIIustrated above, the quantum of diyah was determined by the Prophet 
(PBUH) as one hundred camels, one thousand golden coins (Dinâr) or ten 
thousand silver coins (Dirham). The three are replaced in the contemporary 
Islamic legal systems by currencies. The methodology followed by most of the 
current Islamic state legislations for converting the value of diyah to the 
contemporary currencies is a direct exchange of camels and dirham to the 
currency. According to this methodology, Saudi Arabian courts, for instance, 
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determine diyah at the value of 100,000 -120,000 Saudi Riyals. Saudi Riyals are 
exchanged at a fixed rate of 0.26 U.S. Dollars per Riyal. This means that the 
value of diyah under Saudi law is currently U.S. $26,667.110 Qatar and Kuwait 
have determined diyah at approximately the same rate. 
This methodology may be safe for ensuring compliance with the literai sense of 
the foundational text of Sharfa. The author however presumes that this 
methodology of direct exchange jeopardizes the main intention behind diyah. 
This methodology may result in compensating the victim or his/her heirs with less 
than the foundational text of Sharfa intended. The author, therefore, suggests 
that the economic value of the currency shall be taken into consideration when 
determining the quantum of diyah in modern currencies. This suggestion is 
based on the report that the second caliph, Omar Ibn AI-Khattab, increased the 
value of diyah in golden and silver coinage on the grounds of the increment in the 
value of camels at that point of time. 
2.1.8 The Economie Value of Camels, Dinar and Dirham in the Prophet's 
Era 
ln the Prophetie Era, camels were the principal means of transportation in 
addition to being used for the production of milk and relied upon for meat. 
Owning a camel was a wealth in itself. The main authorities on Islamic history in 
110 This is higher than the limits of liability under Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol and 45% of the 
Montreal Agreement of 1964. 
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the Prophet's era like Wâqidï, AI-Tabarï and Ibn Kathïr reported that missionaries 
were sharing the ride of a camel. With such economic value, a camel had 
attributed to it a monetary value of between 40 and 84 dirham. 111 A Dirham 
weighs 3.024 grams of silver. 112 
Camels were usually exchanged in the rate of 10 sheep per camel 113 (Le. a 
sheep would be worth between 4 to 8.4 dirham). The exchange value of 100 
camels to 8000 or 10000 dirham shows that the Prophet (PBUH) fixed the value 
of camels in dirham and dinar at the maximum rate. 
ln volume III of his Sirah, Ibn Sa'd states that Abubakr, the first Caliph, asked for 
remuneration of 3000 dirham per annum as the caliph of the Islamic State to 
maintain himself, his wife, three children and a freed slave (mawla). The annual 
income of 3000 dirham would barely equate to 35 camels at the rate established 
above. Since Abubakr had requested comfortable but not sumptuous 
remuneration, this means that diyah resembles three years' income of a middle 
class family with six members. 
Moreover, the increment 'Omar Ibn AL-Khatâb, the second caliph, made in the 
exchange value of camels to Dinar and Dirahm reflects that the Dinar and 
III See generally M. Y. Siddiqi, "Role of Booty in the Economy During the Prophet's Time" (1989) Journal 
of King AbdulAziz University: Islamic Economics 83. 
112 See generally A. H. AI-Kurdi, "AI-Maqadir AI-Shar'iyah Wa Ma Yat'allaq Biha Men AI-Al}kam AI-
Shar'iyah Wa Ma Yoqabiloha Men AI-Maqadir AI-Mo'aserah" (2001) 16:47 Journal of Sharia and Islamic 
Studies 245. 
113 M. Y. Siddiqi, supra note Ill. 
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Dirham value which the Prophet (PBUH) designated for camels was based on 
their relative economic value rather than intending to affix them a constant value. 
The following is a practical example of how we may calculate diyah according to 
this suggestion, applying the general observation that the Prophet (PBUH) fixed 
the exchange value at the highest rate: 
We may take the highest income according to the Indicators on Income and 
Economic Activity of the United Nations for the year 2001-2002 which 
indicates that Luxembourg has the highest level of GDP totalling US$ 
44,783.114 The total amount of diyah would consequently be US$ 537,396 
This number is taken on the grounds of the following calculation: 
((Per capita GDP 2 Adults) + ((Per capita GDP 4 dependants) /2)) 3. 
Such a methodology has the advantage of simplicity, but others are possible as 
weil as is discussed in the Conclusion to this thesis. 
2.2 Damân AI-Aqd (Contractual Liabilities) 
T 0 have a comprehensive grasp of the issue of contractual liabilities under 
Islamic-fiqh, it would be appropriate to shed some light on how Islamic-fiqh treats 
114 UN Homepage <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sociallinc-eco.htm#aduIt> (date accessed 
17/2/2004)" . 
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contracts and obligations resulting there from before examining contractual 
liabilities. 
This is worth doing for several reasons. International treaties and conventions -
including Warsaw, Montreal and Rome - are considered by Islamic jurists a 
form of a contract signed by states. This means that it would be necessary to 
understand basic principles of contracts under Islamic-fiqh before turning to the 
discussion of the concepts of international treaties under Isalmic-fiqh. Another 
important issue that has made a relatively lengthy elaboration in this section 
necessary is that the subject matter of the thesis is intimately connected to the 
contract of carriage of passengers by air. This contract can not be addressed 
from the Islamic-fiqh perspective unless such basic principles of contracts are 
weil defined. 
A final reason for this elaboration on the matter of contracts in Islamic-fiqh is that 
the thesis also touches upon the subject of insurance. Insurance is a contract in 
principle and we need to understand the Islamic aspects of contract to address 
insurance from an Islamic-fiqh point of view. 
2.2.1 Contracts Under Islamic-fiqh 
Islamic Nazary'at APAqd (pl. IUqûd), or the theory of contracts, was dealt with by 
Islamic jurists differently than other aspects of law. Instead of researching the 
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theoretical values of raqd, jurists investigated the legal impacts of sorne specific 
practiced legal dispositions and studied them independently. These various 
dispositions shared sorne similar characteristics that correspond to the lexical 
meaning of the word 'aqd as employed by the Qur'ânic verse cited above. These 
dispositions are preceded by the word 'aqd to reflect that they bind the 
dhimmah115 of the parties or one of them towards the other. Such methodology of 
reporting the practice rather than practicing the theory gave Islamic-fiqh of 
contracts ('uqûd) a very distinct personality. The most basic practice upon which 
most, if not ail, jurists ground their analysis of contracts is the contract of sale, 
'aqd al-bat. A particular methodology, iIIustrated below, resulted in what is called 
"nominate contracts", al-'uqûd al-musammâh. The methodology, moreover, 
concluded in an understanding of contractual liabilities by our ancestors that is 
completely different from what we know in the contemporary Civil and Corn mon 
Law traditions. 
2.2.2 Definition of 'Aqd 
Lexically, the word 'aqd is derived from the root "'aqada" which means to tie or to 
bind. 116 Jurists delineate 'aqd as "the legally sound exchange of an offer and 
acceptance in such a manner that leaves its impact on the subject matter,,117 
115 For more on dhimmah, see section 2.1.6 below. 
J16See S.E.Rayner, The Theory ofContracts in Islamic Law (London: Graham & Tortman, 1991) at 87. 
117 See M. Zahraa, "Negotiating Contracts In Islamic And Middle Eastern Laws" (1998) 13:3 Arab Law 
Quarterly at 265. 
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Seing merely an expression of ones will, 'aqd excludes ail prerequisites of legis 
actio for the contract to be executable unless specifically stated in the law or the 
contract itself. The objective nature of 'aqd under Islamic-fiqh makes it different 
fram the Contract of civillaw, which arguably has a subjective nature. 
It is extremely important to note that although the definition does not denote 
unilateral dispositions or obligations as co n tracts , some major jurists refer to 
them as 'aqd or 'uqûd. 
2.2.3 AI-rrUqûd AI-Musammât (Nominate Contracts) under Islamic-fiqh 
The methodology followed by the learned jurists of Islamic-fiqh resulted in having 
a large number of nominate contracts (AI-'Uqûd AI-Musammât) like 'aqd al-bay'e 
(Contract of sale), 'aqd al-ijâr (Contract of Hire), 'aqd al-rahn (Contract of 
Mortage) and 'aqd al-wakâlah (Contract of Agency). 
The phenomenon of al-'uqûd al-musammât raises the question of the 
permissibility of creating and enforcing variant types of 'aqd other than those 
intraduced by our ancestors. 
The reply to this question could be deduced fram the Holy Qur'ân which 
stipulates "0 Vou who believe! Fulfill your obligations,,118 The term obligations or, 
118 Holy Qur'iin, (5:2). 
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as expressed in Arabie, 'uqûd, suggests that there are no restrictions on 
concluding an 'aqd. The Prophet (PBUH) reiterated this fact in a hadith reported 
by AI-Tirmidhi to the effect that 
Every agreement is lawful among Muslims except one which declares 
forbidden that which is allowed, or declares allowed that which is forbidden. 
These two divine stipulations expressly grant to Muslims the freedom to enter 
into any agreement provided that the two quoted conditions are fulfilled. 
Thus, al-'uqûd al-musammât is an offspring of a general methodology and not an 
aspect of theology followed by jurists while studying the various types of 
dispositions within their era. 
Accordingly, there is not and there should not be any restriction on the 
conclusion of any contract ('aqd) that is outside the scope of al-'uqûd al-
musammât save the caution of abiding by halâl (Iegitimacy) and harâm 
(illegitimacy) of Sharra, which corresponds to the concept of public arder in 
Western systems. 
2.2.4 Arcân AI-rAqd (Fundamental Elements of Contracts) under Islamic-
tiqh 
There are three fundamental elements for an 'aqd to be valid. These elements 
are: 
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• AI-Tarâdi(Mutual consent) 
• AI-Mahal (The object of the contract) 
• AI-Sabab (Consideration or cause of the contract) 
Each of these elements should be investigated independently. 
2.2.4.1 AI-Tarâdi (Mutual Consent) 
As in western systems, al-tarâdï (mutual Consent) is the most fundamental 
element of 'aqd. It combines four inter-related aspects; sighat al-'aqd (the form of 
contract), tattabuk al-iradatayn fi maj/is al-'aqd (the meeting of the two wills), 
attraf al-tarâdï (parties to the consent) and eyoup al-iradah (defects of wills). 
2.2.4.1.1 Sighat AI-'Aqd (Form of the Contract) 
Sighat AI-'Aqd is composed of two parts, namely, ijâb (offer) and qabûl 
(acceptance). Ijâb is the manifestation of the offer that is made by the offeror. 
Qabûl is the manifestation of the acceptance that is made by the offeree. 
For sighat al-'aqdto be valid, qabûl must be identical to ijâb, and both should be 
certain. 
Ijâb and qabûl may be laf6ï (oral), kitâbï (in writing) or by ishârah (inferred by a 
conduct). As to the evidentiary value, oral expression has precedence and 
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preference over the other types of expression.119 Expression of ijâb or qabûl 
may, however, be sareeh (explicit) or dimni (implicit). 
With great similarity to Common Law,120 silence of the offeree is not a means of 
communicating his asse nt to an offer. As such, the offeror may not infer or 
impose contractual liability upon an offeree by proclaiming that his silence shall 
be considered consent. 
When ijâb and qabûl (sighat al-'aqd) are mutaqâbil (consistent) and sareeh 
(explicit), then 'aqd should be interpreted in accordance with the expressions of 
the parties despite the alleged intentions. On the other hand, if the expressions 
are unclear or ijâb and qabûl are inconsistent, it may be necessary to investigate 
the intentions of the parties. Such reliance on sighat al-'aqd is due to it being 
considered prima facie evidence that reflects the inner intentions and wills of the 
contractors.121 
Formalities are of minor value in Islamic-fiqh. Ijâb and qabûl may be inferred in 
any manner that reflects certainty as to the actual intentions of the parties. In a 
simple sales contract (emptio/venditio) , for instance, ijâb may take the form of 
any language or action that reflects the actual intent of the offeror. The offeror 
may only need to extend his hands with the object of sale and the offeree may 
119 See A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 66. 
120 See Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) 11 CBNS 869. 
121 See A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 70. 
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accept the offer by extending his hands with the proper monetary value in 
exchange of the object (mo'aatah). 
ln addition, ijâb and qabûl should be made by persons who have the capacity to 
do SO.122 
2.2.4.1.2 Tatâbuq AI-Irâdatayn Fi Maj/is AI-rAqd (The Meeting of the Two 
Wills at a Meeting Session) 
The notion and importance of maj/is al-'aqd (meeting session) is based on the 
hadith narrated by Ibn Omar to the effect that: 
Each of the seller and the purchaser has the right to opt (accept or reject) 
so long as they didn't separate from each other save the case of bay' al-
kheyâr (sale with the right to return for refund). 
It is obvious that an 'aqd is formed when ijâb and qabûl are properly 
communicated and consistently exchanged by the parties. Such communication 
has to take place in/at123 maj/is al-'aqd. 
However, the general rule is that an ijâb shall continue to be valid and the offeree 
shall continue ta have the right ta accept or reject the offer, kheyâr al-qabûl, 
122 The matter of capacity will be discussed later in this chapter. 
123 At this point of illustration "in" and "at" are used to infer the variant interpretations of Majlis Al- 'Aqd. 
Sorne authors denote it as the location wherein the meeting is conducted. Sorne others focus on the time 
sequence implied by the hadIth without reference to a specifie location. The Author stands by the latter 
interpretation. 
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throughout the period of the meeting session. Nevertheless, upon the occurrence 
of any of the following events, the state of ijâb by the offeror shall be terminated: 
• Kheyâr al-rogû': where the offeror revokes his offer before the other party 
communicates his qabûl in/at the same meeting session. 
• Intehâ' al-maj/is: where the meeting session lapses without receiving the 
qabûlof the offeree. 
• Qabû/: where the offeree communicates his acceptance to the offeror to 
conclude the 'aqd. 
The term maj/is al-'aqd is subject to two different interpretations. It may be 
defined as the location where the meeting is conducted. It may, on the other 
hand, be interpreted as being the segment of time during which qabûl should be 
communicated.124 
2.2.4.1.3 Afraf AI-tarâdï (Parties ta the Consent) 
Points 2.2.4.1.1 and 2.2.4.1.2 above briefly discussed the objective aspects of AI-
tarâdi. Point c will deal with the subjective aspect. 
124 See generally A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 1-30. 
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For AI-tarâdi to be valid, persons exchanging ljâb and Oabûl must have full legal 
capacity Ahley'yet AI-Adâ'. The notion of Ahley'yet AI-Adâ' is based on the 
Our'ânic order: 
To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which GOD 
hath made a means of support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, 
and speak to them words of kindness and justice make trial of orphans until 
they reach the age of marriage; if then ye find sound judgment in them 
release their property to them; but consume it not wastefully, nor in haste 
against their growing up 125 
ln harmony with the general rule of the protection of human interests and the 
avoidance of blights126, the Our'ânic verse orders that a person, whether male or 
female, may not be permitted to enter into any legal dispositions unless he/she 
satisfies the requirements of Ahley'yet AI-Adâ'. These requirements are: 
i. To have attained Bu/ûgh (Physical Puberty); and 
ii. To have a certain level of mental ability Rushd (Prudence); 
2.2.4.1.4 'Oyûb AI-Irâdah (Defects of Will) 
For an 'aqd to be valid, the mutual consent of the parties should be based on 
wills that are devoid of defects. The wills must be free from any of the following 
defects ('oyûb al-irâdah) for the contract to be validly concluded: 
125 Holy Qur' an, (4:5&6). 
126 See Y. AI-Qaraqawi, supra note 59 at 53ff. 
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iii. Ikrâh (Coercion) 
An raqd is void if entered into under Ikrâh. Ikrâh would exist if a person 
were to sign a contract under the influence of coercion and fear, without 
which he/she would not have signed. Ikrâh, therefore must emanate from 
a person who has the ability and means to cause the feared harm 
expected by the other party. 
iv. Tad/ïs (Deceit or Misrepresentation) 
If one party is misled by the other by the bias of tadffs or 
misrepresentation, the contract is void. For tadffs to be effective, it has to 
induce the conclusion of a contract that the party would otherwise not 
have agreed to except for the misrepresentation. 
v. Ghalat (Mistake or Misconception of One or More of the Features of 
the Subject Matter). 
The mistake (ghalat), that affects the validity of a contract is gross mistake 
(ghalat jawhary). This kind of ghalat could occur with regard to; the object 
of the contract, the other party, the value and price of the contract, or the 
applicable law. For instance, if a seller sells a diamond to the purchaser 
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who finds out that he mistakenly bought a piece of glass, the contract is 
void. 
2.2.4.2 Mahal AI·rAqd (The Object of The Contract) 
The object of the contract must be valid. Therefore, a contract is void when the 
subject matter is, for example, adultery or usury. 
The majority of jurists require that mah$al al-'aqd (the object of the contract) be 
valid and present at the conclusion of the contract. These prerequisites are made 
to avoid gharar (aleatory contracts) and not for the mere unavailability of the 
object. Consequently, if mah$al al-'aqd is not present but the parties know that it 
will be available, the contract is valid. A typical example of a contract where the 
object is not available but the contract is permitted is bay' al-salam (sale with 
advanced payment and late delivery), which is explicitly permitted by the Prophet 
(PBUH). 
ln addition to validity and availability, there are some other conditions regarding 
mah$al al-'aqd, such as the undisputed ownership of the object and the 
possibility of identifying the object to avoid 'oyûb al-iradah. In addition, the object 
must have a value. 
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The requiremnt of value is, however, different from consideration, known in 
Common Law. Consideration requires that the transaction be of a value, while 
Islamic-fiqh requires that the object itself should bear a value regardless of the 
value at which the contract is concluded, which may be zero. 
2.2.4.3 AI-Sabab (Cause of the Contract) 
The general rule concerning a transaction is that "every transaction is allowed 
unless it is explicitly prohibited by a provision or an injunction" 127 However, 
contrary to what this formulation may suggest, the general rule does not signify 
that there is a single manifestation of what is permitted and what is not. Rather, 
every individual contract should be investigated independently. Grapes, for 
instance, are a valid object under Sharfa and there must not be any prohibition 
concerning the sale of grapes. However, if grapes are sold to a manufacturer of 
alcoholic drinks 128 then the cause of the contract is not valid and the contract 
should be void. 
2.2.5 AI-Mas'ûliya AI-fAqdiya (Contractual Liability) 
127 M. Zahraa, supra note 117 at 272 
128 Intoxication is prohibited by Islam. Therefore, production of a1coholic drinks is not permitted. 
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The concept of liability under Islamic-fiqh is reflected in the two maxims adopted 
by Islamic jurists providing (ùt....;,.l4 ~Iftll) (Gain accompanies liability for loss) 129 
and (ù~'i ùt....;,.lIJ .»\11) (Hire and liability for loss do not coincide).130 
According to the first maxim, (gain accompanies liability for loss), if one party 
enjoys full benefit of the object of the contract, then he/she bears full risk of loss 
like an owner. Indeed jurists, especially Hanafis, have given numerous 
interpretations and explanations of this maxim. In general terms, the party 
benefiting from the object shall act as a guarantor of the object. The following two 
examples will clarify this: 
ln 'aqd al-'ariya (contract of gratuitous loan), where the borrower reaps ail the 
profit of the object, he assumes the risk of loss of the object. If he/she holds the 
object as a gratuitous agent, on the other hand, he/she does not bear any risk of 
loss for there is no benefit to reap. Not to misapprehend this maxim, it applies 
also for non-gratuitous contracts. If someone, for example, bought an object that 
can generate offspring (an animal for instance) on the condition of return for 
refund if found defective, the purchaser has the right to return the object for a full 
refund despite the fact that he/she has generated revenue or an offspring from 
the object prior to the refund. This is on the grounds that the contract itself is 
obsolete because of the defect but the purchaser was a guarantor of the 
129 Mijallat AI-Ahkam AI-Adliyah, para. 85. 
130 Ibid. para. 86. 
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purchased object when it was in his/her hand and bore the risk of loss for that 
period.131 
The second maxim (hire and liability for loss do not coincide) means that in the 
case of rent or a lease (igâra), the lessor bears the risk of loss (damân) whereas 
the rent here constitutes the profit. 132 Indeed, such burden of risk of loss is 
subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of the contract. For example, if someone 
rented an apartment as a residential unit but he/she misused it as a sm ail factory 
which resulted in the destruction of the apartment, the lessee bears the risk of 
loss minus the rent value. 
The aforementioned two maxims apply only if the object has a value by itself. 
Moreover, if the object is fungible then compensation shall be in kind. Non-
fungible objects are compensated in equivalent value. 
2.2.6 Penalty Clauses and Liquidated Damages Under Islamic-fiqh 
The usual question to be asked after elaborating on the basics of contractual 
liability and the two principal maxims in relation thereto, is whether penalties and 
liquidated damages clauses are permissible under Islamic-fiqh. 
!31 A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 119. 
132 See F.E. Vogel and S.L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Retum (Kluwer Law 
International 1998) at 113. See contra A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 119. 
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However, before jumping to the matter of permissibility of such clauses, it is 
necessary to elaborate on the meaning and permissibility of conditions to a 
contract in general under Islamic-fiqh. 
As elaborated previously, the original status and rule of transactions is that 
"every transaction is allowed unless it is explicitly prohibited by a provision or an 
injunction" As such, conditions are permissible unless it is stated otherwise bya 
provision or an injunction. 133 Qur'ânic provisions pertaining to contracts and 
conditions do not contain any prohibitions. As for Sunna, there are five major 
hadith upon which Islamic jurists have established their rulings in relation to the 
permissibility of conditions or stipulation in contracts. These hadith are as 
follows: 
A hadith is reported in ail the major seven books of hadith on the authority of 
Jaber Ibn Abdullah that, during a trip back to Medinah, he sold his camel to the 
Prophet (PBUH) on the condition of carrying him to Medinah. Although it is true 
that this hadith is reported with minor variations between the major books of 
hadith. Some omit to report that the sale was conditional on the camel carrying 
Jaber to Medinah, However, Imam Bukhari claims that the report that includes 
the condition is highly authoritative and, therefore, shall overrule others. 
Nonetheless, Imam ShafiT134 and Imam Abuhanifah have ruled otherwise. 
133 See contra F.E. Vogel and S.L. Hayes, supra note 132 at 97. 
134 Imam Ibn Hajar and Imam Nawawi, who belong to Shafi'i school, reversed Shafi'i's rule in concord 
with Bukhari. 
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The hadith of "Barira" condemns any condition or term "not in the book of God". 
As for Ibn Taimiyah, this hadith prohibits conditions that do not accord with 
Sharfa and does not prohibit the principle of stipulating a term or condition in the 
contract. 
There is hadith of prohibition of "Sale and Condition", which is a weak hadith 
upon which jurists should not base any rule.135 
The hadith of the prohibition of "two conditions in a single sale" is elaborated 
upon by Imam Ibn AI-Qayim who concluded this hadith targets ribâ (usury), 
which is prohibited under Sharfa.136 
Accordingly, despite the opinion of some jurists or researchers with regard 
to tidiness of permissibility of the stipulation of conditions or terms in 
contract, it is obvious that it is permissible for contractors to stipulate any 
condition that does not breach the rulings or intentions of Sharfa. 
Although the Our'ân encourages people to forgive each other, it nevertheless 
permits the victim or the person subjected to harm by another to penalize the 
offender. This penalty must not in any circumstances exceed the damage caused 
by the offense. Amongst such provisions of the Our'ân is verse 42:40 which 
provides: 
J35 See A. A. AI-Saloos, "AI-ShaI1 AI-Gaza'i Wa Tatbikatuh AI-Mo'a!ierah" (2001) 12:14 The Islamic Fiqh 
Council Journal 59 at 118. 
136 See Imam Ibn AI-Qayim, 'Awn Al-Ma'büd Sharl} Sunan Abi Dawüd, Vo1.9, (Midinnah AI-Maktabah AI-
Salafiyah 1388-1969) at 402-409. 
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An ill-treatment may be rewarded with similar ill-treatment. But he who 
forgives and seeks reconcilement shall be recompensed by God. God does 
not love the wrongdoers 
As for Sunna, there is the famous hadith that provides "A person shall not harm 
others and shall not likewise let himself be harmed" 
These provisions of Sharfa affirm that the concept of penalty is admitted but in a 
manner that shall not exceed restitution. 
Penalty clauses are permissible unless they make forbidden that which is 
allowed, or allow that which is forbidden. 
As the two main defects resulting in the invalidity of contracts are ribâ (usury) and 
gharar (aleatory),137 it would be opportune to investigate penalties as a cause of 
ribâ or gharar. 
ln Islamic terminology, contemporary contractual obligations are either dayn or 
'ayn, which roughly correspond to the Western terms rights in personam and 
rights in rem. 138 
I37 See A. A. AI-Saloos, supra note 135 at 59. 
138 See A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 27 at 15. 
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'Ayn and dayn are abbreviations of al-iltizam (obligation) be/'ayn and al-iltizam 
beldayn. The distinction between 'ayn and dayn are based on the nature of the 
subject matter of the obligation. If the subject matter is corporeal, it is 'ayn. If the 
subject matter is incorporeal, then it is dayn.139 
Oayn is linked to the dhimmah of the person. Ohimmah has two related 
meanings: from a subjective angle it is the qualification to bear obligations and 
enjoy rights recognized in each human being by right of birth. From an objective 
angle dhimmah is the receipt of incorporeal properties140. 
Hence, dayn requires the intervention of the person to whom it is linked (the 
debtor). Moreover, as in Western systems, the existence of dayn requires a 
mutalaba (claim) to be laid against the debtor141 . On the other hand, to discharge 
an obligation 'ayn needs, in principle, neither a claim on the debtor nor indeed his 
intervention .142 
Nevertheless, dayn and 'ayn are not completely distinct from each other. 
Whereas 'ayn may also be linked to the dhimmah of the debtor and it may be a 
subject of mutalaba. 'Ayn, for instance, may be the subject matter of a 
guarantee, which means, under Islamic-fiqh, that the guarantor's dhimmah and 
139 See M. A. AI-Zarka, Al-Madkhal Ila Nazariyat Al-Iltiziim Al- 'Ammah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islamf (Dar AI-
Qalam 1420 - 1999) at 83-84. 
140 N. Saleh, supra note 100 at 102. 
141 A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 at 21-22. 
142 See N. Saleh, supra note 100 at 104. 
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the debtor's dhimmah are joined together. Moreover, a debtor who is under an 
obligation to deliver 'ayn, has his dhimmah charged with that obligation. 
Hence, contractual penalty clauses may apply to dayn or 'ayn so long as they are 
created by an 'aqd (Contract). Surcharges on delayed payments are amongst the 
examples of penalty clauses related to dayn. The permissibility of such penalty 
clauses could constitute an independent piece of research. The Islamic-fiqh 
Council of the Muslim World League has concluded, however, that it is not 
permissible for the seller, in the case of sale with instalments, to ask for 
surcharges against the delayed payments whether stipulated in the contract or 
not.143 The Islamic-fiqh Council has concluded as such with the perception that 
surcharges against delayed payments is a form of prohibited ribâ which should 
be avoided. Although the author agrees with this conclusion in relation to civil or 
non-commercial transactions, he does not entirely endorse this conclusion when 
it cornes to pure commercial transactions for reasons that go beyond the scope 
of this thesis.144 
As damages encountered by the passenger are either injuries or damage to their 
luggage, it is obvious that the contract of carriage is an ayn on the part of the 
carrier, who undertakes to transport passengers and their luggage safely. It is 
more important, therefore, to investigate whether it is permissible to incorporate 
143 See A. A. AI-Saloos, supra note 135 at 105 ff. 
144 Compare F.E. Vogel and S.L. Hayes, supra note l32, M. O. Shubair, Al-Mo'iimaliit Al-Miiliyah Al-
Mo'ii$irah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islamï (Dar AI-Nafa'es, 1419-1999), M. N. Al-'Aani, Al]kiim Taghayur Qimat Al-
'Omlah Al-Nakdiyah Wa Atharoha Fi Tasdïd Al-Qarq (Dar AI-Nafa'es, 1421- 2000). 
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into contracts pertaining to ayn, like the contract of carriage, on the part of the 
carrier, a stipulation that operates as a penalty clause. 
ln its seventh session, The Islamic-fiqh Council of the Muslim World League 
decided that it is permissible for the parties to a contract of istisn'a145 to stipulate 
a penalty clause against non-fulfillment of the covenants. 146 Parallel reasoning 
should apply to the contract of carriage. 
145 A contract by which one party undertakes to create and deliver an object to the other for reward (Turn 
Key Contract). 
146 A. A. Al-Saloos, supra note 135 at 59. 
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Chapter III:The Concept of International Conventions & Treaties ln 
Sharï'a 
Islam did not arise in isolation from the other great civilizations surrounding 
Arabia. Despite the unprecedented revolution in traditions he brought about, the 
Prophet (PBUH) was not completely detached from the traditions of his ancestors 
and contemporaries, nor did he ignore the traditions of the civilizations in the 
vicinity of the Islamic state he would establish. Such an interaction and 
encounter between the Islamic state he established and neighbouring 
civilizations manifested itself in the diplomatic envoys they exchanged, the 
treaties they concluded, and the wars in the early era as weil as later eras of 
Islamic States. 
International conventions and treaties are seen by Islamic jurists as contracts, 
although they are between sovereigns rather th an between individuals. Such a 
conception means that the various aspects of contracts established and 
elaborated in Chapter " above shall be taken in consideration while investigating 
the concept of international conventions. 
This chapter will shed some light on the concept of international conventions and 
treaties in Sharfa and Islamic-fiqh. It will give a brief chronological presentation 
of the nature of the relationship between the Islamic State and the surrounding 
States. The chapter will then explore some of the most important treaties and 
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conventions concluded by the Prophet (PBUH), as weil as sorne others 
concluded by the ensuing caliphs. 
3.1 An Overview 
At the outset, it is important to take into consideration that the early Islamic jurists 
did not use the notion of Public Law, as compared to Private Law, adopted by the 
western legal systems. Topics in relation to public international law are, 
therefore, scattered in books of siysa shari'yah (Islamic principles of politics) and 
siyar (conduct of the sovereign). Moreover, the conduct of the sovereign in 
relation to other states is also discussed in the books of Islamic-fiqh under the 
section of gihad. It is, therefore, very difficult to trace the main resources on this 
matter in a chronological fashion. Nor is it possible to claim that a piece of 
literature is devoted to what we may cali in the contemporary days, "Public 
International Law". An exception to this is found in two the works of the hanafiet 
scholar Imam Muhammad Ibn Abilhasan AI-Shaybani (d. 189/807): Kitâb AI-Siyar 
AI-Saghir and Kitab AI-siyar Al-Kabir. These two books are the most renowned 
major classical works on the matter of siyar. The first available version of the 
book is the commentary dictated by another leading Hanfi scholar, Imam 
Sarakhsi (d. 483/1101), who authored the Sharh AI-Siyar Al-Kabir (Commentary 
on AI-Siyar Al-Kabir). 
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It is Sarakhsï not Shaybanï who defined to us what the term siyar, exactly, 
means when he said: 
Siyar is the plural of Sira. It describes the conduct of the believers in their 
relations with the unbelievers of enemy territory as weil as with the people 
with whom the believers had made treaties, whom may have been 
temporarily (musta'mïn) or permanently (dhimmis) in Islamic land; with 
apostates, who were the worst of the unbelievers, since they adjured after 
they accepted Islam; and with rebels (baghl) , who were not counted as 
unbelievers, though they were ignorant and their understanding of Islam 
was false 147 
After Shaybanï, many authors wrote on this topic. Sahih Muslim devotes a 
complete chapter titled Bab AI-Siyar. AI-Mawardï's book AI-Ahkâm AI-Sultâniya 
Wal-Wilâyât AI-Diniya and Ibn Taymiay's AI-siyasah AI-Shariyah Fi Islah AI-raT 
Wal-Ra'eiyah are also amongst the most weil known books on this subject. Both 
touch on the classification of the political status of States in the context of their 
relationship with the State of Islam. The first Islamic sociologist, Ibn Khaldûn 
addressed it in his famous introduction known as Muqadimat Ibn Khaldûn on the 
same matter. Despite the fact that these books, as weil as other famous books 
like Ibn Rushd's Bedayat AI-Mugtahid Wa Nihayat AI-Muqtasid, elaborated on the 
question of the relationship between the Islamic State and the other States, they 
differ from AI-Shaybanï's manuscripts in the extent which their discussions are 
devoted to the matter of siyar. 
147 L. A. Bsoul, "What ls Islamic Law of Nations About?" (January, 2000) [unpublished], received by 
courtesy ofthe author. 
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However, it is possible to eonclude that ail of these books diseuss the status of 
the relationship between the State of Islam and other States and their in habitants 
in eonneetion with the availability or otherwise of a treaty with these states. 
As established in section 1.2 above, paradigms of analysis ean differ dramatieally 
based on jurists' interpretation of basic terms. This is never better demonstrated 
than in the effort to identify Islamie Public International Law. Indeed, the range 
and degree of differentiation between the varying paradigms of some western 
seholars and aetual Islamie rulings pertaining to Public International Law is 
further magnified when the term gihad is involved. The diehotomy may be as 
severe as the one adopted by Samuel Huntington in his famous article whieh 
beeame a book, The Clash of Civilizations148 where he asserts that "Islam has 
bloody borders". Similarly severe miseoneeptions are adopted by some other 
prominent authors on Islamie polities, sueh as Bernard Lewis who takes the issue 
in the same direction as Huntington deseribing the relationship between Islam 
and the West in the following words: 
This is no less than a clash of eivilizations - the perhaps irrational but surely 
historie reaetion of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
seeular present and the worldwide expansion of both.149 
148 S.P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer ] 993): 22-49. See a]so 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order (London: Simon & Shuster, ] 997). One might 
add that recent pronouncements of Pope Benedict XVI quoting a mediaeval Christian account of gihad are 
in a similar vein: see Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections" 
University of Regensburg, September ]2, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/sharedlbsp/hi/pdfs/15 09 06 pope.pdf (accessed September ]6,2006). 
149 B. Lewis, ''The Roots of Muslim Rage" The Atlantic Monthly 266 (September 1990) 60. 
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But such misconceptions are not necessarily limited to the western authors. 
Majid Khaduri also perceives, in his commentary on the ShaybanTs siyar, that 
"there is an obligatory state of war between Muslims and the rest of the world". 
Such a misconception is inevitable of the misinterpretation of the Islamic 
terminology offered by the source books written by our Islamic ancestors on the 
issue of public international law and the vivid state of war in the Middle East and 
some other dramatic incidents such as the events of September 11 th, 2001. 
A thorough investigation of the matter would result in opinions like those adopted 
by John Kelsay and Hilmi Zawati, who concentrate on Islamic principles 
governing the state of war and the state of peace. They concentrate on the fact 
that the segregation of the world into the State of Islam (dar al-islam) and the 
State of disbelievers (dar al-harb) is descriptive. They reflect on the actual 
situation between the Islamic State and the other States. Such segregation does 
not exist today in the same understanding. 
ln this thesis, the illustrations of treaties from the perspective of Islamic SharTa, 
take into consideration the two different schools of thought. The author 
formulates his own opinion on the grounds of the separation between SharTa, 
fiqh and law. However, this approach will take into consideration the 
chronological evolution of the Islamic State in the Prophet's era, when it started 
as a sm ail group of people in Mecca and transformed into a powerful State in 
Medinna. 
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3.2The Prophet's State 
The Prophet started his missionary as a single person. The first person ever to 
believe in him was his wife Khadiga. He started gaining followers subsequently 
but in small numbers. It is narrated that until he left Mecca for Medina, Muslims 
were as few as seventy five people. It may not be appropriate to de scribe this 
number as a State. This number however had increased very rapidly to ten 
thousand companions eight years later. 
A very big difference between the status of the Prophet (PBUH) and his 
companion is observed between Mecca and Medina. It is even observed in the 
nature of the revelations to the Prophet (PBUH). In Mecca, most of the 
revelations were concerned with the establishment of the Islamic creed and faith. 
They talk about God's attributes, the day of Judgment, angles, and refer to 
previous Prophets like Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. 
ln Medina, the situation was completely different. There was aState led by the 
Prophet. The Qur'ânic revelations in Medina were concerned with the State in 
general. Only after migration to Medina did the Prophet receive the verses 
stipulating consultation with the community, sorne of the rules of peace and 
warfare, and the criminal rules. 
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This section will elaborate further on the two eras and try to address the political 
and legal differences between them. 
3.2.1 ln Mecca 
At the time of the birth of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), in Mecca on 
the 20th or 22nd of April 571 A.D, 150 the Arabian Peninsula (Arabia) was at the 
heart of the Old World. To the north were the Byzantines and to the east were 
the Persians who ruled also Yemen (the southern area of Arabia). 
The tribe of Ouraysh, Muhammad's tribe, was the leader of Arabia. They lived in 
Mecca, where the holy shrine (Ka'baa) is located. Because of Ka'baa, which 
Arabs believe was built by Abraham, and its holiness for them, the people of 
Ouraysh, as the servants of the Ka'baa, had a very special status in the whole 
region. They had a very safe path of commerce to the north in summers and to 
the south in winters whereas tribes would not dare to invade the guardians of the 
holy shrine in Mecca. 
For the protection of Ouraysh: their protection in their summer and winter 
journeying. Therefore let them worship the Lord of this House (Ka'aba) who 
fed them in days of famine and shielded them from ail peril151 • 
150 See S. AI-Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet (Maktaba Dar-us-salam) at 
56. 
151 The Holy Qur'iin, (106: 1-4). 
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This unique combination of sacredness, trade and the desert land, in which none 
of the great nations at that point of time had any interest,152 gave Ouryash and its 
people the freedom to contact the civilizations around Arabia and to benefit from 
them without being exposed to any danger.153 
Muhammad was raised in this society. He was the grandson of Abdulmutalib, the 
leader of Ouraysh. 
At this same time the Romans had just established the positivist method of 
Justinian (527 - 565A.O.). In Persia, the Jundishapur educational center, where 
the various schools of the then known world met and interacted with each other, 
was at its peak under the rule of the great Kisra Anu Shairwan (The Just Anu 
Shairwan) (531 - 579A.O.)154. Najran, the region to the north of Yemen was an 
independent Christian region. 
Compared to the Persian and Roman empires, the Meccans had a less 
developed written culture. Indeed, according to the Islamic tradition, Mohammed 
(PBUH) himself was illiterate, which renders his own emphasis upon reading and 
the written word ail the more remarkable: 
Those who follow the Messenger, the Prophet who can neither read nor 
write (i.e. Muhammad PBUH) whom they find written with them in the 
Taurât (Torah) (Oeut, xviii 15) and the ln je el (Gospel) (John xiv, 16), - he 
152 See K. Annstrong, supra note 16 at 55. 
153 See S. AI-Mubarakpuri, supra note 150 at 15. 
154 See S. W. Husaini, Al-fikr Al-lslami Fi Nah4at Wa Ghalabat Al-thaqiifah Al-lslamiyah: 'lbar Min 
Tarikh Ma$iider Almiyiih Wa Al-tiiqah (Fussilat Lilderasat waltarjamah Walnashr 1998) at 46. 
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commands them for AI-Ma'rût (i.e. Islâmic Monotheism and ail that Islâm 
has ordained); and forbids them from AI-Munkar (Le. disbelief, polytheism of 
ail kinds, and ail that Islâm has forbidden); he allows them as lawful At-
Tayyibât (i.e. ail good and lawful as regards things, deeds, beliefs, persons, 
foods), and prohibits them as unlawful AI-Khabâ'ith (Le. ail evil and unlawful 
as regards things, deeds, beliefs, persons and foods), he releases them 
from their heavy burdens (of Allâh's Covenant with the children of Israel), 
and from the fetters (bindings) that were upon them. So those who believe 
in him (Muhammad PBUH), honour him, help him, and follow the light (the 
Qur'ân) which has been sent down with him, it is they who will be 
successful 155 
Say (0 Muhammad PBUH): 0 mankind! Verily, 1 am sent to you ail as the 
Messenger of Allâh - to Whom belongs the dominion of the heavens and 
the earth. Lâ ilâha il/a Huwa (none has the right to be worshipped but He). It 
is He Who gives life and causes death. So believe in Allâh and His 
Messenger (Muhammad PBUH), the Prophet who can neither read nor 
write (Le. Muhammad PBUH), who believes in Allâh and His Words [(this 
Qur'ân), the Taurât (Torah) and the ln je el (Gospel) and also Allâh's Word: 
"Be!" - and he was, i.e. 'Îsâ (Jesus) son of Maryam (Mary) and follow him 
so that you may be guided156 
Muhammad came with new notions for Arabs. The first revelation he received 
was: 
Read! ln the Name of your Lord Who has created (ail that exists). He has 
created man from a clot (a piece of thick coagulated blood). Read! And your 
Lord is the Most Generous. Who has taught (the writing) by the pen. He has 
taught man that which he knew not.157 
It is extremely remarkable that an illiterate person came with such charming 
words calling upon the mostly illiterate people of Quraysh to "read" and informing 
them that the Lord taught humans by "the pen". 
155 The Holy Qur'an, (7:157). 
156 The Holy Qur'an, (7:158). 
157 The Holly Qur'an, (1-5:96). 
104 
This illiteracy of the Meccans did not, however, prevent them from having 
agreements on the national level with other tribes or States. They, for instance, 
had the practice of hanging the most perlect poetry of Arabs on the walls of 
Ka'baa to declare the honor and dignity of both the poet and poetry. There were 
only ten Arabs poets to have this honor. 
Whereas the loot of invasion between each other was the main source of income 
in Arabia. The Arab tribes, including Quraysh, concluded a convention to declare 
four months of the lunar calendar as sacred months during which invasion was 
prohibited. Unfortunately, there are no documents to explore the means through 
which this convention was concluded.158 Another example is the Fudûl Pact (Hilf 
AI-fudû~, which Quraysh concluded to aid and protect any in habitant of, or visitor 
to Mecca when subjected to injustice and to support him against his suppressor 
until restoring his rights. 
These conventions became norms to the Arabs which they could never breach. 
Sorne were adopted by Islam after dominating Arabia. It is reported that the 
Prophet (PBUH) declared to his companions that he attended the Fudûl Pact 
before Islam and approved it to be in conformity with the Islamic principles. The 
Qur'ân has, also, adopted the glorification of the four sacred months. 
158 See Y. Istanbuli, Diplomacy and Diplomatie Praetiee in the Early Islamie Era (Oxford 2001) at 9. 
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When the Prophet (PBUH) received the revelation, however, a new community 
within Mecca was created. The opposition by the people of Qraysh to the 
Prophet (PBUH) and his followers and their deviation from the theological 
traditions of their ancestors created a community, whose leader was Muhammad, 
within the community of Quraysh. While in Mecca, Muhammad and his followers 
were not rebellions. They kept on respecting the political orders and conventions 
ordained by Quraysh who cou Id be described as the state leader at that point of 
time. He, nevertheless, started trying to contact the leaders of other tribes to 
conclude a convention of protection against the oppression he and his followers 
were facing from Quraysh. The author describes this as an early form of 
asylum.159 After thirteen years of oppression in Mecca, he finally achieved such 
a convention with the people of Medina, which would become the first 
manifestation of the establishment of the Islamic State in Medina160. The author 
views this agreement (Bay'atul 'Aqaba) as the first convention in Islam which 
involved most of the established characteristics of modern conventions, except 
for the fact that it was not in writing. There was an offer from the Prophet (PBUH) 
and discussion and acceptance from the people of Medina. This convention, 
however, was concluded between Muslims. There was no non-Islamic element to 
the convention. 
159 The Author suggests that these values should be taught to Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states to 
show them how much respect the Prophet paid to citizenship and nation despite the amount of oppression 
he received. 
160 See Y. Istanbuli, supra note 158 at 23-27. 
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Before the conclusion of Bay'atul 'Aqaba, the Prophet (PBUH) ordered a group of 
his most oppressed companions to migrate to Abyssinia. He appointed Ja'far Ibn 
Abi talib 161 as the leader of the migrants. J'afar acted as the migrants' 
representative before the Christian Negus or the king of Abyssinia. He is the one 
who appealed before the King when Quraysh sent a delegation to get them back 
and he is the one who concluded the agreement with the Negus for their 
settlement in Abyssinia. This agreement may be considered as the first 
convention with a non-Islamic State despite the fact that the Negus have since 
embraced Islam. There is no evidence, nevertheless, that this agreement was 
concluded in writing. 
The history of the Prophet (PBUH) in Mecca may be taken as a good resource 
for the conduct of the sovereign at the time of weakness and oppression. The 
Prophet's companions, in spite of the oppression they encountered, were 
prevented from having any armoured action against Quryash. They were also 
completing commercial transactions with the non-Muslims without restrictions. 
3.2.2 ln Medina 
Characteristics of the social life in Medina were slightly different from how it was 
in Mecca. In Medina, which at that point of time was called Yathrib, the two 
polytheist cousin tribes of Aws and Khazraj were settled. They were in the middle 
161 This may be regarded as the first diplomatie mission in Islam. 
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of a long era of hostility and warfare with each other. In their neighborhood 
various Jewish tribes settled, amongst which were the three tribes of Bani 
Oynuqa', Bani Annadhir and Bani Ourayzah. 
Upon the settlement of the Prophet (PBUH) in Yathrib, its name was changed to 
AI-Medina AI-Munawara (the enlightened city) or Madinnat AI-Rasûl (The City of 
the Prophet). Such a change in the name of the whole city may be considered as 
an implicit declaration of the rise of a new independent state. The Prophet, being 
the leader of Medina, concluded a written agreement (Sahifat AI-Medina) 
between the various inhabitants of Medina; namely The Jews, Aws, Khazarj and 
the Meccan migrants. The main purpose of this agreement was to present order 
and to organize the relationship between the various groups inhabiting Medina. 
This document is considered by sorne prominent scholars as the first treaty 
entered into by the Islamic State, while sorne other prominent scholars consider it 
as the constitution of the Islamic State of Medina. Hilmi Zawati asserts that this is 
neither a treaty in its established form nor a Constitution.162 This is because, for 
Zawati, the Sahifa was dictated by the Prophet (PBUH) as the leader of the 
community without interference from the other parties who adhered to it. Zawati 
asserts that the Sahifa may, nonetheless, be considered as a constitution al 
charter to organize the life in Medina between the Muslims and the Jews. 
162 H.M. Zawati, Is Jihad A Just War: War, Peace, and Human Rights Under Islamic and Public 
International Law (The Edwin Mellen 2001) at 56. 
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While in Medina, the Islamic State encountered various instances of war and 
concluded various peace treaties with Quraysh and the neighbouring states and 
tribes. Among the most famous treaties are the treaty of Hudaybiyah (named 
after the geographic place where it was concluded) and the treaty with the people 
of Najran. 
3.2.3 After The Prophet 
Through the first fifty years following the Prophet's death, the Islamic State was 
ruled by five of his companions. The ruler after the Prophet, Abu Bakr, took the 
title of Caliphat Rasul AI-Allah (the successor of the Prophet (PBUH) of God). In 
the reign of Omar Ibn AI-Khattab, the second caliph, the title of Amir AI-
Mo'meneen (the commander of the faithful) was brought into existence instead of 
calling him Caliphat Calipaht Rasul Allah (the successor of the successor of the 
Prophet (PBUH) of God). The title Caliphat Rasul Allah was abbreviated, 
afte rwa rd , to AI-calipha (the successor), which meant the successor of the 
successor and so forth. This title was used interchangeably with the other title 
Amir AI-Mu'meneen. This title continued to exist with the sa me high level of 
authority in the Islamic world until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. By the 
death of the Prophet, the foundational text was complete and no additions were 
possible. The election of Abu Bakr, Abu Bakr's appointment of Omar as his 
successor, Omar's nomination of six companions of the Prophet (PBUH) for the 
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people to elect one among them, and the title were ail based on Igtihad and 
Ijamaa' of the companions.163 
Afterward, when Mu'awiyah (a companion of the Prophet) became the Islamic 
caliph, he transformed the caliphate to monarchy and established the 
Umayyades 164 caliphate. After the Umayyades, the Abasieds 165 took over. The 
most notable Absied Caliph was Harun AI-Rasheed in whose reign the Islamic 
state reached its peak of advancement and expansion. Many of the provinces 
under the rule of the Abbasieds were ruled independently by their own rulers who 
named themselves as kings or princes and kept their political links to the Abasied 
rule in a unique confederal style. 
As a direct result of the very rapid expansion of the Islamic State through the 
years of these caliphates, many treaties and conventions on various issues were 
concluded between the Islamic State and other Monarchies ail over the world, 
some of which will be reflected upon later in this chapter. 
3.3 Reflections on the Concept of Treaties and Convention in Sahri'a 
163 For more on these incidents see generally S. Al-Mubarakpuri, supra note 150. 
164 Mo' awiya is a descendent of Umaiyah family from Quraysh. It is therefore the monarchy he established 
was nominated after his family. 
165 It was established by Abul Abbas Al-Saffah who is a descendent of the Al-Abbas Ibn Abdulmuttalib the 
Prophet's unc1e. This monarchy is called Abbasied after the name Prophet's unc1e. 
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As iIIustrated previously, for the very reason that the Islamic State did not rise in 
isolation from the world, it had to enter into treaties and conventions with other 
States in a manner that adhered to the Islamic teachings and corresponds to the 
needs, benefit and welfare of the Ummah (the Nation). 
The treaties concluded in the early days of the Islamic State in Medina were, 
basically, pertaining to the establishment of order within the State and the 
conclusion of peace with tribes in war with Medina. The treaties later developed 
different characteristics as the State was concerned with freeing the roads of 
trade from hostilities. 
It is advisable however, before further exploring sorne of the treaties concluded 
by the Islamic State, to reflect upon the permissibility and concept of treaties in 
Shan ..... a. 
3.4 Concept of treaties under Sharra 
The word treaty corresponds to the Islamic term Mo'ahada (PI. Mo'ahadat). The 
term mo'ahada in Islamic terminology is an agreement between two parties 
containing specifie terms and conditions to which each of the parties should 
adhere.166 This understanding has developed in the contemporary Islamic legal 
166 O.J. Dhumayriyah, AI-Mo'iihadiit AI-Dowaliyah Fi Fiqh Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Al-Hasan AI-
Shaybani(Rabitat Al-'Alem AI-Islami, 1417-1997) at 136. 
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terminology to mean an agreement between two or more States to regulate the 
relationship between the parties thereto.167 
Islamic teachings and the foundational text of Shari'a admit the possibility of 
entering into a convention or a treaty with non-Muslims and stress the obligation 
of abiding by treaties even during warfare, whereas the Qur'ân in the course of 
warning the remaining polytheists in Mecca, who were at warfare with Muslims, 
stipulates the following exception: 
Except those of polytheist with whom you have a treaty, and who have not 
subsequently failed you in aught, nor have supported anyone against you. 
So, fulfill their treaty to them for the end of their term. Surely ALLAH (GOD) 
loves Almuttakeen (pious) 168. 
A subsequent verse of the same chapter provides " ... save those with whom you 
have treaties at the Sacred Mosque. So long as they keep straight with you, keep 
straight with them,,169 
The Qur'ân goes further by not permitting Muslims to aid other Muslims against 
Non-Muslims with whom they have concluded a peace treaty " ... But if they seek 
your aid in the cause of the true faith, it is your dut Y to assist them, except 
against a people with whom you have a treaty ... ,,170 
167 Ibid. al 26. 
168 The Holy Qur'an, (9:4). 
169 The Holy Qur 'an, (9:7). 
170 The Holy Qur'an, (8:72)"" 
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The Prophet (PBUH), moreover, on behalf of the Islamic community (Ummah), 
entered into the very famous treaty of Sulh AI-Hudaybeyah with the non-Muslim 
polytheist of the tribe of Quraysh. 
Thus, the concept of treaties in general, and treaties with non-Muslims 
specifically is explicitly permitted by the Holy Qur'ân and Sunna. However, such 
treaties should adhere to the Islamic ru les and intentions including the attainment 
of the interests and welfare of the community and avoidance of blights. 
Consequently, the ratification by a State of a specifie treaty or convention does 
not mean an automatic implementation by the courts of that State, which under 
the rules of Islam have complete independence, unless proven to be fully 
compatible with Sharfa .171 
The structure of modern international law is based on the European model 
established in the colonization era.172 Such a structure, in the absence of any 
significant participation of Islamic states, makes it quite obvious and reasonable 
that sorne major treaties do not take, fully or partially, into consideration 
compliance with Sharfa . 
A treaty should fulfill certain conditions to be valid under Sharfa . A treaty should 
firstly not contradict Sharfa . This absence of contradiction, nevertheless, does 
171 See Sharekat Maktabat Al-khadamat AI-Hadithath vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines [20/d/a/9 year 1414 09th 
circuit! Bureau of Grievancesl Saudi Arabia]. 
172 Most of the existing treaties are traced to the second half of the 19th century and the tirst half of the 20th 
century. The Warsaw Convention was opened for signature on October 12th, 1929. 
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not mean adherence to specific provisions. Ali it me ans is the consideration of 
the explicit provisions of Shar'eea and the interest of the nation (Maslaha).173 
Parties should have the capacity to enter into treaties. Capacity on aState level 
is multifold. The state itself should have the capacity to act on the international 
level and ratification of the treaty should be conducted by the authorized body 
and in accordance with the laws of the State. 
Like contracts, treaties signed under coercion are consequently not valid. 
Coercion, nevertheless, does not mean being compelled to sign a treaty to which 
aState does not agree in full, the Prophet (PBUH) signed the treaty of AI-
Hudaybiayh even though some of its provisions were completely one-sided in 
favour of Qraysh. It also does not mean a situation where a party is weaker than 
the other. For a situation to qualify as coercion on state level, the State should be 
expecting a serious danger that may expose its inhabitants to abolishment or 
mass destruction which it is unable to avoid or defend. Accordingly, to render a 
treaty invalid on the grounds of coercion, the State must prove that it would have 
not signed the treaty had the coercion not taken place. 
Treaties may, moreover, have to comply with certain formalities in order to be 
valid. The Prophet, for instance, made almost ail of his treaties in writing and had 
173 See Ibn AI-Qayim, AI-Turuq AI-Hukmyah Fi AI-Syasah Al-Shar'eyah (AI-Maktaba AI-Tejaryah 1416-
1996) at 21. 
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themall sealed. Shan'a, as such, welcomes the contemporary formalities for 
ratification of treaties. 
There are various types of mu'aahadat (treaties) in Islamic-fiqh literature. Such 
classification is based on the subject matter or the conclusion of the treaty. For 
instance if a treaty is concluded between the Islamic State and another State for 
the safe conduct of the States towards the in habitants of the other State it would 
be ca lied ahd aman (Treaty for safe conduct). In such a treaty, the inhabitants of 
the States which have ratified the treaty have safe presence in the territory of the 
other State. If the treaty is concluded to resolve a dispute then it is sulh 
(seUlement). Amongst the very early terms prescribed by the Prophet (PBUH) in 
relation to treaties is dhimmah, this is a declaration made by the Prophet (PBUH) 
to keep safe and treat weil the people of the book (Jews and Christians) who 
reside permanently in the Islamic State. The Prophet (PBUH) decreed that 
against whoever amongst the Muslims aggravates a dhimi (a Jew or a Christian 
permanently living in the Islamic state), the Prophet (PBUH) will be his opponent 
on the Day of Judgment. 
ln general, it would not be wrong to conclude that Shari'a and the contemporary 
international laws of treaties are similar in their pragmatic nature pertaining to the 
conclusion of treaties and conventions. 
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3.5Some of the Most Significant Treaties in Islamic History 
As explained above, the Qur'ân is very permissive with regard to treaties. It 
encourages the respect of treaties and ranks it as a religious obligation. The 
practices of the Prophet (PBUH) in relation to the treaties he concluded through 
his life are the first authentic references usually discussed in this regard. It 
proves in general to be, as is the Qur'ân, very permissive. He honored his 
treaties and expected his fellow men to honor them to the same extent. It is 
debatable, however, as to which one of the pacts the Prophet had with other 
tribes or States is the first treaty in the contemporary understanding. Sulh AI-
Hudaybiyah is usually referred to as such. Some would refer to the pact of 
Medina. The author is of the view that the agreement concluded between the 
Prophet and the people of Medina known historically as Bya'ta AI-Aqaba 
constitutes this first treaty. This is so because it was concluded between the 
Prophet on the one hand and the people of Medina on the other. They discussed 
the provisions which were concluded in the form of an allegiance (bay'aa). The 
people of Medina were represented by the leader of their tribes (noqaba). The 
people would accept and follow whatever their leader decided Another pact the 
Prophet made is the one concluded through his representative to the Negus of 
Abyssinia which resulted in giving Muslims the right of residency in his State. 
Regardless of which came first chronologically, Medina and Hudaybiyah are still 
the most important, from the authors point of view, as far as the legal reflections 
they imply are concerned. 
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3.5.1 The Charter of Islamic Alliance in Medina (Sahifat AI-Medina) 
As soon as the Prophet (PBUH) reached Medina, he concluded Sahifat AI-
Medina, a charter of Islamic alliance between the new migrants (almuhâjerûn) 
and the original in habitants of Medina who embraced Islam, the helpers 
(alansâr). It is also a Co-operation and Non-Aggression Pact with the non-Muslim 
tribes which inhabited Medina at this point of time. This Charter sought to rule out 
ail pre-Islamic rancor and feuds 174 and to establish a state of welfare and peace 
with the Jewish tribes residing therein. 
Among the provisions of the Charter are: 
Almuhajeroon and alansar are one nation to the exclusion of other people. 
Believers shall not leave anyone destitute among them by not paying his 
redemption money or blood money in kind (diyah). 
Whosoever of the Jews follows us shall have aid and succor; they shall not 
be injured, nor any enemy be aided against them. 
The peace of the believers is indivisible. No separate peace shall be made 
when believers are fighting in the way of God. Conditions must be fair and 
equitable to ail. 
Whenever you differ about a matter, it must be referred to God and to 
Muhammad. 
The Jews of Bani Awf are one community with the believers. The Jews will 
profess their religion and the Muslims theirs. Other Jewish tribes shall have 
similar rights to those of Bani Awf. 
The Jews shall be responsible for their expenditure, and the Muslims for 
theirs. 
If attacked by a third party, each shall come to the assistance of the other. 
Each party shall ho Id counsel with the other. Mutual relations shall be 
founded on righteousness; sin is totally excluded. 
Neither shall commit sins to the prejudice of the other. 
The wronged party shall be aided. 
The Jews shall contribute to the cost of war so long as they are fighting 
alongside the believers. 
174 s. AI-Mubarakpuri, supra note 150 at 189. 
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Medina shall remain sacred and inviolable for ail that join this treaty. 
Should any disagreement arise between the signatories to this treaty, then 
God the AII-High and His Messenger shall settle the dispute. 
The signatories to this treaty shall boycott Quraysh commercially; they shall 
also abstain from extending any support to them. 
This Charter (sahifa) acted as the basic constitution of the new State of Medina. 
It focussed on diluting the strong tribâl loyalty and creating superceding rules of 
relations among the diverse combination of people in the State. The sahifa 
included a Co-operation and Non-Aggression Pact with the Jews neighbouring 
Medina drawing a framework for the relationship between the new State and the 
neighbouring tribes which were mostly Jewish. 
The Sahifa is however not considered by sorne Islamic scholars as a treaty. Hilmi 
Zawati asserts that this Sahifa was not negotiated by the Jews. The author does 
not agree with Zawati's assertion. A thorough investigation of the Sahifa shows 
that it refers more than once to the discretion of entering into it and adhering to 
its rule. Moreover, the sahifa was an open treaty as it provides more than once 
that 'Whoever enters into this treaty shall ... ". 
The author rather asserts that the Sahifa adopted many of the formalities still 
admitted by the contemporary international law of conventions. It was laid down 
in writing and signed by the representatives of each of the parties to the treaty. It 
also reflected upon what we currently know as the conflict of laws whereby the 
treaty provides that upon disagreement, jurisdiction shall be granted to the 
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Prophet (PBUH) as the leader of Medina. The treaty, nevertheless, was not 
drafted in articles as illustrated here. 
The matter of negotiation and the style of drafting shall not affect the status of the 
Sahifa as a treaty. 
3.5.2 The Treaty of Hudaybia 
After a long history of conflicts and hostility between the Islamic State in Medina 
and Quraysh in Mecca, they jointly concluded the peace Treaty of Hudaybia. 
This treaty was concluded in the 6th year of Hijrah (migration to Medina) when the 
Prophet (PBUH) tried to visit Mecca and perform Umrah. 175 Quraysh did not 
permit the Prophet (PBUH) to enter into Mecca and after the exchange of envoys 
and delegations; the Prophet (PBUH) and Quraysh concluded Sulh al-Hudaybiah 
or the Agreement or Treaty of Hudayabiah. The Treaty provided as follows: 
The Muslims shall return this time and come back next year, but they shall 
not stay in Mecca for more than three days. 
Muslims shall not come back armed but can bring with them swords only 
sheathed in scabbards and these shall be kept in bags. 
War activities shall be suspended for ten years, during which both parties 
will live in full security and neither will raise sword against the other. 
If anyone from Quraysh goes over to Muhammad PBUH without his 
guardian's permission, he should be sent back to Quraysh, but should any 
of Muhammad's followers return to Quraysh, he shall not be sent back. 
Whosoever wishes to join Muhammad, or enter into treaty with him, should 
have the liberty to do so; and likewise whosoever wishes to join Quraysh, or 
enter into a treaty with them should be allowed to do so. 
175 Umrah is sorne times referred to as Al-Haj Al-Asghar (The minor pilgrimage) as it has sermonies 
similar to those prescribed for Haj but with major exception. 
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On the conclusion of the treaty, two copies were sealed by the Prophet (PBUH) 
and Quraysh's representative, Suhail Ibn Amr. 176 
Despite the importance of this treaty of Hudaybiah on the political level, the 
author submits that it also has a remarkable importance on the legal front. 
Concerning voting, there was serious opposition from the second Minister or 
Secretary of the Prophet, Omar Ibn AI-Khattab, against the conclusion of this 
treaty which was faced by full agreement from the first Minister, Abu Bakr. This 
was sort of one to one voting which was balanced by the vote of the chief, the 
Prophet, in favour of signing and ratifying the treaty. 
The treaty was made of two signed and sealed copies with each party keeping 
one copy. 
This treaty introduced the authority of the leader to enter into treaties on the 
grounds of maslaha, (the interest of the nation). 
This treaty was closed to the parties thereto. 
It was a bilateral treaty as compared to the multilateral treaty with the Jews 
neighbouring Medina. 
The treaty introduced pragmatism as the basis for concluding treaties with 
others. 
176 See Y. Istanbuli, supra note 158 at 44. 
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Moreover, the treaty of the Alhudaybiyah did not constitute a settlement of the 
dispute and hostility between Medina and Mecca, it was rather a hudna 
(armistice) between the two parties who agreed to put down for 10 years the 
warfare they had continued to have in the last 19 years preceding the conclusion 
of the treaty. 
3.5.3 Other Examples of Treaties Entered into by The Islamic State with 
Non-Islamic States. 
At the conquer177 of /lyae or Jerusalem by the second righteous Caliph, Omar Bin 
AI-Khattab, he concluded a treaty with the Christian inhabitants of the city that 
provides: 
ln the name of God, the most gracious, the Merciful. This is what abdullah 
(servant of God) Omar bin al-Khattab, commander of the believers, has 
conferred protection on the inhabitants of lIyae. He offered them safety over 
their persons, their properties, their Churches and their crosses, over ail the 
inhabitants, the healthy and the sick. Their Churches would not be 
inhabited, or demolished or decreased in area, neither their crosses nor 
would properties be damaged. They would not be forced to reject their faith, 
and none of them would be treated unjustly. Not one of the Jews would be 
allowed to dwell in /lyae. 178 The people of /lyae would pay the jizyah 
according to tha same terms the jizyah being pa id by the people of AI-
Midenna. They should deport the Romans from their city. Those who depart 
would be safeguarded, together with their properties until they reach their 
safe destination. Those who stay would be protected, and they would have 
to pay what the people of lIyae have to pay off as djizyah ... 
177 In Islamic perspective. 
178 Upon the request of the Christian inhabitants of the city. 
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The importance of this treaty from the legal point of view is the practices it 
established for Islamic states for concluding treaties while in a superior position. 
179 T 0 apply the rules of the treaty, it is reported that Omar refused to pray in the 
main Church of Jerusalem, stating that Muslims after him would want to follow 
his deed by praying in the same place. This would disturb the Christians and may 
lead to a de facto breach of the treaty. Moreover, this treaty introduces in writing 
the concept of jiziyah (a form of tax) .. It is called jiziyah to differentiate it from the 
zakat (al ms) which Muslim citizens have to pay. This is not to assert that the 
notion of jiziyah was introduced by this treaty, as it was introduced by the 
Prophet. 
Another famous treaty is the one concluded between Mu'awiyah Ibn AbiSufyan, 
the 1 st Umayyed Caliph, and the Byzantine Emperor at the time of the war 
between Ali Ibn AbiTalib, the 4th righteous caliph, and Mu'awiyah. This treaty was 
concluded to protect the Islamic State from any attacks by the Byzantines in 
exchange for an annual amount pa id by Mu'awiyah to the Byzantine emperor. 
This type of conventions resulted in different points of view amongst the Islamic 
jurists. Sorne, such as AI-Shaybani accepted it only when it was a matter of 
necessity, while AI-Shafi'i' advised against its validity.180 
179 See generally K. Armstrong, Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World (Anchor, 
2nd edition 2001) at 46-47. 
18o H.M. Zawati, supra note 162 at 57. 
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During the reign of Harun AI-Rasheed, the 5th Abbasid caliph, the Islamic State 
was at its peak of power and prosperity. Such prosperity and power did not, 
however, prevent him from concluding a peace treaty with Charlemange, with 
whom they exchanged war prisoners. It was the geographic location of both 
which convinced them to conclude the treaty as each would protect and act as a 
barrier for the other against his enemies. 
Saladin (Salahuddin AI-Ayoubi), the great hero of Muslims also concluded 
various treaties and conventions with the Christian Crusaders led by the English 
King, Richard the Lionheart in 1192, during which they exchanged war prisoners 
and had a peace period of five years. Karen Armstrong contends that Richard 
The Lionheart entered into these treaties on secular grounds in opposition to the 
Church. She asserts that Salahuddin likewise entered into these treaties on 
secular grounds. The author does not agree with Armstrong's conclusion. 
Salahuddin was the leader of the community in whose hands lay the religious 
responsibility to lead it away from blights and to bring to it welfare and prosperity. 
The treaties were in line with such religious fulfillment. It is the author's opinion 
that Salahudin's decision was ordained by Sahree'aa. Karen Armstrong may 
have established her opinion on her Christian background as a former nun, it is 
relevant that the Church and the King used to be two independent and competing 
powers. 
Despite the content of the se treaties, they prove that Islamic Sharfa is very 
practical when it cornes to the conclusion of treaties and conventions with other 
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nations, be they Muslim or not. This practicality should, however, achieve the 
goal of serving the interest of the nation, but not its rulers, and should also 
prevent its affliction. 
Conclusion: 
The main concept the author wanted to reflect upon in this part of the thesis is 
that Islamic Law is not Sharra , and these two are not Islamic-fiqh. Each of these 
terms has its own distinct meaning. Sharra covers three aspects of human life. It 
gos into great detail within its foundational text, the creed ('Aqïdah) of Muslims. 
Such details do not leave any room for further human intellectual reasoning. 
Another aspect Sharï'a includes within its foundational text is the acts of 
humans. These acts are categorized into acts of worship ('ibadât) and acts of 
transactions (mo'amalat), which the author considers the third aspect. Although 
acts of worship are prescribed in detail in the foundational text of Sharra , it still 
needs the interference of human reasoning. Acts of transaction as weil need the 
interference of human reasoning. The reasoning of Islamic jurists in relation to 
the acts of humans, and the opinions they would offer is termed as fiqh which is 
laid down in a countless number of manuscripts on such topics. The main 
difference, however, between the handling of acts of worship and acts of 
transaction is the basic principle in accordance to which the conclusion is 
reached. Acts of worship are forbidden unless prescribed by a foundational text 
and actions of transaction are permissible unless forbidden by a foundational 
text. In other words, humans cannot create a new action of worship that was not 
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prescribed the foundational text of Sharï'a while they cannot restrict an action of 
transaction that accords with the spirit of Sahree'aa and does not conflict with its 
foundational text. 
Jurists' opinions in relation to acts of worship may never become a law. 
Concurrently, their opinions in relation to actions of transaction will never become 
law unless adopted and legislated by the State as law. The author believes that 
this freedom, as given to legislators by Sharï'a would overcome the need to 
secularize laws and separate them from Shaii'a . 
Consequently, contrary to the prominent perception in the west, Islamic Law is 
not termed as such because it is the Religious Law of Muslims. The author 
suggests that the term Islamic Law should rather refer to those laws whether 
constitutional, civil, commercial or otherwise which accord with the spirit of 
Sharï'a and do not contradict its foundational text. 
Through such understanding the State does, indeed, have the freedom to 
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements, treaties and conventions so long as 
it finds them to be in line with its main duties towards its people. The Warsaw 
System and the Montreal Convention mayas such be seen as Islamic unless 
they are found to be in contradiction with the foundational text of Sharï'a or 
deviating from its spirit. 
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Part 1 also addressed in details the matter of diyah as an Islamic principle 
introduced by the foundational text of Sharf'a to rule on liability in cases of 
personal in jury and death. The principle of diyah rules over contractual and 
extracontractual liabilities. Although it does not need to be stipulated in a 
contract, parties may stipulate in their agreement to increase the limits of diyah 
as stated in the relevant law. They, however, may never agree before the in jury 
or death to decrease it. This, nonetheless, does not mean that the injured or their 
heirs do not have the right to agree to decrease or even waive it after the 
occurrence of the in jury. Such unique status of diyah is the core of the 3rd 
dimension through which the thesis will conduct the comparison between the 
Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention; from the perspective of Islamic-
fiqh. 
The next part of this thesis will try to elaborate on the current liability regime for 
air carriers, and investigate whether it contradicts the foundational text of 
Sahree'aa. Then it will suggest how such a regime would have developed if the 
dimension of Sharfa were to have been taken into consideration while 
developing the various international instruments. 
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PART 2: THE INTERPLAY OF DIYAH WITH THE WARSAW 
SYSTEM AND MONTREAL AND ROME CONVENTIONS 
127 
Chapter IV Introduction to Air Carriers' Contractual and Extra-
Contractual Liability 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous part of the thesis has elaborated on major concepts regarding 
Sharfa, Islamic-fiqh and Islamic law, paving the grounds for a concrete 
understanding of the subject matter of the thesis. With such an introduction, the 
reader shall be able to overcome the intellectual challenge of understanding and 
applying the methodology of Islamic-fiqh while analyzing the provisions of the 
Rome Convention, the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention. Having 
established this, this part of the thesis will try to elaborate on the subject of air 
carriers' liability towards persons onboard as weil as those on the ground in 
contrast with the 3rd dimension of Sharfa . 
The air carriers' li ab ilit y regime can be put into two categories; contractual and 
extra-contractual. Such segregation of the liability regime has taken place since 
the Paris Conference of 1925, where CITEJA's 181 agenda included "Damages 
caused by aircraft to goods and persons on the ground" as an independent 
agenda item. Separating this subject from others in such a manner reflects 
implicitly that the Conference had the intention of treating them differently. 
181 Comité International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aériens. 
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CITEJA was concerned with protecting air carriers from overwhelming liabilities 
that may be an obstacle to the advancement of the aviation industry. It was 
furthermore trying to avoid any exaggerated liability litigation either by virtue of 
contract or tort. 
This part of the thesis will follow such classification and categorization. It will 
therefore, discuss the Rome Convention independently from the Warsaw System 
and the Montreal Convention in different chapters. This part will, therefore, 
address the rules each of these instruments have established to regulate and 
unify air carriers' liability pertaining to in jury or death of persons. It will, as weil, 
reflect on such rulings from the perspective of Islamic Sharï'a and then suggest 
how it would have evolved if the dimension of Islamic Sharï'a had been taken 
into consideration at the outset. 
The Rome Convention, Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention evolved in 
a pure common and civil law environ ment without taking into consideration the 
principle of diyah adopted by Sharï'a which asserts that wrongdoers' liability is 
limited but may be raised by virtue of agreement or penalty. This 3rd dimension of 
Sharï'a, the author contends, is a middle line between the Rome and Warsaw 
lower limits and the unlimited liability agreed in Montreal. As will be discussed 
through this part of the thesis, because of the fact that diyah does not rely on 
contract in limiting liability, it would have had an immense impact on the drafting 
of Warsaw Convention. The resulting legal framework would not have evolved in 
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the way it has to today. The comparison with Islamic Sharfa does not mean, and 
is not intended to mean that the Rome Convention, the Warsaw System and the 
Montreal Convention are, at the outset, in conflict with the principles of Islamic 
Sharfa and, consequently, may not be seen as Islamic laws or Islamic coherent 
law. Rather, with such analysis, the author is trying to come up with suggestions 
based on grounds that were not taken into consideration at the time of adopting 
the existing regimes. 
It is noteworthy to point out that matters in relation to private international law 
are, in general devastatingly complicated. This is true especially when it comes 
to determining laws to be applied and the courts having jurisdiction over 
transnational incidents. After the advent of the aviation industry, these matters 
would become even further complicated without establishing a uniform law that 
ail nations of the world would agree upon and apply. It is so not only because of 
the speed with which aircraft pass territories and borders but also due to the 
great number of transnational factors associated with almost every international 
flight. For example, the carrier may belong to a State, the passenger may belong 
to another, the contract of carriage itself may have been concluded in a third and 
an incident or accident may happen over a fourth State. Such complications in 
addition to others, forced a number of States to gather with the aim of trying to 
create a unified internationalliability regime. 
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Great efforts were exerted until the end of the 3rd decade of the 20th century, 
when the Warsaw Convention was signed at Warsaw declaring the birth of the 1st 
legal instrument in connection with the Private International Air Law. The 
Convention aimed to unify the legal regime governing the international carriage 
by air of passengers, baggage and cargo covering two specifie objectives: (1) to 
establish a uniform scheme of dealing with claims arising out of international 
transportation; and (2) to limit potential air carriers liability in the event that 
damages resulted from a related accident.182 
Notwithstanding the fact that the authors of the Warsaw Convention 
demonstrated their farsightedness and intellectual skills by drafting a document 
of such complexity and sophistication, the Convention has been and continues to 
be a battlefield for different paradoxical opinions and interpretations. These 
controversies, which have spanned the entire life of the Convention, have 
resulted in the construction of a body of different interrelated instruments 
collectively referred to as the Warsaw System. 
The most recent product of these differences is the Montreal Convention, which 
entered into force between States party to it as of November 4th, 2003 and 
intends to unify the private international air law especially in the area of air 
carriers' liability after decades of contentions and disagreement. 
182 J.B. Alldredge, "Continuing Questions in Aviation Liability Law: Should Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention Be Construed to Encompass Physical Manifestations of Emotional and Mental Distress?" (Fall 
2002) 67:4 Journal Air Law and Commerce 1345 at 1347. 
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Throughout this Part of the thesis, the author will try to elaborate on the Rome 
Convention, the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention of 1999 and 
investigate ail of the various aspects and interpretations of these. The thesis will 
only focus on the matter of air carriers' liability in relation to the carriage of 
passengers by air. There may, indeed, be some reflections in relation to cargo 
and luggage wherever it is necessary, but they will, nonetheless, be outside of 
the scope of the focus of this thesis. Of course, the discussion will take place in 
contrast with the relevant perspectives of Islamic Sharfa. 
Chapter IV of this part will elaborate on the evolution of the air carriers' liability 
regime since inception to the present. This will include a brief elaboration on the 
Rome Convention, which is meant to unify the rules pertaining to extra-
contractual liability of air carriers towards persons and objects on the surface, 
and a comparison with the Islamic Sharfa perspective. Subsequently, Chapter V 
will discuss the evolution of the Warsaw System with a brief account of each of 
the instruments composing it. That Chapter will also include a brief introduction to 
the Montreal Convention of 1999. These two Chapters will clearly introduce the 
readers to the Conventions, in preparation for embarking on the core subject 
matter of the thesis. Chapter VI will be devoted to further discussion of the Rome 
Convention and the extra-contractual liability of air carriers with attention to the 
relevant dispositions of Islamic Sharfa. Chapter VI will address the contract of 
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carriage, as an introduction to Chapter VII which will discuss the Warsaw System 
and the Montreal Convention in comparison with Islamic Shan'"'a. 
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4.2 Historical Background 
When the Montgolfier Brothers flew their balloon for the first time, they provoked 
the earliest known Directive in relation to aviation. The police authorities of Paris 
issued a Directive on April 23rd 1784 to the effect that flights were not to take 
place without prior authorization.183 Balloons in France also brought about the 
issuance of the first Regulation pertaining to the safety of aerial navigation in 
1819.184 The first reported common law case of a tort committed in the course of 
aviation activity - loss of control by the pilot - was decided by the courts of the 
United States in 1822. 185 The first reported case of damage caused by aviation 
was litigated in the United Kingdom in 1889.186 On July 29th 1899 an international 
treaty entitled the International Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of 
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons was concluded between several States. 
Balloons were also the cause of the first international conference on aviation law 
between France and Germany in Paris. The conference was conducted in 1910 
to resolve the problem of German balloons crossing the French border while 
1831. H. Diederiks- Verschoor, An Introduction of Air Law, 6th ed. (Netherlands, Kluwer: 1997) at 2. 
184 P.B. Keenan, A. Lester and P. Martin, Shawcross and Beaumont On Air Law, 3rd ed. (London, 
Butterworths:1966) at 3 [hereinafter Shawcross]. 
185 Guille v. Swan (1822),19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381; U.S. Av. R. 53. 
186 Scot's Trustees v. Moss (1889), 17 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 32. 
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flying. 187 Although, the conference did not conclude in a treaty, it introduced the 
need to resolve issues in relation to flying objects on an international javel. 
On February 8, 1919 France and the United Kingdom operated the first 
scheduled air service between Paris and London. 188 This took place nineteen 
years after the first engine powered flight by the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk. 
Indeed, with the post World War 1 mentality in relation to sovereignty, such an 
operation called for various meetings and conferences on the international level, 
amongst these was the one conducted in Paris in 1919. 
Despite the fact that ail of these conferences and conventions were concerned 
with the public international law aspects of aviation, such as sovereignty and the 
denotation of airdromes, they attracted the attention of the international 
community to the need for a similar uniform regime governing private 
international air law. The first step towards such a regime was taken by the 
French government in June 1923, when a bill was submitted to the National 
Assembly regarding the liability of carriers in air transport. 189 Thereupon, the 
French government invited a number of States to an international conference to 
draw up a convention on the liability of air carriers. Accordingly, the first 
international conference on private air law was held in Paris between October 27 
and November 6, 1925 and was attended by the official representatives of fort Y 
187 1. H. Diederiks-Verschoor, supra note 183 at 2. 
188 Ibid. 
189 P. H. Sand, J. Freitas & G.N. Pratt, "An Historical Survey of International Air Law" (1960) 7 McGill 
L.J. 24 at 27. 
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four States as weil as observers from Hungary, Japan and the United States. The 
conference resulted in the creation of a committee of experts, to be known as 
CITEJA.190 Within the period between May 17, 1926, when the CITEJA members 
met for the first time in Paris, and the beginning of World War Il, there were four 
conventions and a protocol created by CITEJA and opened for signature. The 
most important of these conventions is the Warsaw Convention of 1929, which 
was submitted by CITEJA to the conference between October 4th to 12th , 1929. 
The Convention was the result of CITEJA's perusal of the questions raised in the 
Paris conferences of 1925 and 1926. It was opened for signature at the 
conclusion of the conference, which was attended by the representatives of 
thirty-three States. Two other documents were submitted to the conference held 
in Rome between May 9th and 29th , 1933. The first convention relates to the 
precautionary attachment of aircraft and the second was for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the 
Surface. 191 The latter was designed to govern air carriers' extra-contractual 
liability for fatalities caused by an aircraft, in contrast with the contractual liability 
governed by the Warsaw Convention. Neither of these two latter conventions 
entered into force because they did not achieve the required number of 
ratifications. A fourth document was submitted at the Brussels Conference of 
1938. It related to aviation insurance and was not ratified by any State. World 
War Il disrupted the remarkable progress of CITEJA, which subsequently ceased 
to exist. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
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The International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, was created as a result of 
the Chicago Convention of 1944. 192 The legal committee of ICAO took over 
CITEJA's responsibilities and was successful in creating many other conventions 
and protocols. Amongst these are the Tokyo Convention of 1963,193 ail the 
protocols and convention comprising the Warsaw System, the Rome Convention 
and its amending Protocol194 and the Montreal Convention of 1999. 
As a landmark advancement of the aviation industry in general, and the liability 
regime specifically, one can not ignore the creation of the International Air Traffic 
Association in 1919 by the principal companies operating international air 
services in Europe, which was meant to establish a single regime governing in 
the operation of airlines.195 Again, the outbreak of the World War Il interrupted 
the progress of this association, which was then liquidated in 1945 and replaced 
by the International Air Transport Association, which we ail now know as IATA.196 
The objective of the Association is to promote safe, regular and economical air 
transport for the benefit of the people of the world, to foster air commerce, and to 
study the problems connected therewith; to provide means for collaboration 
192 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6 [hereinafter Chicago 
Convention]. 
193 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircrajt, 14 September 1963, 
ICAO Doc. 8364 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention] .. 
194 Protocol to Amend the Convention on the Damage Caused by Foreign Aircrajt to Third Parties on the 
Surface, signed at Rome, on 7 October 1952, 23 September 1978, ICAO Doc. 9257 [hereinafter Montreal 
ProtocoI1978]. 
195 Shawcross, supra note 184 at 74. 
196 Ibid. 
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among the air transport enterprises engaged directly or indirectly in international 
air transport services; to co-operate with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization and other international organizations. 
The International Air Traffic Association drew up the Uniform Conditions of 
Carriage in 1927, which were framed so as to relieve a carrier from any liability 
(except where such liability was compulsory and imposed by national laws) to 
those with whom it had entered into a contract of carriage, either for in jury or 
death of the passenger or for the loss of or damage to cargo. 197 After the 
enactment of the Warsaw Convention, conditions of carriage were amended to 
comply with its requirements. 198 IATA continued to play a major role in the 
advancement of the aviation industry in general and aviation regulations in 
specific. In the field of air carriers' liability, sorne IATA members agonized in 1995 
over the unlimited strict liability concept. As a result, the IATA Inter-carrier 
Agreement (liA) was approved and adopted unanimously by a Resolution of the 
51 st Annual General Meeting of IATA in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on October 31, 
1995.199 
Under this agreement, the airlines agreed to waive the limits of liability in respect 
of claims under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for death or bodily in jury of 
197 Ibid. at 75. 
198 Ibid. at 77. 
199 D.H. Kim, "The System of the Warsaw Convention Liability in International Carriage by Air" (1997) 1: 
2 Boletim da Faculdade de Direito 55 at 70. 
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passengers as provided in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.200 The regime 
introduced by the liA imposed strict liability upon carriers for claims not 
exceeding 100,000 SOR. For amounts claimed in excess of 100,000 SOR, the 
agreement retained ail of the defences available under the Warsaw Convention 
to be invoked by the carriers. T 0 implement the principles of the Inter-carrier 
Agreement, airlines under the auspices of IATA adopted Measures to Implement 
the IATA Inter-carrier Agreement (MIA). 
This action taken by lAT A and its members has played a major role in two 
respects: i) it disrupted the Warsaw System as it introduced changed limits; and 
ii) it paved the way for the new Montreal Convention. Indeed, the Montreal 
Convention reflected the rules adopted by the liA and MIIA. 
The next Chapter will elaborate on the evolution of the Warsaw System by 
addressing each of its components. 
200 The IATA Inter-carrier Agreement 1995 (lIA) came into force on 14th February 1997. 
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Chapter V: Air Carriers' Extra-contractual Liability 
National laws would usually take different approaches to liabilities arising out of 
bodily in jury or death to persons on the surface and those arising out of trespass 
and nuisance. This is so because trespass and nuisance are torts related to the 
ownership or occupation of land, while the causation of bodily in jury or death of a 
person on the surface is not. Despite such differences in nature, they were both 
treated similarly on the international level under one convention. The only reason 
for treating both in the Rome Convention was, the author presumes, that both are 
extra-contractual liabilities dealing with third parties with whom the carrier has no 
contract. 
Whereas this thesis addresses carrier liability arising out of in jury or death of 
persons, whether aboard an aircraft or on surface; and whereas it also tries to 
elaborate on the diyah methodology which combines contractual and extra-
contractual liability, the author finds it necessary to elaborate on the Rome 
Convention and its implications in relation to air carriers' liability in general. This 
is do ne so as to set the Rome Convention apprapriately in context for the 
subsequent discussion. However, the thesis will concentrate on the part of the 
Convention relating to in jury and death of persons on the surface to avoid 
deviation fram its main subject mater. 
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5.1 The Rome Convention 
The Rome Convention is concerned with unifying the rules pertaining to extra-
contractual liability of air carriers for damages they may cause to third parties. It 
is composed of 6 chapters and 39 articles. It came into force on the 4th February 
1958 which was the 19th day after the date of the deposit of the 5th instrument of 
ratification. The Rome Convention was introduced in order to improve the 
provisions of the Rome Convention 1933 on the same subject. The 1952 
Convention, therefore, supersedes the 1933 Convention. However, to the 
present day, the Rome Convention has yet to be widely ratified. There are 
various reasons usually given for the reluctance of states to ratify the 
Convention, including that the provisions of the Convention linking the limits of 
liability to the weight of the aircraft, which may sometimes lead to unreasonable 
results. 201 Another reason is the very low limits of liability adopted by the 
Convention. To increase the likelihood of further ratifications, the Convention was 
amended by the Montreal Protocol of 1978 according to which the limits of 
liability in respect of personal in jury or loss of life were increased to 125,000 
SDRs.202 ln the following sections, the thesis will elaborate further on the various 
provisions of the Rome Convention and the amending Montreal Protocol of 1978. 
201 Shawcross, supra note 184 at 522. 
202 Montreal Protocol of 1978, supra note 194 Art. III. 
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5.2 Principles of Liability 
Articles 1 thraugh 10 articulate the principles of liability adopted by the Rome 
Convention. In order to define the scope of the Convention, Article 1 (1) pravides 
that: 
Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon praof only that 
the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing 
falling therefrom, be entitled to compensation as pravided by this 
Convention. Nevertheless there shall be no right to compensation if the 
damage is not a direct consequence of the incident giving rise thereto, or if 
the damage results fram the mere fact of passage of the aircraft through the 
airspace in conformity with existing air traffic regulations. 
According to this Article, a person who suffers damage caused by an aircraft in 
flight is entitled to compensation. Such entitlement however is subject to the 
following conditions: 
• The aircraft causing the damage has to be in flight. Article 1 (2) stipulates 
that U[f]or the purpose of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in 
flight fram the moment when power is applied for the purpose of actual take-
off until the moment when the landing run ends. In the case of an aircraft 
lighter than air, the expression "in flight" relates to the period fram the 
moment when it becomes detached fram the surface until it becomes again 
attached thereto"; and 
• Damage should be suffered by a person. Such damages shall include 
damages to property and personal injuries or death. 
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Reading this Article in conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 23, 24, 25 and 26, there 
shall be no right to compensation under the Rome Convention in the following 
circumstances: 
• If the damage is the direct consequence of armed conflict or civil 
d istu rbance ;203 
• If it is proved that the damage was caused solely through the negligence 
or other wrongful act or omission of the person who suffers the damage or 
of the latter's servants or agents. Nevertheless there shall be no such 
exoneration or reduction if, in the case of the negligence or other wrongful 
act or omission of a servant or agent, the person who suffers the damage 
proves that his servant or agent was acting outside the scope of his 
authority;204 
• If the damage is not a direct consequence of the incident giving ri se 
thereto·205 , 
• If the damage results from the mere fact of passage of the aircraft through 
the airspace in conformity with existing air traffic regulations; 
• If damage is not caused in the territory of a Contracting State by an 
aircraft registered in the territory of another Contracting State;206 
• If damage is caused to an aircraft in flight, or to persons or goods on 
board such aircraft;207 
203 Rome Convention, supra note 4 Art. 5. 
204 Ibid. Art. 6 (1). 
205 Ibid. Art. 23. 
206 Ibid. Art. 23 (l). 
207 Ibid. Art. 24. 
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• If damage is on the surface while liability for such damage is regulated 
either by a contract between the person who suffers such damage and the 
operator or the person entitled to use the aircraft at the time the damage 
occurred, or by the law relating to workmen's compensation applicable to 
a contract of employment between such persons;20B or 
• If damage is caused by military, customs or police aircraft.209 
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention define who shall be liable on the occurrence 
of damage. Article 2 (1) provides that 
The liability for compensation contemplated by Article 1 of this Convention 
shall attach to the operator of the aircraft. 
Articles 2(2) through 4 define the term operator. These articles provide that the 
operator of the ai rcraft , upon the realisation of damage, is not necessarily the 
owner of the aircraft in whose name it is registered. Nonetheless, the owner of 
the aircraft is presumed to be the operator unless in the proceedings for the 
determination of his liability, he proves that sorne other person was the operator 
and, in so far as legal procedures permit, takes appropriate measures to make 
that other person a party to the proceedings. 210 The operator may rather be 
another person with the following characteristics: 
208 Ibid. Art. 25. 
209 Ibid. Art. 26. 
210 Ibid. Art. 2 (3). 
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• the person who was making use of the aircraft at the time the damage was 
caused, provided that if control of the navigation of the aircraft was 
retained by the person from whom the right to make use of the aircraft was 
derived, whether directly or indirectly, that person shall be considered the 
operator211 ; or 
• A person shall be considered to be making use of an aircraft when he is 
using it personally or when his servants or agents are using the aircraft in 
the course of their employment, whether or not within the scope of their 
authority.212 
The owner of the aircraft or the person from whom rights are derived and the 
operator shall, however, be jointly and severally liable in the following 
circumstances: 
• If the person who was the operator at the time the damage was caused 
did not have the exclusive right to use the aircraft for a period of more than 
fourteen days, dating from the moment when the right to use commenced; 
or213 
• If a person makes use of an aircraft without the consent of the person 
entitled to its navigational control, unless he proves that he has exercised 
due care to prevent such use.214 
Article 7 adds to the previous stipulations that if the damage on the surface is an 
outcome of the collision of two aircraft, then the operators of each of the aircraft 
2Il Ibid. Art. 2(2/a). 
212 Ibid. Art. 2(2/b). 
213 Ibid. Art. 3. 
214 Ibid. Art. 4. 
145 
concerned shall be considered to have caused the damage and the operator of 
each aircraft shall be liable, each of them being bound under the provisions and 
within the limits of liability of the Convention. 
5.3 Extent of Liability and Related Securities 
Articles 11 through 14 delineate the extent or limit of liability under the Rome 
Convention. Article 11 links the liability of the operator to the weight of the aircraft 
causing the damage. This somewhat arbitrary method for determining the limits 
of liability is, indeed, one of the major obstacles preventing wide ratification of the 
Convention.215 Paragraph (1) of Article 11 specifies the limits of liability for each 
aircraft and incident in respect of ail persons liable under the Rome Convention, 
as follows: 
• 500,000 francs for aircraft weighing 1,000 kilograms or less; 
• 500,000 francs plus 400 francs per kilogram over 1 ,000 kilograms for 
aircraft weighing more than 1,000 but not exceeding 6,000 kilograms; 
• 2,500,000 francs plus 250 francs per kilogram over 6,000 kilograms for 
aircraft weighing more than 6,000 but not exceeding 20,000 kilograms; 
• 6,000,000 francs plus 150 francs per kilogram over 20,000 kilograms for 
aircraft weighing more th an 20,000 but not exceeding 50,000 kilograms; 
215 Shawcross, supra note 184 at 522. 
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• 10,500,000 francs plus 100 francs per kilogram over 50,000 kilograms for 
aircraft weighing more th an 50,000 kilograms. 
Paragraph 2 of the Article provides that the liability in respect of loss of life or 
personal in jury shall not exceed 500,000 francs per person killed or injured. 
These two paragraphs of Article 11 are to be interpreted in conjunction with 
Article 14, which provides that if the total amount of the claims established 
exceeds the limit of liability applicable under the provisions of the Convention, the 
following rules shall apply, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2 of 
Article 11: 
• If the claims are exclusively in respect of loss of life or personal in jury or 
exclusively in respect of damage to property, such claims shall be reduced 
in proportion to their respective amounts; 
• If the claims are both in respect of loss of life or personal in jury and in 
respect of damage to property, one half of the total sum distributable shall 
be appropriated preferentially to meet claims in respect of loss of life and 
personal in jury and, if insufficient, shall be distributed proportionately 
between the claims concerned. 
• The remainder of the total sum distributable shall be distributed 
proportionately among the claims in respect of damage to property and 
the portion not already covered of the claims in respect of loss of life and 
personal in jury. 
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Article 12 of the Convention stipulates that the limits of liability shall not apply if 
the person who suffers damages praves that it was caused by a deliberate act or 
omission of the operator, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause 
damage. 
The Convention permits the Contracting States to require that the operator of an 
aircraft registered in another Contracting State be insured in respect of his 
liability. It also elaborates on the conditions and security Contracting States may 
require from operators. 216 
5.4 Rules of Procedure and Limitation of Actions217 
Article 19 specifies that ail claimants are to bring their claims to court within 6 
months of the date of the incident which caused the damage in order to be 
among those to gain a proportionate share of the compensation as per Article 14. 
Article 20 seeks to unify rules in relation to jurisdiction, notification of 
praceedings, consolidation of cases and enforceability and execution of 
judgements. Article 21 provides that actions under the Convention shall be 
subject to a limitation period of two years tram the date of the incident which 
caused the damage. 
216 Rome Convention, supra note 4 Chapter III, articles 15 - 18. 
217 Ibid. Chapter IV, articles 19 - 22. 
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5.5 Application of the Convention and General Provisions218 
Articles 24, 25 and 26, which set out the key exceptions to the application of the 
Convention, have already been touched upon above. Subsequent articles 
address the issues of; facilitation of payments,219 legislative measures,220 effect 
of the Convention with regard to the Rome Convention of 1933 221 and the 
definition of key terms.222 
Articles 31 through 39 of the Convention address the ratification deposition,223 
coming into force, 224 denunciation, 225 application of the Convention and 
reservations.226 
5.6 Evaluating the Rome Convention 
The Rome Convention has not yet gained more th an 46 ratifications, and three of 
these have subsequently denounced. It is therefore ail but obsolete. Indeed, the 
limits of liability, as defined by the Rome Convention, are unrealistically low and 
arbitrary, favouring the interest of the air carrier over the interest of the third party 
218 Ibid. Chapter V, articles 23 - 30. 
219 Ibid. Art. 27. 
220 Ibid. Art. 28. 
221 Ibid. Art. 29. 
222 Ibid. Art. 30. 
223 Ibid. Art. 32. 
224 Ibid. Arts. 33 and 34. 
225 Ibid. Art. 35. 
226 Ibid. Arts. 36 - 39. 
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suffering damage. The mathematical equation of proportionate reduction of 
liability is not as easy to apply as it sounds. Such a proportionate reduction 
methodology followed by the Convention implies that ail cases in relation to a 
specifie accident should first be resolved, and then actual amounts of 
compensation to each affected person on the surface are to be decided. This is 
an unrealistic approach. Although the Convention tried to address this issue in 
Article 20 (3) by obliging the courts of Contracting States, so far as possible, to 
ensure that ail actions arising from a single incident are consolidated in a single 
proceeding before the same court, this may not indeed always be possible. The 
Convention, therefore, accepts this fact without envisaging a solution. In 
particular, when cases in relation to one incident are not consolidated before the 
same court, the Convention does not address the issue as to which court shall 
have the right to decide the proportionate amounts to be paid by the carrier to 
each affected person since the amounts are decided for each of them on 
individual bases. 
Surprisingly, the low limits of liability of the Rome Convention were adopted at 
the same time as there was a struggle under way to produce higher limits in the 
Warsaw Convention. The Rome Convention actuallY entered into force three 
years after the adoption of the Hague Protocol. Whereas liability arises under 
contract in Warsaw and under tort in the Rome Convention, this do es not provide 
any reason, in the author's view, for establishing the limits of compensation in 
cases of injuries and death differently. Such a disparity between what an injured 
150 
or dead person on the ground would receive, and what a victim would receive 
when suffering the same in jury or death on board is intuitively unacceptable, and 
implies that the Rome Convention was drafted in complete isolation from the 
Warsaw System, and with no link whatsoever to the Montreal Convention of 
1999. 
The protocol adopted at Montreal in 1978 to amend the Rome Convention did not 
receive its fifth ratification required for it to enter into force until July, 2002. This 
shows that the whole system adopted by the Convention requires improvement 
not only the limits of liability. The need to revisit the Rome Convention to address 
the whole liability regime towards things and persons on the surface was 
underlined after the dramatic catastrophe which occurred on the 11 th of 
September 2001. There is now both a legal and mainly a political conflict over 
who shall bear the risk of terrorist attacks such as those of the 11 th of September, 
the government or the carrier? 80th are now lobbying to burden the other with 
this risk. ICAO has accordingly set up a special Secretariat Study Group (SSG) 
to revisit the legal regime created by the Rome Convention and the amending 
Montreal Protocol. 227 The intention behind this study is to extend the liability 
regime for surface damage so as to expressly encompass terrorist acts.228 The 
new draft to be proposed by the SSG will link the new Rome Convention with the 
227 Barlow Lyed & Gelbert, BLG Aviation News Issue 15, 'The Rome Convention Re-visited - A Cap on 
the Priee of Terror" Winter 200312004 at 1. 
228/bid. 
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regime adopted by the new Montreal Convention of 1999 under which a two tier 
liability regime is advanced. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the author suggests that both air 
carriers' contractual and extra-contractual liability should be governed by the 
same Convention or by two Conventions directly linked to each other. Third 
parties on the ground and passengers onboard affected by an accident caused 
by an aircraft should not be dealt with differently. However, this argument will 
require elaboration upon the Warsaw Convention and on the contract of carriage. 
Before taking up that discussion, however, it is first of essence to the thesis to 
compare the current Rome Convention with the Islamic methodology of diyah. 
5.7 Comparison with Diayh 
ln comparison with the principles and methodology of Islamic-fiqh, especially 
those related to diyah, the Rome Convention presents various points of 
agreement and disagreement. 
At the outset they both focus on compensating the harmed person and not 
penalizing the carrier, which is presumed to have caused the damage 
unintentionally. Where the damage is caused intentionally, nevertheless, they 
both penalize the carrier but using different methodologies. The Rome 
Convention penalizes the carrier by returning it to the original status of unlimited 
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liability,229 while the diyah system would increase the limits to double or even 
more but would always preserve sorne limit. 
Rome and diyah base compensation on the link between damages and 
causation. Both place the burden of proof of this link on the harmed persons or 
their heirs.23o The Rome Convention however goes to the extreme opposite end 
of the scale by ruling that the harmed person shaH have no compensation if the 
damage is not directly caused by the carrier. The diyah system, on the other 
hand, would instead reduce the liability of the carrier by a proportionate 
percentage to its contribution to the damage. 
For compensation to be due, Rome requires that aircraft be in flight, which starts 
from the moment when power is applied to the aircraft, or for aircraft lighter than 
air, from the moment it becomes detached from the surface. This is a procedural 
provision with which the diyah system would not conflict. This is due to it being 
assumed that when power is not applied to the aircraft, it is in a place where 
people aftected by it would be in a position to bring suit under various types of 
contracts or the ordinary regime of extra-contractual liability. Moreover, it should 
not always be the responsibility of the operator in such a situation to take care of 
others, as the aircraft may not be under his control. 
229 See Rome Convention, supra note 4, Art. 12. 
230 See Ibid. Art. 1. 
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Rome, moreover, in Articles 5, 6, 23, 24, 25 and 26 lists situations in which 
carriers bear no liability towards injured persons. Included on the list is the case 
of force majeure.231 Similarly, Islamic diyah would not consider the carrier liable 
in such circumstances. The list also includes the case of proving that damages 
were caused solely through the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of 
the person who suffers the damage. This, likewise, accords with the principle of 
diyah that liability is divided proportionally to the contribution of the wrongdoer to 
the damage. Furthermore, Islamic-fiqh never allows a person to benefit from his 
own wrongdoing. 
As will be shown while discussing contractualliability, Rome and diyah are also 
in coherence with each other when Rome states that there shall be no 
exoneration or reduction in the case of the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of a servant or agent, if the person who suffers the damage proves that 
his servant or agent was acting outside the scope of his authority.232 ln such a 
case, diyah would make the servant or agent together with the carrier liable to 
the person who suffers the damage in proportion to the contribution of each. 
Diyah would not however, require a proof that the agent was acting outside the 
scope of his authority. 
ln addition, the list excludes carriers' liability if damage is caused to an aircraft in 
flight or to persons or goods on board such aircraft. Such an exclusion may 
231 Ibid. Art. 5. 
232 Ibid. Art. 6 (l). 
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theoretically be acceptable where the victim would have the right to 
compensation under contract trom the carrier on board whose tlight the in jury 
occurred. As for diyah, in the case of a collision, both carriers are jointly and 
severally liable towards the injured person on the grounds of their contribution to 
the damage. 
The Rome Convention attributes liability to the operator. It details who shall be 
deemed the operator. The owner of the aircraft is usually presumed to be the 
operator unless it is proven that some other persons were the operators of the 
aircraft. This, of course, is in agreement with diyah. 
The limits or extent of liability as enumerated in the Rome Convention is a point 
of divergence from the diyah system. This is because of the methodology of 
calculation, which may result in dramatic variation in compensation within the 
Rome Convention on arbitrary weight-based grounds. Rome's methodology of 
compensation addresses the carrier rather th an the harmed person. It therefore 
appears to limit liability or to some extent even relieve the carrier from liability in 
detriment to the victims. Diyah, on the other hand, would concentrate on 
compensating the victims within a unified limit to liability. According to diyah, ail 
suffering persons shall be compensated equivalently. Each claim under diyah, 
however, shall not exceed the limits enumerated for each person. The only 
variation in quantum would result from variation in damages. Such a 
methodology, had it been applied under the Rome Convention, might have 
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convinced States to ratify, since it avoids two of the concerns that now confront 
the Convention. Firstly. it fixes the amount of compensation to be paid to the 
victim regardless of any variation in the make, model and weight of the aircraft 
causing damage and regardless of the number of persons harmed. Secondly, 
depending upon how its limits of liability are interpreted in contemporary context, 
diyah may provide a basis for raising the limits of liability under the Rome 
Convention. 
Indeed, one problem with the diyah system as elaborated upon in Part 1 of the 
thesis is the methodology of calculating the quantum that suffering persons 
should receive. In Part 1, the author suggested that diyah may be calculated on 
the basis of three years income of a middle class family of six. This methodology 
could result in compensating persons in the United States of America, for 
example, differently from persons in a developing nation, where the aggregate 
annual income of middle class families is much lower than in the USA. This 
methodology might further result in compensating persons differently in 
accordance to the statistics of each year. It, moreover, may not be able to 
respond to the case of a visitor who suffers damages on the surface of another 
contracting party which has higher or lower aggregate annual incarne than in 
his/her own country. The author, therefore, suggests that consideration of the 
limits should be based on the aggregate annual income of the State having the 
highest record as per the United Nations statistics, which however should be 
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reviewed periodically. This methodology does not contradict Islamic principles in 
relation to diyah and, simultaneously, would avoid low limits of liability. 
Articles 19 and 21 of the Rome Convention create time bars for claims. Article 19 
provides that claimants must bring their claims to court within six months of the 
date of the incident that has caused the damage to be among those due a 
proportionate share of the compensation under Article 14. Article 21 dictates that 
actions under the Rome Convention are subject to a limitation period of two 
years from the date of the incident which caused the damage. Under Islamic-fiqh, 
monetary rights, in principle, are not extinguished by passage of time, but 
legislators may set up a prescription period for courts not to accept any claims 
after the passage of a certain time. 
ln conclusion, the only point of the Rome Convention that present a major 
inconsistency with the diyah system is the methodology of fixing limits of liability. 
Diyah is not unique in this point of disagreement; rather it is in accordance with 
most of the other systems of law in States which did not rat if y the Convention. 
The thesis will go on to discuss how taking account of the diyah system could 
help to solve the problems associated with the Rome Convention and link the 
Warsaw and the Montreal Conventions with the Rome provisions. We turn next, 
therefore, to an exploration of these other Conventions. 
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Chapter VI: The Contract of International Carriage of Passengers 
Air carriers' liability towards passengers is based on the contract of carriage, 
which can be of two types, domestic or international. A contract of domestic 
carriage is usually subject to the national laws of the State in which the carriage 
is performed. A contract of international carriage, on the other hand, is subject to 
international treaties between States. 
By referring to contractual liability, the author me ans liability under the Warsaw 
System and the Montreal Convention. These two instruments address the 
various aspects of the contract of carriage including documentation, limits of 
liability and jurisdiction. This chapter will concentrate on the formation, parties 
and terms of the contract of carriage and the conditions of carriage. To elaborate 
on, and to address the matter of air carriers' contractualliability, the thesis will go 
through the articles of the various documents comprising the Warsaw System as 
weil as the corresponding provisions of the Montreal Convention. Before doing 
so, however, this chapter will outline the various instruments comprising the 
Warsaw System. It will subsequently elaborate on the various aspects of the 
contract of carriage. 
6.1 Knowing the Warsaw System 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Warsaw Convention intended to unify the laws 
and rules pertaining to air carriers' liability, it actually had, to a certain extent, the 
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diametrically opposed effect. Soon after it entered into force, litigants began to 
debate the limits of liability in order to attempt to overcome or circumvent them, 
while defendants, usually air carriers, were trying to ensure their application.233To 
accommodate such variations and cope with the rapid development of case law, 
ICAO adopted various instruments to amend the Warsaw Convention. These 
instruments are collectively called the Warsaw System, which is comprised of the 
following documents: 
6.1.1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to 
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 
234 
As is discussed above, the Warsaw Convention was the result of two 
international conferences organized by CITEJA.235 
The Warsaw Convention is composed of 5 chapters and 41 Articles addressing 
the contractual liability of air carriers in international carriage of cargo, 
passengers and their luggage. It is one of the most widely ratified instruments in 
private international law, having at the time of writing 151 signatories. 236 
Subsequent sections of the next two chapters will elaborate further on the 
provisions of the Warsaw Convention. 
233 See Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd., [1937] 1. K. B. 50; 1 Avi 622 [hereinafter Grein v. Imperial 
Airways]. 
234 Supra note l. 
235 See Section 4.2 above. 
236 See Homepage of Internationl Civil Aviation Organization <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/wc-hp.pdf> 
(date accessed 14/0912006). 
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6.1.2 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 
12 October 1929, done at the Hague on 28 September 1955237 
The first amendment to the Warsaw Convention was made by the Protocol to 
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air, known as the Hague Protocol of the 28th September 
1955. Despite the fact that the Hague Protocol did not change the basis of air 
carriers' liability, it introduced very important amendments aimed at solving the 
legal and economic issues that arose during the application of the Warsaw 
Convention since its coming into force. 238 The most important amendment it 
introduced concerned the limits of liability. 
After lengthy debates, Article XI of the Hague Protocol amended the provisions of 
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention and doubled the limit of liability of carriers 
for death, wounding or other bodily in jury of each passenger to 250,000 Poincare 
francs.239 
The Protocol, moreover, introduced a new provision in relation to loss, damage 
or delay of part of registered baggage or cargo where the weight to be taken into 
consideration in determining the amount to which the carrier's liability is limited is 
237 ICAO Doc. 7632. [hereinafter the Hague Protocol]. 
238 G. Miller, Liability in International Air Transport (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1977) at 68. 
239 US Dollars 16,600. 
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the total weight of the package or packages concerned. 240 ln addition, the se 
limits were made applicable to air carrier's servants and agents.241 
Another important addition saw the introduction by the Hague Protocol of a 
provision which foresees that the Court may, in accordance with its own law, 
award court costs and other expenses incurred through litigation to the plaintiff. 
However, this could be done only where the damages awarded do not exceed 
the sum offered by the carrier to the claimants in writing within six months of the 
date of the event causing the damage.242 
Finally, in place of the wilful misconduct rules under Article 25 of Warsaw, Article 
XIII of the Hague Protocol introduced the fOllowing text: 
The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that 
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or 
agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge 
that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such an act 
or omission of a servant or a~ent, it is also proved that he was acting within 
the scope of his employment. 43 
The Hague Protocol is composed of 3 chapters and 27 Articles and entered into 
force on 13 August 1963. It has been ratified by 136 States.244 
240 The Hague Protocol, supra note 237Art. IX 2 (b). 
241 Ibid. Art. XIV. 
242 Ibid. Art. XI (4). 
243 Ibid. Art. XIII. 
244 The United States of America have ratified the Hague Protocol implicitly through ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol N04. 
161 
6.1.3 Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 
Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, signed in 
Guadalajara, on 18 September 1961 245 
As the aviation industry continued to develop and evolve, new practices not 
covered by the Warsaw Convention or its amendments in the Hague Protocol 
began to arise. Some of these practices created a situation in which the carrier 
might not be contractually linked to the passenger under the terms of the Warsaw 
Convention, such as the case of lease or charter. ICAO, therefore, convened a 
conference on September 18,1961 in Guadalajara City. This conference resulted 
in the adoption of the Guadalajara Convention. This Convention in its 18 articles 
recognizes the distinction between the contracting and the actual carrier. It 
applies or extends the rules of the Warsaw Convention or the Convention as 
amended by the Hague Protocol to the carrier performing the carriage on behalf 
of the carrier who contracted with the passenger for the performance of carriage. 
According to Article I(b) of the Convention, the contracting carrier is the person 
who as principal, makes an agreement for carriage governed by the Warsaw 
Convention with a passenger or a consignor, or with a person acting on behalf of 
the passenger or consignor. Article I(c) defines actual carrier in contrast to 
contracting carrier as a person, stipulating that "the actual carrier is a person 
other than the contracting carrier who, by virtue of authority from the contracting 
carrier, performs the whole or part of the carriage contemplated in paragraph (b) 
245 ICAO Doc. 8181. [hereinafter Guadalajara Convnetion] 
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but who is not with respect to such part a successive carrier within the meaning 
of the Warsaw Convention.". Despite the fact that the United States of America 
did not ratify it, the Guadalajara Convention has 84 signatories.246 
6.1.4 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 
12 October 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on 
28 September 1955, signed at Guatemala City, on 8 March 1971247 
The Guatemala City Protocol adopted provisions that would have solved many 
paradoxical interpretations of the Warsaw Conventions and its amendments. 
However it has never entered into force. 
Instead of concentrating on the limits of liability alone, this Protocol attempted to 
reshape the whole of the Warsaw Convention. 
The Guatemala City Protocol established a regime of strict Iiability of the carrier 
in the case of death, wounding or other bodily in jury of passengers and also for 
the destruction, loss or damage of baggage, "checked or unchecked". Article IV 
(1) of the Protocol, intended as a replacement for Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, states, 
246 See International Civil Aviation Organization http://www.icao.intlicao/enlleb/guadalajara.pdf (date 
accessed 14/09/2006). 
247 ICAO Doc. 8932. [hereinafter Guatemala City ProtocolJ. 
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The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal in jury 
of a passenger upon condition only that the event that which caused the 
death or in jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable 
if the death or in jury resulted solely from the state of health of the 
passenger 
Compared to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, it may be noted that the term 
"accident" had been replaced by the term "event". More significantly, the term 
"bodily injury" used in Article 17 was replaced by the term "personal injury". Such 
replacements sought to coyer a wider subject matter than originally covered by 
the Warsaw Convention. 248 Personal in jury for instance would include mental 
in jury whereas bodily in jury would not. Article IV (2) extends the legal regime of 
strict liability to include the transportation of baggage. 
Furthermore, the Protocol attempted to increase the limits of liability to levels that 
reflected changes in the global economy. The limit of liability was increased to 
1,500,000249 francs in the case of death or in jury of a passenger.250 However it is 
specified that this limit may not be exceeded under any CÎrcumstances. Thus, 
unlike the new Montreal Convention of 1999, the Protocol attempted to raise the 
limits of liability while retaining the principle of limited liability. 
Another important advance that the Protocol tried to introduce was the creation of 
a more practical system of documentation. The purpose was to prevent the 
248 M. Milde, "Warsaw requiem or unfinished symphony? (From Warsaw to The Hague, Guatemala, 
Montreal, Kuala Lumpur and to .... ?)" [1996] The Aviation Quarterly 37 at 40. 
249 Equivalent to US$ 100,000. 
250 Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 247 Art. VIII( 1)( a). 
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formalities of documentation from having any impact on the liability regime. If 
ratified, such an approach would have solved the object of much litigation. 
Unfortunately, this Protocol is not and never will be in force. The Protocol fell 
victim to its own Article XX which required that it be ratified by the five States 
whose airlines represent at least 40% of total scheduled international air traffic. 
Despite this lack of success of the Guatemala City Protocol, it can be argued that 
this Protocol was the Godfather of the Montreal Convention. 
6.1.5 Additional Protocols to Amend the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, signed at Montreal, on 25 September 
1975 (Montreal Protocol No.1,2512,2523253 and 4254). 
These 4 Montreal Protocols are among the best examples of how the paths of 
economics, politics and law are inextricably linked. 
After go Id was demonetized in the early 1970's, the Warsaw Convention and its 
supplementary instruments were found to be beset with a monetary 
anachronism. Ali of these documents expressed the limits of liability in terms of 
French go Id francs consisting of 65 % milligrams of gold at the standard fineness 
251 ICAO Doc. 9145. [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 1] 
252 ICAO Doc. 9146. [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No.2] 
253 ICAO Doc. 9147. [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No.3] 
254 ICAO Doc. 9148. [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No.4] 
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of nine hundred thousands. Such provisions relied on gold to be the basic 
monetary yardstick. As soon as gold was demonetized and became a subject of 
the market rules of supply and demand, these provisions needed to be 
changed.255 
Montreal Protocols No. 1, 2 and 3 of 1975 adopted a new yardstick applied by 
the International Monetary Fund called Special Drawing Rights. Each of these 3 
Protocols was concerned with one of instruments comprising the Warsaw 
System at that point of time. More precisely, Montreal Protocol No.1 addressed 
the Warsaw Convention itself, while Montreal Protocol No. 2 addressed the 
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. Montreal Protocol No. 3 
addressed the Guatemala City Protocol. 
Since both ICAO and lAT A considered that due to growth in international 
business a parallel regime should be adopted with respect to the liability of the 
carrier for cargo, the Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 restated the ru les 
relating to the carriage of cargo byair.256 
Montreal Additional Protocols Nos.1, 2 & 3 did not alter the limits of liability 
adopted by the original instruments. Rather, they kept the same limits in the SDR 
format. Accordingly, Montreal Additional Protocol No.1 provided a passenger 
255 See T. A. Weigand, "Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances under the Warsaw Convention" 
(2001) ]6 Am. U. InC] L. Rev. 891at 906. 
256 D. H. Kim, supra note] 99 at 63. 
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liability limit of 8,300 SORs, a registered baggage limit of 17 SORs per kilogram, 
and a 332 SOR limit per passenger for objects which the passenger takes charge 
of himself. 257 ln accordance with the Hague Protocol, Montreal Additional 
Protocol No. 2 doubled the passenger liability limit to 16,600 SORs and retained 
ail the other limits established by Protocol No. 1.258 Montreal Additional Protocol 
No. 3 raised the limits to the level of those contained in the Guatemala City 
Protocol, namely 100,000 SORs per passenger for passenger liability, 4150 
SORs per passenger for delay, 1000 SORs per passenger for loss, damage, 
destruction or delay to baggage, and 17 SORs per kilogram for cargo.259 
Montreal Additional Protocols No. 1, 2, and 4 have secured the required number 
of ratifications and have since entered into force. However, Montreal Additional 
Protocol No. 3 has not entered into force yet, due to its relationship to the 
Guatemala City Protoco!. The gold currency unit may be retained by States 
which are not members of the International Monetary Fund and whose law does 
not permit the use of SORs.260 
6.1.6 Inter-carrier Agreements 
Oespite the fact that the following instruments are not treaties or Conventions 
adopted by governments, they have had an immense impact on the liability 
257 Montreal Additional Protocol No. 1, supra note 251 Art. Il. 
258 Montreal Additional Protocol No. 2, supra note 252Art. II. 
259 Montreal Additional Protocol No. 3, supra note 253 Art. II. 
260 Montreal Additional Protocol No. l, supra note 251 Art. II. 
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regime as adopted by the Warsaw System. Moreover, they contributed to the 
advent of the Montreal Convention. It is important, therefore, to elaborate briefly 
on these documents as an integral part of the Warsaw System though they may 
not be deemed as such on a purely legal basis. 
6.1.6.1 The Montreal Agreement 1966 
This agreement was the result of the denunciation of the Warsaw Convention 
filed by the United States of America on the 1Sth October 1965 as a consequence 
of the low limits of liability adopted by the Convention. Before such denunciation 
took effect, ICAO took the initiative and held a conference in Montreal Canada in 
February 1966 to try to solve the problem.261 
Two days before the denunciation could take effect, the Montreal Agreement was 
signed and the denunciation was retracted.262 This accord is a private agreement 
signed by several air carriers operating to, from or through the territory of the 
United States. By virtue of this special contract,263 air carriers agreed to raise the 
limits of liability adopted by the Warsaw Convention to USD 75000 inclusive of 
attorney's fees and costs. In the Montreal Agreement, air carriers also waive their 
right to the defences available under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, 
261 According to Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention "denunciation shall take effect six month after 
notification" . 
262 P. Dempsey & M.Milde, International Air Carrier Liability: The Montreal Convention of 1999 
(Montreal: McGiIl University, 2005) at 30. 
263 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 Article 32. 
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thereby subjecting themselves to strict liability. Accordingly, harmed passengers 
or their heirs would only need to prove damage up to USD 75000. 
6.1.6.2 IATA Intercarrier Agreement (liA); Measures to Apply IATA 
International Agreement (MIIA) 
The limits of liability adopted by the Warsaw Convention and its supplementary 
instruments were taken by air carriers as a safeguard against the jungle of 
paradoxical laws. This safeguard began to deteriorate owing to economic 
inflation which rendered the limits of liability adopted by Warsaw derisory. This 
situation created a problematic situation for air carriers, which started to believe 
that if they did not take the initiative, the Warsaw Convention would soon be 
denounced by major States.264 ln fact, this situation had already been faced in 
1965 when the United States filed for denunciation. The failure to obtain the 
ratification of the Guatemala City Protocol was another concern in this area. In 
1974, an informai consortium of European governments encouraged their flag 
carriers to adopt higher limits of liability.265 This resulted in the Malta Agreement 
of 1974. The Italian Constitutional Court found, in 1985, that the domestic law 
implementing the Warsaw/Hague limitations of liability was void as it conflicted 
with Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution.266 This decision subjected Italian 
carriers to unlimited liability until 1988 when the Italian government enacted Law 
264 See P. Dempsey & M.Milde, supra note 262 at 33. 
265 Ibid. at 3l. 
266 Ibid. 
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No. 274 providing for strict carrier liability up to 100,000 SORs and imposed a 
requirement of compulsory insurance.267 
ln 1995, after gaining IATA antirust immunity from the U.S. Oepartment of 
Transportation (DOT), IATA carriers gathered at the Washington Conference 
preparing the way for what is now collectively known as the IATA "Intercarrier 
Agreements on Passenger Liability".268 
The agreements consist of the lAT A Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger 
Li abi lit y (liA), signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 21 October 1995, and the 
IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement 
(MIIA), opened for signature in May 1996. For convenience, the agreements are 
hereafter referred to collectively as the Intercarrier Agreements. 
According to these Agreements, the airlines who signed them voluntarily 
undertook to waive Article 22(1) limits in respect of claims for "recoverable 
compensatory damages" under the Warsaw regime as weil as any Article 20(1) 
defences up to 100,000 SORs. 
6.2The Contra ct of Carriage 
267 Ibid. 
268 L. s. Clark, "European Council Regulation (EC)No.2027/97: Will the Warsaw Convention Bite Back?" 
(2001) vol. xxvi/3Air & Space Law 137 at 138. 
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The explicit reference to the contract of carriage throughout the articles of the 
Warsaw Convention, its subsequent amendments and the Montreal Convention 
of 1999, implies that these instruments assume the existence of a contract of 
carriage between the carrier and the passenger. None of them, nevertheless, 
contains a definition of the term contract of carriage.269 This term has therefore 
never received unanimous treatment. 
CITEJA defined the contract of carriage as an "[a]rrangement to carry by air 
made between a carrier and a passenger or consignor,,270 The author suggests 
that although this definition addresses perfectly the parties to the contract of 
carriage, it is not helpful with regard to the nature of the contract of carriage nor 
does it solve the problems of how, where and when it is formed. 
Sorne other definitions provide that "a contract of carriage is formed when one 
party is bound to carry by aircraft the other party from one place t9 another and 
the other party is bound to pay the price,,271 According to this definition, payment 
by the passenger is an essential element of the contract of carriage. Gratuitous 
carriage would, consequently, be outside of the scope of this definition. This does 
not comport with the provisions of Article 1 (1) of Warsaw and Montreal 
Conventions, which recognize gratuitous carriage as a valid contract of carriage 
269 See A. M. Briant, "International Carriage of Cargo: A comparative study of the liability of the carrier in 
Maritime and Air Transport Law" (1993) XVIII:I Annals of Air and Space Law 50. 
270 See S. Tsai, The Legal Status of Passenger Ticket For International Carriage by Air (LL.M. Thesis, 
Institute of Air And Space Law, McGill University 1968) [unpublished] at 17. 
271 See Storm van's Gravesande, J. W. E. "Right examiner on dut y" (1984) VIII:2 Air Law 115. 
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that the "payment" definition attempts to introduce the element of consideration 
as found in common law. Thus, for example, in Bates Black et al. v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France a U.S. court held: 272 
It is also clear that by referring to a contract, the Convention does not intend 
to establish the prerequisite that consideration, in a corn mon law sense, 
must flow both ways between the two parties before their relationship can 
come under the Convention's control. Even if the passenger should make 
no promise to pay there would still be a contract of transportation, 
supported by cause, in a civilian sense. Article 1 (1) explicitly declares that 
the Convention shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft 
performed by an air transportation enterprise 
Accordingly, ail that is needed to establish the contract of carriage is a promise or 
an undertaking on the part of the carrier to transport the passenger, and the 
consent of the passenger. In the case of Robert M. Boyar et al. v. Korean Air 
Lines,273 the court held that "[t]he mutual consent necessary to the formation of 
the contract occurred in Seoul, and the United States was, therefore, not an 
appropriate jurisdiction to hear the action" It he Id further that "the passenger 
ticket was not the contract, but its issuance evidenced the contractual 
relationship between (the parties)." Thus, in Black v. Air France and Boyar v. 
Korean Air Unes, the existence of the contract of carriage depends only on the 
mutual consent of both the carrier and the passenger in a manner that reflects 
the intentions of the parties and does not depend on the payment of 
consideration. 
272 (1967) 386 F.2d 323 (CA-5) , 10 Avi 17,5] 8 [hereinafter Block v. Air France]. 
273 (1987) 664 F. Supp. ]48] (D.C. Cir), 20 Avi 18,467 [hereinafter Boyar v. Korean Airlines]. 
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ln conformity with these two judgments, the contract of carriage may be defined 
as "an agreement whereby the carrier binds himself by contract to perform the 
carriage of goods or persons by air.,,274 
The definition of the contract of carriage by air under Islamic-fiqh is likely 
consistent with the approach just described, although of course it was not 
explicitly discussed in the traditional sources. This conclusion is reached based 
on the various definitions available for the contract of carriage by sea, which is 
discussed thoroughly in the source works. Using the technique of analogy, we 
may conclude that the contract of carriage is "a consensual contract that is 
formed at the exchange of the mutual consents of the parties whereby the carrier 
undertakes to perform the carriage whether gratuitously or for compensation." 
The contract of carriage is, as such, formed on the exchange of offer and 
acceptance between the passenger and the carrier. The next section will discuss 
in more detail the formation of the contract of carriage. 
6.2.1 Formation of the Contract Of Carriage 
As previously established, the existence of the contract of carriage relies on the 
exchange of offer and acceptance by the parties. 
274 See A. M. Brian, supra note 269 at 50. 
173 
Airlines usually issue timetables or tariffs that contain conditions of carriage 
under which a passenger makes his reservation. The author suggests two 
possible scenarios for understanding the function of tariffs and timetables of 
airlines. 
ln the first scenario, timetables may be considered as a continuous offer by the 
carrier to the public, to which a person may assent simply by making a 
reservation or by buying a ticket or, in a second scenario, timetables may be 
considered as an invitation to treat which allows passengers to manifest their 
offer by making a reservation or buying a ticket. Airlines either accept or reject 
offers, made by clients, by either making or refusing the reservation or by the 
issuance or otherwise of a ticket. 
ln general, the classification of an invitation to treat would mean that the airline is 
inviting the public to manifest their offers, and repeating the conditions of contract 
and carriage. It also means that the offeror would be able to bargain over the 
price and is fully aware of the conditions of contract and conditions of the 
carriage at the conclusion of the contract. Such a presumption would result in the 
dismissal of any contention by the passenger that he/she was not aware of those 
conditions. It is also at odds with the actual interplay in the contracting process 
between the air carrier and the passenger. 
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Thus air carriers are always the offerors and passengers are always the 
offerees.275 Offers are sufficiently definite manifestations of an intention to sell a 
ticket. Offers contain dates, departure and arrivai times, priees, aircraft types, 
and even information about meals offered onboard. A person wanting to fly with 
the airline on a specifie flight may accept the offer and conclude a contract by 
buying a ticket, making a reservation or by any other acceptable means via which 
he/she can communicate the acceptance. 
Hence, the contract of carriage is affirmed and concluded upon the 
communication of acceptance by the passenger or by a third party on his/her 
behalt. 
ln Islamic-fiqh, the notion of "invitation to treat" is very weil established and 
analyzed. However there are some differences of regime that arise under the title 
"Baay' Man Yazïd' (auctions), which are not relevent to the ticketing context. 
ln the modern style of timetable and indeed in the case of internet ticket sales, 
the air carrier offers his services to the public under the terms and conditions 
found in the tariffs, and in accordance with the timetable and seats available. The 
passenger manifests his/her acceptance of the offer by applying for a reservation 
or by buying a ticket. Thus, Islamic-fiqh would definitely consider the carrier as 
275 See Heinonen, J., "The Warsaw Convention Jurisdiction and The Internet" (2000) 65:3 Journal of Air 
Law and Commerce 453 al 462. 
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the party manifesting ijâb (offer), and the passenger as the one manifesting kubûl 
(acceptance). 
As established in Chapter Il above, 'aqd (contract) is concluded once the ijâb and 
qabûl are consistently communicated within the maj/is al-'aqd (meeting session). 
Maj/is al-'aqd, in the context of timetables, is assessed at two levels. The first is 
the whole period during which the carrier maintains his offer, e.g. a season or the 
whole year. The second is the period within which the 'aqd is being negotiated 
with the customer where the maj/is shall be concluded at the end of the phone 
cali or the meeting. Within either frame of reference, one can readily conclude in 
the usual circumstance that when a ticket is issued, the 'aqd was concluded 
within the maj/is al-'aqd. Thus, the principles in relation to the formation of the 
contract of carriage are almost identical in Islamic-fiqh and the established ru les 
of the western schools of law. 
Offer and acceptance are usually exchanged between the carrier and the 
passenger. The next section will therefore elaborate on who the carrier and the 
passenger are. 
6.2.2 Parties to the Contract Of Carriage 
Unfortunately, this point is not as clear as it may appear. The parties to the 
contract of carriage are in essence the air carrier and the passenger. 
Nevertheless, there are instances in which things are more complicated, such as 
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the case of carriage by a person other than the contracting carrier, and carriage 
of minors and employees. However, these complications could be understood 
and analyzed by connecting them to the two basic parties, namely the carrier and 
the passenger. 
6.2.2.1 The Carrier 
ln Charles Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corporation, et al.,276 the court held that "an 
air carrier, in the sense of the Convention, is someone who performs a carriage 
by air". This definition presumes that the contracting carrier is always the actual 
carrier.277 This may be in line with the Warsaw Convention, but it contradicts the 
actual practice within the industry, for the carrier, in whose name the contract is 
concluded, is not always the person who performs the carriage. 
Article I(b & c) of The Guadalajara Convention identified two different types of 
carrier; namely; the "Contracting Carrier" and the "Actual Carrier". The former 
is defined as "a person who as a principal makes an agreement for carriage 
governed by the Warsaw Convention with a passenger or a consignor or with a 
276 (1988) 845 F.2d 1100 (CA OC), 21 Avi 17,336 [hereinafter Kapar v. Kuwait Airways]. 
277 The United States did not ratify the Guadalajara Convention. In Stanford v. Kuwait Airlines (1989) AL 
278 No.29, 21 Avi 18,097, the court held that a carrier that issues a ticket, but does not take part in the 
actual carriage, is merely an agent of the actual carrier. 
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person acting on behalf of the passenger or the consignor,,278 The latter is 
defined as follows: 279 
[T]he person, other than the contracting carrier, who by virtue of authority 
from the contracting carrier performs the whole or part of carriage 
contemplated in paragraph (b) but who is not with respect to such part a 
successive carrier within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Such 
authority is presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary 
Moreover, Article Il of the Guadalajara Convention provides inter alia that 
both the contracting carrier and the actual carrier shall, except as otherwise 
provided in this Convention, be subject to the rules of the Warsaw 
Convention, the former for the whole of the carriage contemplated in the 
agreement, the latter solely for the carriage he performs. 
Article III provides that "the acts and omissions of the actual carrier shall, in 
relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, be deemed to be also 
those of the Contracting carrier". 
ln its Chapter V, the Montreal Convention also differentiates between the 
contracting and the actual carrier. In very simple and practical language, Article 
39 of the Montreal Convention stipulates that the contracting carrier is he who "as 
a principal makes a contract of carriage governed by this Convention with a 
passenger or consignor or with a person acting on behalf of the passenger or 
consignor." The same article foresees that the actual carrier is the carrier that 
"performs by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier." 
278 Guadalajara Convention, supra note 245Article I(b). 
279 Ibid. Article I(c). 
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The question becomes, is the actual carrier a party to the contract of carriage? If 
not, on what grounds is it liable to the passenger? And if it is liable, how can this 
be reconciled with the principle of privity of contracts? 
From the author's perspective, this may not be an issue under the Montreal 
Convention, for its stipulations incorporate the actual carrier into the contract of 
carriage by virtue of Article 40, which states: 
If an actual carrier performs the whole or part of carriage which, according 
to the contract referred to in Article 39, is governed by this Convention, 
both the contracting carrier and the actual carrier shall, except as otherwise 
provided in this Chapter, be subject to the rules of this Convention, the 
former for the whole of the carriage contemplated in the contract, the latter 
solely for the carriage which it performs. 
On the other hand, for carriage under the Warsaw Convention, there may be 
more than one scenario. The contract of carriage may clearly stipulate that ail or 
part of the carriage may, at the discretion of the carrier, be performed by another 
carrier. Such a reference could be construed to incorporate the actual carrier into 
the contract of carriage, and thus it may be sued under the contract to which it is 
party. Article 1 of the General Conditions of Carriage adopted by IATA provides 
that the term 'carrier' includes "the air carrier issuing the ticket and ail air carriers 
that carry or undertake to carry the passenger and or his baggage hereunder,,280 
However, the author suggests that it is yet to be determined whether this 
280 IATA General Conditions ofCarriage (recommended Practice), IATA resolution No. 1724. 
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constitutes a definite incorporation of the actual carrier into the contract of 
carriage. This is because the General Conditions of Carriage recommended by 
lAT A do not expressly incorporate the Guadalajara Convention into the contract 
of carriage, although they do incorporate the Warsaw Convention and the Hague 
Protocol. This may render the above definition of the carrier applicable to the 
case of successive carriers, not actual carriers. 
The situation varies, of course, where States with jurisdiction over the carriage 
performed by the actual carrier have incorporated the Guadalajara Convention 
into national law. In this case, by virtue of law, the actual carrier shall be deemed 
a party to the contract of carriage. In such a case, it would not matter whether 
there is a reference to the actual carrier in the contract itself. 
Finally, we may face cases where neither the contract of carriage nor the national 
laws consider the position of the actual carrier. In such a scenario, the matter will 
be based on the national laws of the State of jurisdiction. However, the author is 
of the opinion that in such situations the passenger would be a covered 
"passenger" for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, but the absence of a 
contract of carriage with the actual carrier means that it cannot rely upon limits of 
liability. 
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From the author's point of view, the Montreal Convention is coherent with 
Islamic-fiqh with regard to this matter because Islamic-fiqh would not consider 
the actual carrier a party to the contract of carriage, unless provisions 
incorporated in the conditions of carriage foresaw this. Thus, the contracting 
carrier would be liable under contract, while the liability of the actual carrier is 
extra-contractual. In the case of death or in jury of the passenger, the actual 
carrier may be jointly liable with the contracting carrier towards the passenger by 
virtue of diyah. However, in the case of agreeing with the contracting carrier on 
limits higher than diyah, the contracting carrier will be considered as dâmir181 for 
the actual carrier for that margin of difference. 
However, the discussion above does not preclude the right of either carrier to 
have recourse against the other under the terms of contract between them. 
6.2.2.2 The passenger 
Once more, neither the Montreal nor the Warsaw Convention provides any clear 
definition of the term "passenger" although it is obvious that there is a distinction 
between the passenger in the sense of the Montreal and the Warsaw 
Conventions, and other persons onboard the aircraft that are not passengers. 
281 pamin is a person who undertakes to makeup a specifie obligation (mostly monetary) that other persons 
fail to do. 
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The General Conditions of Carriage adopted by IATA stipulate that "[p]assenger 
means any person, except members of the crew, carried or to be carried in an 
aircraft with the consent of carrier". According to this definition, a passenger 
excludes members of the crew and those who are onboard an aircraft without the 
consent of the carrier, such as stowaways. This definition does not cover those 
who are onboard with the consent of the carrier, but who are not transported 
under a contract of carriage and who are not members of the crew, such as flight 
examiners who may not be treated as regular passengers. 
A better definition for the purposes of the Convention would be that "[a] 
passenger within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention is a person who is 
carried by aircraft by virtue of a contract of carriage.,,282 This definition combines 
two very important criteria to distinguish a passenger from other persons onboard 
an aircraft: 
• Performance of carriage by the air carrier; and 
• Carriage is based on a contract of carriage. 
The definition mentioned above raises the issue of the validity of the contract 
concluded between a carrier and a guardian of a minor for the transport of a 
minor. The minor does not have the legal capacity to conclude such a contract 
with the carrier, but would that be taken as grounds for repudiating the contract? 
282 J. w. E. Storm van's Gravesande, supra note 271 at 115. 
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ln Braughton v United Air Lines, Ine. (1960, DC Mo) 189 F.Supp 137, a father, 
who was an airline employee, brought an action for the wrongful death of his two 
children who were killed in an airline crash. The two children, with their mother, 
were traveling under a gratuitous pass issued to airline employees. The pass 
contained a clause providing that "the airline would not be liable for in jury or 
death whether caused by negligence or otherwise,,283 The father contended that 
by bringing the present action, any contract between the airline and the infant 
victims was repudiated and, thus, that the infant victims were not bound by the 
limitation of liability. The court held that the mother was, at most, a gratuitous 
licensee on the airplane and that the children, being in her custody at the time in 
question, cou Id only occupy the same legal status as that occupied by their 
mother. As a consequence, for the court, even though the infants' contracts with 
the airline might be considered repudiated by the father, the undisputed fact was 
that the children remained gratuitous licensees of the airline. Thus, the only legal 
dut Y owed to the children by the airline was not to wilfully injure them while they 
were occupants of its airplane. This case pertains to a domestic contract of 
carriage, which was not subject to the Warsaw Convention. However it does give 
an ide a of how the Warsaw System may respond to such a case due to it not 
including any express provisions dealing with it. The author, thus, suggests that 
despite the possibility of repudiating the contract of carriage, a child with legal 
documents carried by an air carrier is a passenger within the meaning of the 
283 In diyah system such a clause would he void as the carrier cannot exclude its liability for carriage it 
performs. If the contract of carriage does not put the passenger in a hetter position in terms of amount of 
compensation the baseline of compensation shaH he the limits defined by diyah. 
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Warsaw Convention. However, it is not certain whether such a ruling would be 
retained in ail jurisdictions. 
The Montreal Convention expressly provides for this situation within Article 39, 
which states that the contract of carriage is usually concluded between the 
contracting carrier and lia passenger or a consignor or with a person acting on 
behalf of the passenger or consignor" Such a provision makes clear that the 
Montreal Convention agrees with the principle adopted in Braughton v United Air 
Unes because, in the case of contracting with minors, the contract would be 
concluded between the carrier and lia person acting on behalf of the passenger," 
who would in this case be the guardian. 
Although the baseline for compensation in the diyah system is the same for 
passengers and other persons, it still may be important to differentiate between 
passengers and other persons onboard. 
Islamic-fiqh would not define the passenger differently. The nature of the 
relationship between a person onboard an aircraft and the carrier depends on the 
type of contract concluded between them. If he/she is onboard the aircraft by 
virtue of a contract of international carriage, then he/she is a passenger within 
the meaning of the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention. If the person 
is an operating crew member onboard an aircraft, then their legal relationship 
shall be subject to the provisions of the contract of employment. The author 
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suggests that the only difference between Warsaw and Montreal on the one 
hand, and Islamic-fiqh on the other, is the case of stowaways. Although it is true 
that there is no contract between a stowaway and the carrier, we can not omit the 
fact that Islamic Sharfa orders Muslims not to endanger the lives of others. As 
such, although there is no contract between the carrier and the stowaway, the 
carrier may be held liable extra-contractually for injuries sustained by the 
stowaway on the condition that the carrier knew that the stowaway was onboard 
the aircraft and did not strive to save him from sustaining such injuries. 
As for the matter of minority and the contract of carriage, Islamic-fiqh imposes 
upon the guardian the burden of pratecting the minor fram harm and 
safeguarding his/her goods. Therefore, Islamic-fiqh allows the guardian, whether 
natural or appointed, to handle the affairs of the minor in the manner that is best 
for him/her. However, Islamic-fiqh makes it clear to the guardian that the misuse 
of his/her privileges with respect to the minor would make him/her liable to the 
minor before both the court and ALLAH. 
It is therefore within the scope of authority of the guardian to conclude a contract 
of carriage on behalf of the minor, who is then considered a passenger within the 
meaning of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions. 
6.2.3 Conditions of Contract and Conditions of Carriage 
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Currently, whenever a passenger wants to travel, he/she receives a paper 
document from the carrier or his travel agent commonly known as "the ticket". 
This ticket contains the IATA standard Conditions of Contract 284 which, by 
reference, attempts to incorporate the Conditions of Carriage. 
It also obliges air carriers to make available to the passenger these conditions 
upon his/her request as otherwise they will not carry their force. Almost every 
carrier has its own formula of Conditions of Carriage. However they are mainly 
based on the IATA General Conditions of Carriage, which, unlike the Conditions 
of Contract, was adopted as a recommended practice. Such a recommended 
practice is not necessarily accepted by every State, IATA pointed out that: 285 
[Iln order to increase the prospects that the courts would uphold and 
enforce the most important provisions of the conditions of carriage which 
materially affect passengers' rights, it was concluded that they should be 
highlighted in the Conditions of Contract. However, one member advised 
that in his jurisdiction, the Conditions of Carriage would not be taken into 
account by a court of law because they are not provided to passengers with 
each ticket. 
ln a perfectly reliable definition of the Conditions of Carriage, the Canadian 
Transportation Agency states that the terms and conditions of carriage 286 
are provisions contained in an air carrier's tariff that the carrier applies to ail 
its passengers regardless of the fare paid. They spell out the various 
284IATA resolutions 275b and 724. 
285 lAT A Document No. (LACPSCWGII) Montreal 8-9 December 1998. 
286 Canadian Transportation Agency <http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/cta-otc2000/faqs/terms_carriage3.html> 
date accessed (13111/2000). 
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benefits and limitations associated with the air transportation service being 
provided. Terms and conditions of carriage cover a number of things such 
as: limits or restrictions on the weight or size of baggage, compensation for 
lost, delayed or damaged luggage, compensation for denied boarding 
(bumping), and the carrier's rules concerning the carriage of persons with 
disabilities or minors 
Conditions that would have an impact on carriers' liability are usually 
incorporated within the conditions of contract on the reverse of each ticket. These 
conditions will be discussed in the following section. 
6.2.3.1 The Conditions of Contract 
ln this section, the author seeks to elaborate very briefly on the IATA Conditions 
of Contract in order to understand the interplay between them and the provisions 
of the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention. The IATA Conditions of 
Contract are composed of eleven articles, which are discussed sequentially. 
1 . As used in this contract "ticket" me ans this passenger ticket and baggage 
check, or this itinerary/receipt if applicable, in the case of an electronic 
ticket, of which these conditions and the notices form part, "carriage" is 
equivalent to "transportation", "carrier" means ail air carriers that carry or 
undertake to carry the passenger or his baggage hereunder or perform any 
other service incidental to such air carriage, "electronic ticket" me ans the 
Itinerary/Receipt issued by or on behalf of Carrier, the Electronic Coupons 
and, if applicable, a boarding document. 'Warsaw Convention" means the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw, 12th October 1929, or that Convention 
as amended at the Hague, 28th September 1955, whichever may be 
applicable. 
This Article sets out the terminology used in the contract. A valid interpretation of 
the meaning of "any other services incidental to air carriage" includes the case in 
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which the carrier itself provides transportation from an air terminal to the 
airport.287 The new text of these provisions has clearly adopted the concept of 
electronic ticketing. 
Islamic-fiqh places a great deal of emphasis on the intentions of the parties to the 
contract. Therefore, defining the terminology of the contract would be a 
recommended practice as it clarifies the desired intentions. 
2. Carriage hereunder is subject to the rules and limitations relating to 
liability established by the Warsaw Convention unless such carriage is not 
"international carriage" as defined by that Convention. 
This Article provides that the carriage under the contract is subject to the limits of 
liability established by the Warsaw Convention. It also underlines that if the 
carriage is not "international" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention th en 
the limits of liability shaH not apply. 
Resolutions 275b and 724 require the text of this paragraph to be printed in a 
bolder type than the other paragraphs.288 This provision is in li ne with the notice 
requirements under Article 3(1) (e) of the Warsaw Convention and Article 3(1) (c) 
of the Hague Protocol. 
287 P. Martin, J. McClean, E. Martin, J. Bristow & J. Brooks, Air Law, 4th ed., (Butterworth & Co, 1977) at 
364. 
288/bid. at 365. 
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This Article highlights a core difference between Islamic-fiqh and Western 
Systems. As has been noted, the fundamental basis of liability in Islamic-fiqh is 
diyah, with the possibility for the parties to agree on higher limits. However, as for 
the general rulings of 'aqd under Islamic-fiqh, the actual behaviour of the parties 
must make clear that the provisions of the contract are in accordance with the 
actual intention of the parties. Thus, having such a notice written in a bolder type, 
or in a type that makes it clear for any regular contracting person (passenger) 
that it is a "must read" provision, is an acceptable method to assert that the 
intentions of the parties correspond to the provisions of the contract. However, 
this may not be considered in isolation from other factors such as the positions of 
the contracting parties, and the validity of the provisions themselves. Thus, if the 
limit prescribed in the contract is lower than diyah, then that provision is void. On 
the other hand if the limit is higher than Warsaw, then it is in the favour of the 
passenger and his/her heirs, and thus the question of notice and special typeface 
may not be relevant. 
3. To the extent not in conflict with the foregoing, carriage and other 
services performed by each carrier are subject to: 
(i) provisions contained in the ticket; (ii) applicable tariffs; (iii) carrier's 
conditions of carriage and related regulations which are made part hereof 
(and are available on application at the offices of carrier), except in 
transportation between a place in the United States or Canada and any 
place outside thereof to which tariffs in force in those countries apply. 
This Article seeks to incorporate the Conditions of Carriage and the Applicable 
Tariffs into the contract of carriage. However, as mentioned above, the General 
Conditions of Carriage were adopted as a recommended practice for lAT A 
Members. Therefore, there is a very wide spectrum of variation between the 
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conditions of carriage of different airlines even though they ail adopt the General 
Conditions of IATA as the basic outline for their own conditions of carriage. 
An exception is made with regard to transportation between a place in the United 
States and Canada, and any other place outside of these countries. This is due 
to the fact that in certain States, the lAT A conditions are applicable only after 
approval by the competent authority.289 
Indeed, in the case of conflict between any provision of the conditions of carriage 
and the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, the latter prevails.290 
4. Carriers name may be abbreviated in the ticket, the full name and its 
abbreviation being set forth in carrier's tariffs, conditions of carriage, 
regulations or timetables; carrier's address shall be the airport of departure 
shown opposite the first abbreviation of carriers name in the ticket, the 
agreed stopping places are those places set in this ticket or as shown in 
carrier's timetables as scheduled stopping places in the passenger's route, 
carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive carriers is 
regarded as a single operation. 
By articulating that the abbreviation is an indication of the full name of the carrier, 
this Article satisfies the requirement stipulated in Article 3(1 )(d) of Warsaw 
Convention which provides that tickets should include "[t]he name and address of 
the carrier or carriers" 
289 R. H. Mankiewicz, The Liability Regime of the International Air Carrier (The Hague: Kluwer Law And 
Taxation 1987), at 16. The U.S and Canada have filed reservations with regard to resolution 724 to the 
effect that the tariffs filed with the competent authority shall prevail in the case of conflict with the 
Conditions of Contract. 
290Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 Article 32. 
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This Article requires the insertion of the "agreed stopping places" in the ticket, 
which is an essential factor to consider when determining whether the flight is 
"international" within the meaning of the Warsaw System and Montreal 
Convention. 
The last paragraph of this Article restates the exact provision of Article 30 of the 
Warsaw Convention in relation to successive carriage. However, this should not 
be taken as a redundant statement since it functions independently in instances 
of non-Warsaw carriage.291 
This Article, in conjunction with Article 1 above serves and fulfils the extremely 
important requirements of clarity and transparency of the provisions of the 
contract under Islamic-fiqh 
5. An air carrier issuing a ticket for carriage over the lines of another air 
carrier does so only as its agent. 
The main purpose of this Article is to protect the carrier issuing a ticket for 
carriage over the lines of another carrier. This does not include the situation of 
interline carriage which is considered as "successive carriage", as in this case 
both of the carriers are contracting parties by virtue of Article (30) of the Warsaw 
Convention. This Article furthermore does not apply to code-sharing which is an 
arrangement whereby a passenger would have a contracting carrier and an 
291 See L. B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: a Legal Handbook (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1988) at 377. 
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actual carrier. It also does not apply to the scenario of an airline selling a travel 
package and thereby undertaking to perform the carriage. In such a situation it 
will be considered as a contracting carrier even though carriage is performed by 
another carrier.292 
ln short, this Article applies where the airline does nothing other than to issue the 
ticket as if it were a travel agency or a sales agent for the carrier. 
6. Any exclusion or limitation of liability of the carrier shall apply to and be 
for the benefit of agents, servants and representatives of the carrier and any 
person whose aircraft is used by the carrier for carriage and its agents, 
servants and representatives. 
This Article and Article 25a of the Hague Protocol are alike. It is needed to 
provide uniform rule for incidents that are not subject to the Hague Protocol. 
Although this Article sought to solve some problems in relation to the liability of 
the agents and servants of the carrier, it results in some difficult questions with 
regard to cases where the carrier unilaterally waives the limits of liability, or 
where the carrier is deprived of those limits. 
With respect to Islamic-fiqh, so long as agents (wakïl pl. wokalâ) are acting 
within the limits of their agency (wakalah) and are concluding the 'aqd (contract) 
on behalf and in the name of the al-muwakil (principal), they are never liable for 
292 See generally D. Grant, 'Tour operators, airlines and the Warsaw Convention" [1999] 4 The Aviation 
Quarterly 231. 
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the other party. Moreover, servants are usually private hires (agir khas) of the 
carrier. 293 The relationship between al- agir al- khas and the carrier is governed 
by the contract of hire ('aqd al-igârah) in which the duties of the agir are 
prescribed. As a general rule agir khas are never held liable to third parties (e.g. 
passengers) unless they cause harm intentionally or by negligence. 294 
Accordingly, the servant is Iiable to the hirer only, not to the hirer's client. 
7. Checked baggage will be delivered to the bearer of the baggage check. 
ln case of damage to baggage moving in international transportation 
complaint must be made in writing forthwith after discovery of damage and, 
at the latest, within 7 days from receipt; in case of delay, complaint must be 
made within 21 days from the date the baggage was delivered. See tariffs 
or conditions of carriage regarding non- International transportation. 
This Article adopts the same time limits prescribed by the Hague Protocol, which 
are preferable to those prescribed by the Warsaw Convention. Article 32 of the 
Warsaw Convention does not apply to this Article provided that the passengers 
are placed in a better situation. 
Islamic-fiqh does not allow rights to be barred with the passage of time. 
Whenever rights are attached to persons, they are never extinguished unless 
they are returned to the claimant or waived by him. Nevertheless, Islamic-fiqh, 
gives the ruler the right to establish a timeframe beyond which the claimant has 
no right to raise the case before the court. 
8. This ticket is good for carriage for one year from the date of issue, except 
as otherwise provided in this ticket, in carrier's tariffs, conditions of carriage, 
or related regulations. The fare for carriage hereunder is subject to change 
293 Al-Ajeer Al-Khass is "a hireling whose benefits and services are devoted for the hirer) (Mujalat Al-
Ahkam Al-Shareyah, Article 522, at 205. Best examples for private hires is fulltime employees. 
294 Mujalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shareyah, Article 704 and 705 at 261. 
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prior to commencement of carriage. Carrier may refuse transportation if the 
applicable fare has not been paid. 
This Article prescribes the standard term of the ticket and notifies the passenger 
of the possibility of exceptions. However, a question may be raised with regard to 
the legality of enabling the airlines to unilaterally amend the fares of the carriage 
after the conclusion of the contract. Another question may be raised with regards 
to the legality of refusing to carry the passenger on the grounds of a unilateral 
change in the fares by an airline. 
Under Islamic-fiqh, the maj/is al-'aqd (meeting session) will be concluded and 
khiyar al-maj/is (The option to withdraw offer or consent) will be over at the 
moment the qabûl (acceptance) is communicated to the offeror. As such, the 
unilateral change of fares by the airline after the conclusion of the contract of 
carriage is without effect. Hence airlines are liable if they decide not to carry a 
passenger after unilaterally changing the fare. 
9. Carrier undertakes to use its best efforts to carry the passenger and 
baggage with reasonable dispatch. Times shown in timetable or elsewhere 
are not guaranteed and form no part of this contract. Carrier may without 
notice substitute alternate carriers or aircraft, and may alter or omit stopping 
places shown in the ticket in case of necessity. Schedules are subject to 
change without notice. Carrier assumes no responsibility for making 
connections. 
Delay is a major concern for passengers, especially those who are planning to 
catch an onward connecting flight. The Warsaw Convention recognized this 
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problem from the beginning and provided that the carrier is liable for any delay.295 
On the other hand, the tariffs provide that the schedules and timetables are 
approximate and may not be relied upon. This is an important conflict with the 
provisions of the Warsaw Convention.296 However, courts tend to apply Article 19 
of the Convention very strictly and hold the carrier liable for any delay unless it 
discharges the burden of proof imposed by Article 20 and 21 of the Warsaw 
Convention. 297 
Under Islamic-fiqh, timetables and airline schedules are part of the ijâb (offer), 
which the carrier must uphold and abide by so long as it was known at the time of 
receiving the qabûl (acceptance) from the passenger. From the author's point of 
view, Islamic-fiqh would apply stringent measures to cases of delay. But Islamic 
fiqh compensates only for actual damages. This means that the passenger 
should prove the damage sustained as a result of such delay. No compensation 
for consequential damages shaH be applied under Islamic-fiqh. 
10. Passenger shaH comply with Government travel requirements, present 
exit, entry and other required documents and arrive at airport by time fixed 
by carrier or, if no time is fixed early enough to complete departure 
procedures. 
This Article is required to protect the carrier from the sanctions and fines applied 
by sorne States against carriers that bring into their territory a passenger without 
proper travel documents. Moreover, it creates a valid ground, consistent with 
Islamic-fiqh on which a carrier may rely to refuse to perform the carriage. 
11. No agent, servant or representative of carrier has authority to alter, 
modify or waive any provision of this contract. 
295Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 ArticIe19. 
296 See R. H. Mankiewicz, supra note 289 at 188. 
297 See McMurrayvs v. Capital International Airways, 15 Avi 18.087. See also R. H. Mankiewicz, supra 
note 289 at 189. 
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This Article saves the airlines from any allegation that it has waived any of the 
conditions of the contract through its agents or servants. Again, it is consistent 
with Islamic-fiqh. 
6.2.4 Enforceability of Conditions of Contract and Carriage 
It is obvious that the Warsaw Convention and the subsequent amendments do 
not cover ail aspects of the contract of carriage. Therefore, Article 22(1) 
expressly gives the parties (the carrier and the passenger) the right to agree on 
higher limits of liability. Nevertheless, Articles 23 and 33 of the Convention 
consider null and void every agreement between the parties that contradicts the 
provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Moreover, Article 25 of the Montreal 
Convention gives the carrier and the passenger the freedom to agree on higher 
limits. Besides, Article 26 annuls any provisions relieving the carrier from its 
liability, be the relief total or partial. 
Thus, theoretically, the parties to the contract of carriage are granted the 
privilege to conclude a contract freely with the sole condition that it does not 
contradict the provisions of either the Warsaw System or the Montreal 
Convention. 
However, this conclusion cannot be taken for granted as it does not exactly 
correspond to the actual process of issuing tickets. tATA members are obliged to 
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include the lAT A Conditions of Contract, which neither the carrier nor the 
passenger are permitted to alter. Moreover, the carrier is usually the party who 
dictates the conditions of carriage, and it is almost never possible for the 
passenger to negotiate these or to ask for amendments. If this were to occur, it 
would result in an interesting question with regard to the enforceability of such 
contracts. 
As mentioned previously, the provisions of the contract of carriage are not 
automatically enforceable. Every case must be considered independently. 
Although the general rule is that the party seeking to rely on specifie terms and 
conditions must show that he/she did what was reasonable to give the other 
party proper notice at or before the conclusion of the contract, it is not always the 
case for carriers and passengers where the notice and conditions are sometimes 
delivered to the passenger after the conclusion of the contract. 298 
Thus, the rule should be interpreted liberally with regard to carriage by air. T 0 
make the conditions of carriage and conditions of contract enforceable, the 
carrier must show that it delivered the ticket in a timely manner so as to allow the 
passenger time to decide his or her position. 
298 See P. Martin, "Phone in, Turn up, Take-off, a Look at The Legal Implications of Self- services 
Ticketing" (1995) XX:4/5 Air & Space Law 190 at 192. 
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Chapter VII: The Liability Regime 
The previous chapters of this Part were intended to act as an introduction to this 
chapter. In essence, this chapter will elaborate on the liability regime of air 
carriers in international carriage of passengers in three dimensions. It will focus 
on each element of the contractual liability regime in the context of the Warsaw 
System, the Montreal Convention and Islamic-fiqh. 
It will be observed that the sequence of articles as appearing in the Warsaw 
System and the Montreal Convention is not to be strictly followed through this 
Chapter. Priority is given to clarity and connectivity of the subjects rather than the 
sequence of articles. For instance, this Chapter will commence with 
consideration of the scope of applicability of both the Warsaw System and the 
Montreal Convention, and the perspective of Islamic-fiqh in relation to this. It will 
then jump directly to the matter of liability before returning to the other subjects of 
the conventions such as documentation and jurisdiction. This structure is 
adopted to allow the logical analysis required to make a thorough comparison 
between Islamic-fiqh on the one hand, and the Warsaw System and the Montreal 
Convention on the other hand. 
7.1 Scope of Applicability of the Warsaw System and Montreal Convention 
Articles 1, 2 and 34 of the Warsaw Convention adequately define its scope. 
Article 1 articulates very clearly that "[t]his Convention applies to ail international 
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carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It applies 
equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport 
undertaking." 
As discussed in the previous chapter while addressing the contract of carriage, 
the word person in this Article does not include operating crew members and 
stowaways or other persons aboard an aircraft who are not being transported 
under a contract of carriage. This paragraph also confirms that gratuitous 
carriage is subject to the Convention no differently than carriage for reward, and 
thus, the contract of carriage does not require the element of consideration, in 
the common law sense in order for the contract to be valid.299 
For further clarification, Paragraph 2 of Article 1 defines what international 
carriage means, stipulating that 
For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" 
means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, 
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be 
a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the 
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single 
High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory 
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another 
Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage 
without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the 
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting 
Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. 
299 Black v. Air France, supra note 272 ("If the carrier is an air transportation enterprise, the passenger 
need not have paid or have promised to pay, provided that the carrier has consented to transport the 
passenger under those conditions."). 
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As was true in the leading case of Grein v. Imperial Airways, it is almost always 
necessary foltowing an air accident for courts to determine whether the carriage 
faits within the scope of the Convention or not. 300 Owing to the c1arity of this 
provision, courts face minor difficulties in determining whether carriage is 
international according to the Convention. Such minor difficulties have however 
arisen is cases such as round trips, where the starting and end points are the 
same. Difficulties could potentialty have arisen in the case of carriage to be 
performed by several successive air carriers, but for Paragraph 3 of Article 1, 
which provides that 
A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for 
the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it has been 
regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed 
upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it 
does not lose its international character merely because one contract or a 
series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the 
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting 
Party. 
According to Paragraph 3, a break in carriage does not affect the international 
character of the carriage so long as it is one undivided carriage. As such, an 
accident in a domestic leg of an international contract would not constitute a 
break in carriage.301 ln Grein v. Imperial Airways, the court very c1early stated 
that "it matters not that the journey is broken. Thus, if the contract were for 
carriage of a passenger from Paris to Madrid it would make no difference if the 
300 See generally Bank N. V. v. British Overseas Airways Corp. (1953, QB), Stratton v. Trans-Canada 
Airlines (1962, Brit Col Ct App), Block v. Air France, supra note 272. See also Grein v. Imperial 
Airways, supra note 1233. 
301 Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 65 S. Ct. 1029 (U. S. Sup.); 1 Avi 1093. 
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passenger was entitled under the contract to break his journey at Toulouse; he 
might be entitled to remain in Toulouse for a week or a month and then resume 
his journey, the carriage would nonetheless satisfy the definition". The court 
suggested that, U[t]he reason for this is clear once it is appreciated that the 
contract is the unit, not the journey." This conclusion is further affirmed by similar 
rulings in various other jurisdictions such as the Canadian case of United 
International Stables Ltd. v. Pacific Western Airlines Ltd.302 
Another term that Paragraph 3 introduces is the notion of a successive carriage, 
which is crucial when considering the nature of carriage. Three characteristics 
must be present at the time when a contract or a series of contracts is made for 
the carriage to be considered successive: 
i. the carriage must have been regarded by the parties as a single operation; 
ii. the carriage must have been divided into separate successive stages; and 
Hi. the parties must have agreed that the carriage was to be performed by 
several successive carriers.303 
Thus, a codeshared leg of a trip may not be considered as successive carriage 
for the purpose of this Convention because the carrier is unilaterally conducting 
part or ail of the carriage on behalf of another carrier. International carriage can 
302 (1969) 68 W.w.R 317. 
303 Shawcross, supra note 184 at 410. 
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be determined according to the intention of the parties, as expressed in the ticket 
or contract. 304 
It should be noted that Paragraphs 2 & 3 of Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention 
were amended by the Hague Protocol as follows: 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the expression international carriage 
means any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the 
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not 
there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within 
the territories of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory of a 
single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the 
territory of another State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. 
Carriage between two points within the territory of a single High Contracting 
Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State 
is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention. 
3. Carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, 
for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage if it has 
been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been 
agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, 
and it does not lose its international character merely because one contract 
or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within the territory of the 
same State. 
Although this amendment did not make major alterations to the applicable regime, 
it is noteworthy that by referring to the agreement between the parties instead of 
the contract between the parties, Paragraph 2 has adopted a more accu rate 
translation of the French phrase "d'après les stipulations des parties". The 
amendment, moreover, recognized the difficulty of multiple documents regulating 
304 s. M. Speiser & c. F. Krause, Aviation Tort Law, Vol.2 (New York: Lawyer Co-Operative Publishing 
Co. 1978) at 655. 
202 
the international carriage of passengers by air. Under the Hague Protocol "High 
Contracting Parties" means those who have adopted the Protocol. 
Article 2 of the Convention provides that: 
1. This Convention applies to carriage performed by the State or by legally 
constituted public bodies provided it falls within the conditions laid down in 
Article 1. 
2. This Convention does not apply to carriage performed under the terms of 
any international postal Convention. 
According to the provisions of this Article, the Convention applies to ail carriage 
falling within the conditions prescribed by Article 1, even if this is carried out by 
public bodies belonging to States. Paragraph 2 excludes carriage performed 
under any international postal Convention. This Paragraph as amended by the 
Hague Protocol provides that "[t]his Convention shall not apply to carriage of mail 
and postal packages." 
ln addition to the above, Article 34 of the Warsaw Convention excludes from the 
application of the Convention: 
international carriage by air performed by way of experimental trial by air 
navigation undertakings with the view to the establishment of a regular li ne 
of air navigation, nor does it apply to carriage performed in extraordinary 
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's business. 
This Article was adopted to protect a carrier who, for a benevolent purpose, 
undertakes a flight which from its inception is to be performed under 
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"extraordinary circumstances" and therefore falls outside of the normal scope of a 
carrier's business. An example of this is a rescue flight.305 
Article 1 of the Montreal Convention does not differ from the rules established by 
the Warsaw Convention with regard to the scope of application. Rather, Chapter 
V of the Convention (Articles 39 through 48) incorporates the provisions of the 
Guadalajara Supplementary Convention of 1961.306 Moreover, Article 2 of the 
Montreal Convention adopts the ru les of the Montreal Protocol No. 4 regarding 
the carriage of postal items.307 
It is clear that the Montreal Convention does not attempt to modify the original 
scope of application of the Warsaw Convention. It attempts rather to consolidate 
the provisions relating to the scope of application which had been scattered 
amongst other instruments. Nonetheless, cases under the new Montreal 
Convention still have to take into consideration the rule of Chubb & Son, Ine. v. 
Asian Airlines in which the court ruled that the United States and Korea were not 
together bound by treaty because Korea had adopted the Hague Protocol without 
referring to the Warsaw Convention whereas the United States was party to the 
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.308 
305 Ibid. at 653. 
306 M. Milde, "New Unification of Private International Air Law - A Rebirth of the Warsaw System?" The 
Korean Journal of Air and Space Law, VoU 1 1999 at 77. 
307 Ibid. 
308(2d Cir. 2000) 214 F3d 301; 27 Avi. 17,877. 
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It is important, however, to pinpoint the fact that the Montreal Convention was 
expected to provide definitions and solutions to some unclear terms included in 
the Warsaw Convention. An example is the term person, which the Montreal 
Convention retained whereas it would have been better, the author suggests, to 
use the term passenger. 
Another point one might have to be addressed by the Montreal Convention but in 
fact was not, is the definition of international carriage. The author is of the view 
that by keeping the same definition as enunciated by the Warsaw Convention, 
and adding the fifth jurisdiction rule,309 the Montreal Convention has magnified 
the arbitrariness of treatment of passengers. According to the Montreal 
Convention two passengers who are injured while sitting beside each other may 
receive extremely different compensation. The introduction of the concept of 
international flight instead international carriage could have solved the problem. 
By using flight instead of carriage, formalities and particulars of ticketing would 
have lost their importance to a great extent. This is owing to the fact that it would 
suffice to know that the passenger is flying on an international flight without the 
need to determine whether there was an agreement for international carriage. 
Nonetheless, such a concept would have introduced a major change in the case 
law and given rise to further battles as to whether the contract of carriage is 
subject to the Montreal Convention or not because of the change in analogy and 
309 Montreal Convention, supra note 3 Article 33. 
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rationale in defining the term international. According to the current concept of 
international carriage, it is the content of the ticket that determines the nature of 
the contract of carriage. By contrast, introducing the concept of international flight, 
the yardstick becomes the path of the flight. This concept, may prove problematic 
when it cornes to accidents on domestic legs of international carriage. 
Whereas Islamic-fiqh acknowledges the diversity of national laws it would not 
deviate, the author suggests, from the scope of application adopted by both the 
Warsaw System and Montreal Convention. 
7.2The Limits of Liability 
Almost every text written in relation to the history of the Warsaw System contains 
a statement to the effect that the Warsaw Convention took into consideration the 
need to protect the aviation industry which was in its infancy. Such protection 
was made through the adoption of the res ipsa loquitur principle in exchange for 
fixed limited liability. The manifestation of this principle is found in Articles 17 
through 22 and Article 25 of the Convention. 
Although these articles were designed and adopted to unify the ru les of air 
carriers' liability, they shortly thereafter posed a dilemma. Almost ail of the 
Conventions and Protocols subsequent to the Warsaw Convention concerned 
these articles. 
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The aviation industry evolved very rapidly from its status as an infant industry. 
Thus, in short order the industry in such a manner was no longer in need of 
protection. Furthermore, the demonetarisation of gold and the effect of inflation 
made the limits adopted by the Warsaw Convention unrealistic. 
ln the following section the thesis will address these articles in detail, taking into 
consideration the amendments and implications of the new Montreal Convention 
and Islamic-fiqh. 
7.2.1 Article 22 Limits of Liability under the Warsaw System 
Article 22 is concerned with defining the limits of liability. These limits were 
expressed by a go Id clause to avoid the disadvantages of the super-inflation of 
currencies in the post- World War 1 period.310 The Article reads as follows: 
1. In the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for each 
passenger is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where in accordance 
with the law of the Court seized of the case, damages may be awarded in 
the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the sa id 
payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special 
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of 
liability ... 
4. The sum mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc 
consisting of 65% milligram gold of millesimal fineness 900. These sums 
may be converted into any national currency in round figures. 
The amount numerated by this article is equivalent to US $8,300, or after 
the 1969 devaluation of the US dollar, approximately US $10,000. 
310 See M, Milde, "The Warsaw System of Liability in International Carriage by Air: History, Merits and 
F1aws ... And the New Non-Warsaw Convention of 28 May 1999" Annals of Air And Space Law Vol. 
XXIV 155. 
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These limits of liability were adopted as the counterpart of reversing the burden 
of proof and limiting the defences available to the carrier, as will be shown later in 
this thesis. 
Only 8 years after the adoption of Warsaw, France abandoned the Franc 
Poincaré as a unit of currency in 1937.311 ln 1944, the Breton Woods Conference 
altered the fundamental relationship between national currencies and gold.312 
Moreover, the creation of the Special Drawing Rights in 1974 by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) had its own impact. Due to these fundamental changes in 
the international monetary system and some other economic factors, these limits 
have become unsatisfactory and the source of litigation. 
As is discussed above,313 in recognition of the need to amend such limits of 
liability, the Hague Protocol doubled the monetary limits of liability to 250,000 
Francs Poincaré (approximately US $16,600). In addition, the Hague Protocol 
included a provision allowing litigation expenses to be awarded in accordance 
with local laws. These amendments were adopted under Article XI of the Protocol 
which provides that Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention shall be deleted and 
replaced by the following: 
311 A. Rueda, "The Warsaw Convention And Electronic Ticketing" (2002) 67:2 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 401 at 413. 
312/bid. 
313 See Sections 4.2 & 76.1.2 
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1. In the carriage of persons the liability of the carrier for each passenger is 
limited to the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand francs. Where, in 
accordance with the law of the court seised of the case, damages may be 
awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of 
the said payments shall not exceed two hundred and fifty thousand francs. 
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree 
to a higher limit of liability ... 
4. The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the court from 
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of 
the court costs and of the other expenses if the litigation incurred by the 
plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if the amount of the 
damages awarded, excluding court costs and other expenses of the 
litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to 
the plaintiff within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence 
causing the damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is 
later. 
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides that 
1. The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this 
Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by 
his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with 
the law of the Court seized of the case is considered to be equivalent to 
wilful misconduct. 
2. Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said 
provisions, if the damage is caused as aforesaid by any agent of the carrier 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
The importance of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention stemmed from it being 
one of the two important means of escape by which claimants can overcome the 
limitations of liability. 
Due to the controversial nature of the term wilful misconduct, as introduced by 
the English translation of the Convention, and which does not correspond to the 
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French term "dol" as employed in the original French text,314 this Article was 
amended by the Hague Protocol to read as follows: 
The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that 
the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or 
agents, done with the intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of 
such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
The advantage of this new rule is that the elements of both dol and wilful 
misconduct are included, while at the same time omission has been included as 
a ground for unlimited liability.315 
As previously shown while elaborating on the evolution of the Warsaw System, 
the limits of liability were the focus of almost ail the amendments and 
supplements to the Warsaw Convention. 316 Even the Montreal Agreement of 
1966 and MIIA were concerned with the limits of liability. 
The Guatemala City Protocol attempted to include much higher limits than those 
originally adopted by the Warsaw Convention or by the Convention as amended 
by the Hague Protocol. It retained the expression in francs but raised the limits 
up to 1,500,000 francs (USD100,000). The protocol never entered into force, but 
it paved the grounds for the Montreal Convention to introduce its two tier liability 
regime. 
314 See A. Khan, Air Carrier's Unlimited Liability Under the Warsaw System, (LL.M Thesis, Institution of 
Air and Space Law, Mc Gill University 1990) [unpublished] at 2. 
315 Ibid. at 91. 
316 See section 6.1 above. 
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7.2.2 Limits of Liability Under the Montreal Convention 
The Montreal Convention divided Warsaw's Article 22 into two articles, Articles 
21 and 22. The latter addresses delay, cargo and baggage liability while the 
former concerns passenger liability, and they provide as follows: 
Article 21 - Compensation in Case of Death or ln jury of Passengers: 
1. For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 
100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be 
able to exclude or limit its liability. 
2. The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of 
Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100,000 
Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that: 
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or 
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of a third party. 
Article 22 - Limits of Liability in Relation to Delay, Baggage and Cargo 
1. In the case of damage caused by delay as specified in Article 19 in the 
carriage of persons, the liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited 
to 4 150 Special Drawing Rights. 
5. ·The foregoing provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not 
apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the 
carrier, its servants or agents, do ne with intent to cause damage or 
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result; provided 
that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also 
proved that such servant or agent was acting within the scope of its 
employment. 
6. The limits prescribed in Article 21 and in this Article shall not prevent the 
court from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole 
or part of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred 
by the plaintiff, including interest. The foregoing provision shall not apply if 
the amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs and other 
expenses of the litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has 
offered in writing to the plaintiff within a period of six months from the date 
of the occurrence causing the damage, or before the commencement of the 
action, if that is later. 
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Article 21 prescribes a two tier liability regime, under which the carrier is unable 
to exclude or limit its liability for the first 100,000 SDRs. For claims above 
100,000 SORs the carrier retains the right to defend itself as will be shown in 
detail at section 7.3 below. Oespite the fact that carriers' liability under the 
second tier of liability is not limited, the quantum of damages has to be proved by 
the claimant. In addition, determination of such proved damages shall be subject 
to the lex fori principle.317 
Air carriers' liability as prescribed by Article 21 of Montreal Convention may be 
understood to be absolute up to the first 100,000 SORs. This appears to be true 
if Article 21 is read in isolation from Article 20, which exonerates the carrier's 
liability in whole or in part even within the boundaries of the first 100,000 SORs in 
the case of contributory negligence of the passenger. Consequently, liability up to 
the first 100,000 SORs is not purely absolute. 
Article 22 of the Montreal Convention limits carriers' liability in case of delay to 
4,150 SORs. This limit would not be applied, however, if it is proven that such 
damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done either with the intent 
to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result. This exception is found in Paragraph 5 of Article 22 and is equivalent to 
317 P. Dempsey & M.Milde, supra note 262 at 183. 
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the provision concerning wilful misconduct in the Warsaw Convention.318 The text 
of the Montreal Convention is similar to the one adopted by Hague Protocol.319 
The Montreal Convention excluded the wilful misconduct rule of Article 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention as it does not fit with the approach of strict and unlimited 
liabilities. 
7.2.3 Limits of Liability Under Islamic-fiqh 
As studied in Part 1 of the thesis, diyah is a source of limited liability. It does not 
rely on a contract although it may be increased by virtue of a contract. Part 1 
discussed in detail the value and nature of diyah. As we have seen, there are two 
methodologies to calculate the value of diyah in the context of the modern 
monetary system. One approach is to convert the value of diyah as enumerated 
by the Prophet directly into today's terminology. This technique is actually the 
approach adopted by most of Islamic states applying diyah. 
The author suggests another approach reliant on the economic value of diyah. 
Under this approach, the sums awarded by the Prophet are taken to be a 
reference to the economic value of diyah in his era. To calculate the value of 
diyah at any given point of time, these quantities have ta be given a sense other 
th an their literai meaning. 
318Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 Article 25. 
319 Hague Protocol, supra note 237 Article XIII. 
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This suggestion was discussed when addressing the subject of diyah at section 
2.1.1 and the limits of liability under the Rome Convention in section 5.1 above. 
The same suggestion will now be discussed in the context of contractual liability 
of the carrier. 
The regime for contractual liability in the context of diyah is different from the 
current approach found in the Conventions. The conventional approach begins 
with the assumption that liability is unlimited. It tried, therefore, to unify the terms 
of liability by applying a uniform ceiling of liability that may not apply in case of 
failure to conform to certain formalities and in the case of wilful misconduct. The 
carrier is left with the limited defences of "contributory negligence" and "ail 
necessary measures". After 70 years, this regime was amended. Now the 
Montreal Convention applies a two tier regime as shown within this chapter. 
However there is still the assumption that carriers' liability is unlimited. 80th 
Montreal and Warsaw rely on contract to determine the liability of the carrier. 
Accordingly, the problems with the limits of liability adopted by the Warsaw 
System are: 
i. The limits of liability are fixed in numbers which prevented the Warsaw 
Convention from keeping pace with the economic devaluation of 
currencies. This mandated the adoption of the supplementary instruments 
comprising the Warsaw System. 
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iL Such limits of liability are linked to the contract of carriage and subject to 
extremely stringent formalities the absence of which would result in 
exposing the carriers to unlimited liability. 
Although the reaction adopted through Montreal Convention aimed at solving the 
problems associated with the Warsaw System, the author contends that the new 
solutions are expected to have their own impeded flows as follows: 
L ln reaction to the numerated limits of liability adopted by Warsaw, 
Montreal adopted a two tier liability regime of which the second is an 
unlimited. At the same time it adopted the fifth jurisdiction princip le which 
would open the doors widely for litigants to search for courts allowing for 
higher value of compensation. 
iL Article 24 of the Montreal Convention abstracts from the fact that Montreal 
liability regime is not limited at the outset. Thus the review of limits 
adopted by Montreal concerns other limited aspects of the Convention 
including the first tier. 
The author suggests that the diyah system shall bring these two extremes of 
Warsaw system and Montreal Convention to a balanced median point benefiting 
from the advantages of both and trying to avoid the flaws associated with both. 
Diyah de parts from the assumption that liability should be limited and determined 
by virtue of law rather than contract. 
ln Part l, the author suggested that diyah may be calculated on the grounds of 
three years income of a middle class family of six. This methodology could result 
in higher compensation for persons in the United States of America th an for 
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persons on the same flight but coming from a developing nation, where the 
aggregate annual income of middle class families is much lower than in the USA. 
This methodology could also, result in compensating persons differently 
according to the statistics for each year. The author suggests, therefore, that 
consideration of the limits should be based on the aggregate annual income of 
the state having the highest recorded figure according to the United Nations 
statistics. Those should be reviewed periodically. This methodology does not 
contradict the Islamic principles in relation to diyah and, simultaneously, would 
avoid low limits of liability. 
While discussing the subject of diyah in section 2.1.1 above, the author 
suggested that diyah amount would be US$ 537,396. 
However, bearing in mind that the author is trying to present the methodology 
adopted by diyah rather than the theology behind it, it is worth noting that the 
limits of liability may be designated in any other way that may be seen 
convenient and satisfactory. The main issue in this regard is that such limits 
should not be given in numbers to avoid the problems associated with the 
Warsaw System. 
Adopting adynamie method of calculating damages while keeping them limited 
to a specifie ceiling without reliance on stringent formalities would also prevent 
the flaws associated with Montreal Convention mentioned above. According to 
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this methodology litigants will not have an incentive to go forum shopping as the 
amount of compensation would be the same everywhere it was adopted. 
Moreover, the amount of uncertainty would be much reduced which may induce 
positive results as concerns insu rance premiums. 
7.3 Exoneration 
Articles 20, 21 and 22 have always been at the core of ail amendments and 
developments of the Warsaw System .. Article 22 will be discussed independently 
• 
in the next section. This section will be devoted to Articles 20 and 21 of the 
Warsaw Convention and their corresponding articles in the related protocols and 
Montreal Convention. While discussing the development of the articles, it will be 
necessary to elaborate on the impact of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (liA) 
and the measures to apply this agreement (MIIA). This explanation will be 
divided into the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention (Le. the liA 
and MIIA will not be discussed in an independent section). 
7.3.1 Exoneration under Warsaw System 
Article 20 (1) of the Warsaw Convention reads as follows: 
The Carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have 
taken ail necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible 
for him or them to take such measures. 
Article 21 reads: 
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If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the 
negligence of the injured person the Court may, in accordance with the 
provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his 
liability. 
Drafters of the Warsaw Convention left these two articles as the only two escape 
routes barely open for carriers. Article 20( 1) of Warsaw reverses the burden of 
proof on the part of the carrier. While passengers are left with the burden to 
prove the damage and that it took place aboard an aircraft, the air carrier has to 
prove that it took ail necessary measures to prevent such damage or that it was 
impossible to take such measures. Nevertheless, the burden imposed on air 
carriers by Article 20(1) is almost insurmountable.32o Accordingly, from a practical 
point of view, the Warsaw Convention has almost always become a defacto strict 
liability regime despite the sm ail number of cases that have invoked the of Article 
20(1) exception?21 
According to Harold Capian 322 and Anthony G. Mercer 323 this Article is 
interpreted in several jurisdictions as "ail reasonably necessary measures". The 
decision in D/ding v. Singapore Airlines supports this interpretation. 324 ln this 
case, the plaintiff asserted that he suffered in jury as a result of swallowing 
fragments of glass in pineapple juice on an international flight served by the 
320 S. M. Speiser & C. F. Krause, supra note 304 at 704. 
321 See American Smelting and Refining Company v. Philippine Airlines lnc. June 21, 1954 (N.Y. Sup., 
N.Y. County); 4 Avi. 17,413, Jang Sool Known v. Singapore Airlines 9 Avi. 18,184 (N.D. Cal 2003). 
322 H. CapIan, "Novelty in the New Convention" [1999] 4 The Aviation Quarterly 193. 
323 A. Mercer, "The Montreal Protocols and the Japanese Initiative: Can the Warsaw System Survive?" 
(1994) XIX: 6 Air & Space Law 301. 
324 [2002] 1515 HKCU 1. (quoted from liability report 2004 page 28). 
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defendant. The court decided that Singapore Airlines presented a good defence 
under Article 20 by establishing that if there had been glass in the pineapple juice 
that glass had been present in the can when it had been obtained from the juice 
manufacturer. The Court held that the risk of finding a foreign body in a canned 
drink in this day and age was sa slight that the airline could not be expected ta 
sieve or individually check drinks for foreign bodies. 
Likewise, in Manufactures Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines,325 the court 
defined the term "ail necessary measures" as "ail reasonable measures", 
including a regular and proper maintenance schedule for aircraft, the 
airworthiness of the aircraft, proper certification of the f1ight crew, or warnings ta 
passengers about the expected dangers. 
ln Fleming v. Delta Air Unes, Inc.,326 the air carrier failed ta warn passengers 
about the possibility of bad weather during the flight. In an action for damages for 
in jury suffered by a passenger, the court held that the air carrier had not taken ail 
necessary measures ta avoid the damage and, as such, was liable for damage 
suffered by the injured passenger. 
There is limited, and arguably inadequately definitive, case law pertaining ta this 
Article, since it was completely waived in accordance with the Montreal 
325 429 F. Supp. 964 at 967 (D.C.N.Y.1977).; 14 AvÎ. 17,710. 
326(1973) 359 F.Supp 339 (DC NY); 12 AvÎ 18, ]22. 
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Agreement 1966. It was also waived by air carriers signatory to the MIIA for the 
first 100,000 SORs. 
The text of Article 21, on the other hand, makes it much clearer and easier for the 
carrier to be exonerated from liability partly or completely. 
Unlike the "ail necessary measures" defence of Article 20, the defence of 
"contributory negligence" by the passenger as found in Article 21 survived ail the 
amendments pertaining to the liability regime, including those made in 
accordance with Article 32 of the Warsaw Convention under the Montreal 
Agreement of 1966 and the MIIA. 
There are few reported cases concerning contributory negligence on the part of 
passengers. However, the leading case is Chutter v. K.L.M Royal Dutch Airlines 
et al., in which the Court decided that there had been contributory negligence on 
the part of the passenger. 327 After boarding the aircraft, the passenger went 
back to the door and stepped out of the airplane while the boarding stairs were 
being rolled away. 
7.3.2 Defence Available under the Montreal Convention 
327(1955) 132 F. Supp. 611 (De-N. Y.); 4 Avi. 17,733. [Hereinafter Chutter Case]: 
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The subject of exoneration of carriers' liability is scattered in various Articles of 
the Montreal Convention. 
Article 20 is devoted to exoneration on the grounds of contributory negligence or 
other wrongful acts or omissions of the passenger. It stipulates that: 
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed to by the 
negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the person claiming 
compensation, or the person from whom he or she derives his or her rights, 
the carrier shall be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability to the 
claimant to the extent that such negligence or wrongful act or omission 
caused or contributed to the damage. When by reason of death or in jury of 
a passenger compensation is claimed by a person other than the 
passenger, the carrier shall likewise be wholly or partly exonerated from its 
liability to the extent that it proves that the damage was caused or 
contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of that 
passenger. This Article applies to ail the liability provisions in this 
Convention, including paragraph 1 of Article 21. 
Prima facie, this Article greatly resembles the contributory negligence provision 
of Warsaw.328 It states that this defence is available to the carrier even within the 
first 100,000 SDRs. Nonetheless, this Article is different from Warsaw as it has 
removed the lex fori methodology. The application of this rule is now no longer a 
matter for the discretion of courts. It is to be applied without discrimination in ail 
courts. The only question becomes whether contribution would bar the liability 
wholly or partly - there is no inquiry by the Court as to whether this is in 
accordance with its own law.329 
328Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 Article 21. 
329 See P. Dempsey & M.Milde, supra note 262 at 178-]80. 
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The author finds the title given to Article 20, "Exoneration," misleading. It implies 
that Article 20 is the only Article concerned with exoneration of liability. This is 
inaccurate since Articles 19 and 21 (2) are concerned with exoneration Article 20. 
While Article 19 is concerned with delay, it allows air carriers the Warsaw "ail 
necessary measures defence". Article 19 provides: 
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of 
passengers, baggage, or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable 
for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and 
agents took ail measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures. 
The author suggests that this reformulation of the "ail necessary measures" 
defence into "ail measures that could reasonably be required" will need to be 
litigated in courts before determining whether it is in practice more clear. 
However, this defence is now limited only to the case of delay. The carrier may 
not use this defence in any other circumstances. 
Finally Article 21 (2) articulates methods of exoneration other than those provided 
in Article 20 for claims above the initial 100,000 SORs. This Article reads as 
follows: 
The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of 
Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 1 00 000 
Special Orawing Rights if the carrier proves that: 
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(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or 
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrangful act or 
omission of a third party. 
The wording of this Article is to some extent vague. The better interpretation is 
that exoneration under Article 21 (2) is only available for amounts claimed 
against the carrier in excess of 100,000 SDR. In particular, the claimant will thus 
be entitled to recover amounts up to 100,000 SDR fram the carrier even if the 
carrier is exonerated for claims in excess of this 1 st tier. Another possible 
interpretation, however, is that "damages" applies to the amount of the in jury 
suffered rather than the amount claimed. Thus, where the quantum of damages 
exceeds 100,000 SDR, exoneration under Article 21 (2) would extend to the 
entirety of that amount. The latter interpretation would also cast on advance 
payment as per Article 28 of the Convention.330 
The author suggests that the first few cases involving discussions of these points 
will have to revert to the drafting history of the Convention to overcome the 
difficulty of interpreting this Article. 
The Iiability regime and defences available under the Montreal Convention were 
acutely criticized at the Diplomatie Conference held between the 11 th and 29th 
330 Article 28 - Advance Payments: "In the case of aircraft accidents resulting in death or injury of 
passengers, the carrier shall, if required by its national law, make ad vance payments without delay to a 
natural person or persons who are entitled to claim compensation in order to meet the immediate economic 
needs of such persons. Such advance payments shall not constitute a recognition of liability and may be 
offset against any amounts subsequently paid as damages by the carrier." 
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May 1999 for the adoption of the Convention. Most of the criticism emanated 
from developing nations such as India.331 A group of 53 states of Africa 332 plus 
Vietnam333 provided criticism centred on the fact that the new Convention puts 
customers in a better position than the carrier. These points focused on the 
economic aspects of the provision rather th an the legal aspects. 
According to Article 21 (2), the carrier is required to prove that there was no 
negligence or other wrongful act or omission in the sequence of incidents 
causing the accident and the damage. Paragraph (b) is dramatically affected by 
inclusion of the word "solely". It may be very difficult or even impossible for the 
carrier to prove or attribute the damage solely to third parties. 334 It may be 
extremely difficult to prove the sole liability of third parties such as manufacturers 
of aircraft and engines, air traffic controllers and other air carriers. Such a 
provision also poses the difficult and contentious question of whether terrorists in 
the case of hijack are third parties, and whether it is their sole wrongful act that 
has caused in jury to passengers. 
ln conclusion, according to Articles 19, 20 and 21 (2), the carrier now has the 
following defences with regard to the amount of compensation: 
33\ See ICAO DCW Doc No. 18 dated 11/5/1999. 
332 See ICAO DCW Doc No. 21. dated ]2/5/]999. 
333 See ICAO DCW Doc No. 24. dated 12/5/1999. 
334 ICAO DCW Doc No. 28. date 13/5/1999 at 4. 
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L ln case of delay, the carrier shall be exonerated from its liability if it proves 
that it has taken ail necessary measures or it was impossible for it to take 
such measures. 
iL Contributory negligence on the part of the passenger shall exonerate the 
carrier from its liability to the extent of the passenger's fault. 
ln addition to the above, the carrier has the following defences in ail claims 
exceeding 100,000 SDR's: 
L Damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission 
of the carrier or its servants or agents; or 
iL Damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of a third party. 
ln conclusion, the author is of the opinion that the exoneration methodologies 
adopted by both the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions are extreme, owing to 
their subjectivity. In 1929, when the Warsaw Convention was adopted, the 
drafters kept in consideration the need to protect the infant aviation industry. 
They therefore created what was very soon considered to be unrealistic limits on 
liability. On the other hand, it bewet air carriers with a reversed burden of proof 
and limited defences which were difficult to surmount. In practical terms, this 
methodology turned out to be in effect a form of strict limited liability. This came 
from the fact that courts tended to apply the rules subjectively in favour of 
passengers, taking into consideration the fact that whatever the compensation 
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owed to passengers it was still insufficient when compared to the damage they 
suffered. 
The Montreal Convention took as a starting point the series of efforts undertaken 
to amend the Warsaw Convention. It adopted a consumer protection point of 
view, taking into account the Montreal Agreement 1966, the Guatemala City 
Protocol and the MIIA. Accordingly, the Montreal Convention attempted to 
encapsulate ail of these developments and present in a single Convention. 
Passengers were to be dealt with differently and discriminately. According to 
Article 19 of the Convention, whatever the nature of damage the passenger 
suffers as a result of a delay, the carrier will be able escape its Iiability on the 
grounds of the "ail necessary measures" defence. Bearing in mind that such 
damages may be corporal in nature, this would result in a discriminatory 
treatment compared with those suffering corporal injuries for a reason other than 
delay. 
On the other hand, the provisions of Article 21 uncovered the somewhat veiled 
intentions of courts to protect consumers at the cost of airlines. It implicitly tells 
passengers "if you get injured, airlines will compensate you up to 100,000 SORs 
even if the damage was caused solely by a third party". It thus imposed on the 
airlines the role of insurer. In this context the Montreal Convention failed to be fair 
and balanced even when it tried to do so. By inserting the word "solely" to the 
third party defence available under Article 21 (2), it adopted an a" or nothing 
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methodology. Thus, with the inclusion of such a term the carrier will not be able 
to exonerate itself or limit liability even if a third party is predominantly involved in 
the causation of damage. Once more, this impractical defence takes us towards 
de facto strict liability. 
The following section of the thesis will elaborate on defences available under 
Islamic-fiqh in the context of air carriage and how these would contrast with those 
available under the Warsaw System and the Montreal Convention. 
7.3.3 Defences available under Islamic-fiqh 
The basic standard principle of evidence under Islamic Law is: 
.<:\. ,- ·····'1 . ...c..)1· ,- WI 
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The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff and to the denier is the burden of 
oath. 
This self explanatory basic principle of proof is in accordance with natural logic. 
Islamic jurists have however concluded that this principle cannot apply to sorne 
situations, where it may not be possible for the plaintiff to prove his case not 
merely due to a lack of evidence but rather because of the difficulty of having 
such proof, such as in medication cases where proof and evidence are very 
scientific and sophisticated, to the extent that a layman can not follow. Another 
difficult example is when the patient is under anaesthesia and unconscious. In 
such cases jurists applied an analogy to the hadith of the Prophet: 
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A person performing as a physician while he is not known to be such shall 
bear liability 
According to this tradition of the Prophet, Islamic scholars like Ibnulqayem, Ibn 
Rushd and Alkhatabï concluded that a physician's liability is assumed unless 
he/she proves that he conducted his work in due diligence and in accordance to 
the established conventional medical standards. 
Islamic jurists have reached a consensus on differentiating between the situation 
where the aggressor has control of the subject causing the damage, or is at least 
able to prevent such damage from being caused and the situation where the 
aggressor does not have such a possibility. According to Abdulqader Auda, to 
evaluate whether the aggressor is liable for the wrongful damage or death, jurists 
are applying two doctrines: 
I~I' ~.\ ~ 4..i.o'.- ~II ·.C. '\.S I~I "...J! ~I \ oÙc.\.! <ÛI:. Il .. .:.11. 1 . -:.- l. L.. le:" 
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i. Aggressors are liable for ail actions which may cause damage to other 
persons, so long as it was possible for him/her to take necessary 
precautions to prevent it. The aggressor shall be deemed to have been 
taking necessary precautions to prevent the damage so long as he/she 
proves that he/ she was acting cautiously. If, however, it was impossible 
335 See A. Owdah, supra note 28 at 104-108. 
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for the aggressor to avoid the occurrence of the accident, there should be 
no liability whatsoever on the part of the aggressor. 
ii. If the event causing damage is by itself nol permissible or illegal and the 
aggressor has acted without necessity. In this case the aggressor is liable 
for damage resulting from his/her action despite the impossibility of taking 
precautions to prevent such damage. 
Accordingly, jurists have given various examples of what may be considered 
accidents for which the aggressor is liable or not liable. For instance, if a person 
is walking in the street carrying a piece of wood and this fa Ils on to someone 
causing in jury, the carrier of the wood shall be liable for the damage because it 
was possible for him/her to take the necessary precautions to prevent such a fall. 
But if dust resulting from walking harms the eye of another, the walking person 
may not be liable for such damage as it is impossible to avoid the dUSt.336 
Other examples include liability for parking a cart where it should not be parked if 
the cart subsequently causes damage to others. 
One can argue that the Warsaw Convention is consistent with Isalmic-fiqh insofar 
as it does not directly reverse the burden of proof. Rather, it is a normal 
consequence of the situation, and of the relationship between the passenger and 
the carrier which makes the carrier liable once damage is sustained onboard. 
This is so because the carrier is supposed to carry the passenger to his/her 
336 See Ibid. al 105. 
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destination safely. Passengers are under the control of the carrier throughout the 
flight. Everything in the surroundings belongs to or is under the control of the 
carrier. Therefore, any damage sustained is most probably caused by the carrier 
or by something or someone supposedly under the control of the carrier. The 
carrier also is - or ought to be - best informed about the technical details of the 
flight. Accordingly, it would be unnatural and illogical to presume that damage is 
caused by someone else but the carrier. This presumption is not absolute for it is 
possible in some situations to find that the damage is not caused by the carrier. 
ln these cases, damage sustained may be caused by the passenger himself or 
by a third party. In the flow of logical analysis, it would be more realistic to ask 
the carrier to prove that the accident happened because of such foreign 
elements, if any exist, rather than to ask the passenger to prove that it was the 
carrier and exclusively the carrier. This approach is certainly analogous to the 
approach taken by Abdulqader Auda. 
7.4 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states: 
The carrier is liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily in jury suffered by a passenger, 
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board 
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking. 
The Hague Protocol did not impie ment any amendments to the original text of 
this Article. Therefore it is still in effect, as the original text of the Convention. 
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The language of Article 17 establishes presumptive carrier liability. Articles 20 
and 21 affirm this concept by asserting that the carrier shall bear the burden of 
proof that someone else has contributed to the damage and that it has taken ail 
necessary measures to prevent such damage. 
Article 17 introduces some very controversial terms which need to be addressed 
in detail, namely "passenger", "bodily in jury", "accident", "embarking" and 
"disembarking". 
Whereas the term "passenger" was sufficiently addressed under section 6.2.2.2 
of the thesis, this part will concentrate on the remaining terms. 
7.4.1 Bodily in jury 
7.4.1.1 Bodily in jury under Warsaw 
The term bodily in jury in the context of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is 
very contentious. The main issue at stake here is whether the expression "any 
other bodily in jury" includes pure mental trauma su ch as nervous shock, post 
traumatic stress disorder, depression and ail other kinds of mental distress, 
psychic and psycho-somatic injuries. 
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The first significant ruling on the meaning of "other bodily injury" is traced back to 
1973 and the case of Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., in which a married 
couple claimed damages for bodily injuries and mental suffering following the 
1970 hijacking in the Dawson Field of the Jordanian desert. 337 The court 
asserted that: 
Certainly, mental anguish directly resulting from bodily in jury is damage 
sustained in the event of a bodily in jury. The delegates (at the Warsaw 
conference) apparently chose to follow this well-recognized principle of law 
allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting from the occurrence of a 
bodily in jury, the emotional distress being directly precipitated by the bodily 
in jury itself. Therefore, plaintiffs may recover in this action for any such 
emotional anxiety that they can demonstrate resulted from a bodily in jury 
suffered as a consequence of the hijacking. 
The court further asserted, "By thus restricting recovery to bodily injuries, the 
inference is strong that the Warsaw Convention intended to narrow the otherwise 
broad scope of liability under the former draft and preclude recovery for mental 
. h " angUis ... 
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines Inc.338 arose from a similar incident. The court 
asserted that "only by abandoning the ordinary and natural meaning of the 
language of Article 17, could we arrive at a meaning of the terms 'wounding' and 
'bodily in jury' which might comprehend purely mental suffering without physical 
manifestation." The court then finally and clearly decided that 
Only the damages flowing from the "bodily injury", whatever the causal link, 
are compensable. We are drawn to these conclusions by the clear import of 
the terms of Article 17. Those terms in their ordinary meaning, will not 
337 (1973) 368 F Supp. 1152 (D.C NM); 12 Avi. 18,405. 
338(1974) 34 NY2d 385 (NY C. App); 13 Avi. 17,231. 
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support the plaintiff's claim that psychic trauma alone, or even psychic 
trauma which caused the bodily in jury, is compensable under the Warsaw 
Convention. 
ln Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd. the court took a different view, it 
expanded the meaning of bodily in jury to include "as many types of in jury as are 
colorably within the ambit of the numerated types. Mental and psychological 
injuries are colorably within that ambit and are therefore, comprehended by 
Article 17." 339 
Despite the expansive approach adopted in the Husserl case, most courts have 
been unwilling to venture beyond the requirement that a passenger must suffer 
death, physical in jury or physical manifestation of in jury before recovery against 
an airline is possible for bodily injury.340 
This interpretive controversy continued until the United States Supreme Court 
ruled in 1990 in the land mark case of Eastern Airlines, Ine. v. Floyd et al.341 The 
Court asserted, after a thorough analysis of the original French text of the 
Warsaw Convention, that: 
even if we were to agree that allowing recovery for purely psychic in jury is 
desirable as a policy goal, we cannot give effect to such policy without 
convincing evidence that the signatories' intent with respect to Article 17 
would allow such recovery. As discussed, neither the language, negotiating 
339(1972) 351 FSupp. 702 (DC NY); 12 Avi 12,637: 
340 J. Brent Alldredge, "Continuing Questions in Aviation Liability Law: Should Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention be Construed to Encompass Physical Manefistations of Emotional and Mental Distress?" 
(2002) 67:4 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1345. 
341 499 U.S. 530 (1991); 23 Avi. 17,367. [hereinafter Floyd] 
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history, nor post-enactment interpretations of Article 17 clearly evidences 
such intent. 
Notwithstanding the dismissal of pure mental in jury in the Floyd case, it, 
unfortunately, did not determine very clearly the meaning of manifestation of 
physical in jury. In other words it is still not completely clear whether mental 
trauma accompanied by bodily in jury is recoverable or not.342 However, until the 
very recent case of Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc.,343 subsequent court 
decisions dismissed claims based on pure mental trauma. 
ln this regard, British courts have been in line with the majority of the US courts. 
ln the case of Sidhu v. British Airways, the English Court of Appeal excluded 
pure mental trauma from the Convention's bodily in jury, holding that "[t]he 
Convention was not designed to provide remedies against the carrier to enable 
ail losses to be compensated. It was designed instead to define those situations 
in which compensation was to be available." 344 
The author suggests that it is important to differentiate between two major issues 
in ail of these cases. It is clear from the context of the cases that the learned 
judges respect and appreciate that mental trauma may ordinarily be recoverable, 
342 See Jack v. TWA, 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994), Longo v. Air France (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996); 25 
Avi.629. 
343 2002 US Dist. LEXIS 21419; 29 Avi. 17,252. 
344 Sidhu v. British Airways, [1997] AC 430. see also See Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2001] 3 
Ali ER 126, [2002] QB 100 (Ct of Appeal); [2002] 2 Ali ER 565 (House of Lords) [hereinafter Morris 
v.KLM] and King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd, 1999 SLT. 919 (Lord Ordinary); 2001. [hereinafter King v. 
Bristow] 
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but it is not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. In this regard, it would 
seem to be the unwelcome clarity rather than ambiguity of the text of Warsaw 
Convention which has caused such variations and disagreements amongst the 
courts. Even in the case of Weaverv. Delta Airlines345, where it was decided that 
post traumatic stress disorder is recoverable, the court did not deviate from the 
original rule of the text of the Warsaw Convention. The court decided that post 
traumatic stress disorder is recoverable because it is actually a result of the brain 
in jury suffered from the accident. 
7.4.1.2 Bodily ln jury under the Montreal Convention 
At the ICAO Diplomatic Conference in Montreal in May 1999, the matter of pure 
mental in jury was addressed extensively. Sorne of the delegates tried to suggest 
the adoption of the Guatemala City Protocol by replacing the term "Bodily Injury" 
with the term "Personal Injury".346 However it was contended that this term is 
very broad and lacking in clarity. The drafting committee, therefore, adopted the 
idea of inserting the more elaborate term "bodily or mental in jury" to resolve the 
ambiguity of the Warsaw text.347 Insurance companies criticized this approach 
which they deemed overly generous and suggested that the word mental should 
be deleted.348 
345 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (Dist.Ct. Montana 1999). 
346 ICAO DCW Doc. No. 10 dated 4/5/99. 
347 ICAO DCW Doc. No. Il dated 4/5/99. 
348 ICAO DCW Doc. No. 28 dated 13/5/99, and DCW Doc No. 34 dated 17/5/99. 
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Article 17 of Montreal Convention, however, adopted the following text: 
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily in jury of 
a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death 
or in jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking. 
The Montreal Convention, thus adopted almost the exact text of the Warsaw 
Convention in this regard. Accordingly, in the case of Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 
the court followed the Floyd rule and concluded that Montreal Convention allows 
recovery only for mental injuries caused by bodily injuries. 349 
The author contends that the adoption of Warsaw's provisions in the Montreal 
Convention, and the decision in the Ehrlich case will give ri se to considerable 
litigation. 
Indeed, it is likely that courts will be more interventionist in excluding pure mental 
trauma in cases based on the Montreal Convention. This contention flows form 
the analysis of the meaning of bodily in jury under the Warsaw System. Most of 
the older cases take us back to the original French text of the Warsaw 
Convention so as to conclude that the French text intended to exclude pure 
mental trauma. Besides, the cases of Morris v. KLtJ350 and King v. Bristow'51 
demonstrate that pure mental trauma was not admitted by most courts of the 
signatory states at that point of time. Accordingly, it may be more accu rate to 
349 360 F3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004). [hereinafter Ehrlich] 
350 Supra note 344. 
351 Supra note 344. 
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conclude that Warsaw drafters did not have the intention to include pure mental 
trauma rather than saying that they intended it to be excluded. 
As regard the Montreal Convention, however, the case is completely different. 
The concept of admitting pure mental trauma had been considered by courts for 
some thirty years, and therefore no one can allege that it was not taken into 
consideration by the drafters of the Convention. Rather, documents of the 
international conference at which the Montreal Convention was adopted show 
that the matter of including pure mental trauma was addressed extensively 
without giving ri se to a successful amendment to the provisions of Montreal's 
Article 17. It would be more accurate and precise to conclude, therefore, that the 
Montreal Convention intended to exclude pure mental trauma. 
7.4.1.3 Bodily ln jury and Islamic-fiqh 
As is discussed in Part 1 above, according to the rules adopted by the 
foundational text of Sharï'a, an offender causing wrongful death must pay diyah 
to the heirs of the victim. However for bodily in jury other than death, there are 
two other measures, namely irsh and hokümat 'adJ. 
Jrsh is a predetermined compensation for the loss of one or more organs. Recall 
that the basic equation or formula for irsh is: 
(the lost organ/the number of similar organs in the body) the agreed value 
of diyah. 
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This is based on various narrations belonging to the Prophet which stated 
this.352 ln addition, if the function of the concerned organ or group of organs is 
lost completely then the victim shall deserve full amount of diyah. 
Sorne other injuries which do not include loss of organs were described by nature 
and kind in the Prophet's traditions (foundational texts). These are generally 
called shigaj or girah. The related irsh for these injuries ranges from one 
twentieth to one third of the agreed value of diyah. Shigaj, however concerns 
only injuries to the head and to the face. 
For other kinds of bodily in jury which cannot be calculated in such a way, the 
judge uses his discretion to justly evaluate the damage and the compensation 
deserved. This is hokümat 'adl which shall include inter alia the loss of damaged 
organs, for instance the loss of the eye of a blind person. It also includes the 
weakening of an organ's capability and function, such as vision. 
Islamic jurists, generally, admit that pure mental trauma should be 
compensated.353 They base this on considering mental activities as a product of 
appropriate functioning of the mind, which they consider to be an organ. Any 
defect in the mental capabilities means that the mind is not functioning properly. 
352 See T. Taha, Al-ta'wif/ An Al-Af/riir Al-Gasadiyah Fi l)aw' Al-Fiqh Wa Qada' Al-Naqf/ Al-Hadith 
(Egypt: Dar Al-kutub Al-qanüniyah, 2002) at 191-195. 
353 Ibn Qudama, Al-Moghni Ma' Al-sharl} Al-kabir part 9 at 634. 
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Thus, this defect is treated according to the regular principles of diyah. Islamic 
jurists, moreover, elaborated extensively on the methods of calculating the 
damages departing from the point that for total loss of the mind the victim shall 
be paid full amount of diyah. 
It may therefore unlikely that Islamic jurists would have adopted the principle of 
limiting the damages to bodily injuries to the exclusion of pure mental trauma. 
While analysing the case of Morris v. KLM354 and King v. Bristow355 and 
discussing the various interpretations of the term bodily in jury, Anthony Mercer356 
provides that "Lord Steyn identified six factors that would have influenced his 
interpretation of 'bodily in jury' , absent a preceding judgement. These included the 
general absence of liability of air carriers for mental in jury under the law of most 
States in 1929; the type of incidents peculiar to aviation that may cause mental 
in jury today would have been experienced in 1929; 'mental in jury' was not 
expressly provided for in the Convention and the travaux préparatoires were 
silent on the matter; and no claims for mental in jury under Warsaw were brought 
to court until more than 50 years after Warsaw was agreed." Lord Steyn's speech 
before the House of Lords made use of the historical fact that mental trauma was 
not admitled as a basis of liability by most of the States which are signatories to 
the Warsaw Convention in 1929. 
354 Supra note 344. 
355 Supra note 344. 
356 A. Mercer, "Liability of Air Carriers for Mental Injury under the Warsaw Convention" (June 2003) 
xxviii/3Air & Space Law 147. 
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According to the analysis above, this is untrue for those States applying Islamic 
Sharfa. However would their governments, had they attended, have agreed to 
accepting such a rule? An answer may be deduced from the fact that sorne 
States applying Islamic Sharfa like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan have 
adopted the Warsaw Convention without any reservation in this regard. This may 
be seen as an indication that these States implicitly accepted the exclusion of 
compensation for pure mental trauma. Moreover, the ratification of the Montreal 
Convention by these States without reservations against the provisions of its 
Article 17 would affirm this conclusion. 
Nonetheless, the Saudi Sharfa courts ruled that the ratification of a specifie 
treaty or convention by the State does mean an automatic implementation by the 
courts of that State, unless it is proven to be fully compatible with Sharfa. 357 
Consequently, courts would have to affirm that the exclusion of pure mental 
injuries by both Warsaw and Montreal does not contradict the rulings of Islamic 
Sharfa. 
From the author's point of view, although the founders of the Warsaw Convention 
wished to protect the infant aviation industry at that point of time, we cannot 
conclude that the Montreal Convention retained the same rule for the same 
reasons. Therefore, the exclusion may be accepted under Warsaw but not 
357 see Sharekat Maktabat Al-khadamat Al-Hadithath vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines [20/d/a/9 year 1414 09th 
circuit! Bureau of Grievances/ Saudi Arabia). 
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Montreal. Moreover, protection may be atlained by limiting liability without 
excluding it entirely. Accordingly, protection of the aviation industry should not be 
at the cost of passengers. A betler approach would be to define the nature of 
pure mental trauma subject to compensation. The author presumes that with the 
advancement of psychiatry, this approach would be feasible for both airlines and 
passengers. 
Airlines and consequently insu rance companies will not have to face 
exaggerated claims resulting from the foreseeable risk of unrealistic allegations 
of mental injuries. Passengers, likewise, will not fear bringing a case with litlle 
hope of receiving a just compensation for their in jury. 
7.4.2 "Accident" 
7.4.2.1 "Accident" under Warsaw System: 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes the right of compensation dependant 
on the condition that the bodily in jury results from an accident. It provides that 
" ... if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on ... " As 
such it is normal to find this term thoroughly investigated in almost every case to 
determine whether the incident causing the damage can be qualified as an 
accident in the context of Warsaw System. 
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Despite the importance of the term, the Warsaw Convention (System 
instruments) do not provide any definition of "accident". It is, therefore, important 
that we revert to case law to trace the interpretation of this term. 
It is important to note that the term "accident" as used in the Warsaw context may 
be different from its regular usage and understanding. In general usage, the term 
"accident" expresses events that happened without control over them. A good 
example is the usual apology that a child may give after spilling a full cup of 
grape juice on a clean white dining table cloth, "Sorry Mom, it was an accident" 
The word accident in the English language can be used to denote the in jury as 
weil as the cause of the in jury. The French legal meaning of the term "accident" 
differs little from the meaning of the term in the UK, USA and Germany. 358 
ln the context of the Warsaw System, the situation is different. This is particularly 
the case since we know that the term accident is used to mean something other 
th an "occurrence". The latter term is used in Article 18 to describe the foundation 
of liability in relation to baggage and cargo, while the former is used in Article 17 
to describe the cause of liability in relation to passengers. 
358 See generally L. Goldhirsch, "Definition of 'Accident':Revisiting Air France v. Saks." (April 2(01) 
XXVI/2 Air & Space Law 86. See also L. Cobbs, "The Shifting Meaning of Accident under Article 17 of 
the Warsaw Convention: What did the Airline know and what did it do about it?" (1999) XXIV/3 AIR & 
Space Law 121 at 122-123. 
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Courts have adopted vastly different positions with regard to this. Some courts 
have taken the view that "occurrence of an in jury" constitutes an accident in the 
Warsaw context while others have tried to qualify the term accident. 
The leading case in relation to the term "accident" is Air France v. Saks.359 The 
decisions of the 9th Circuit360 and the Supreme Court in Saks represent the two 
interpretive extremes. The author will therefore discuss them to canvas the range 
of possible interpretation of the term "accident". 
ln Saks, the plaintiff suffered from partial loss of hearing due to the 
depressurization usually encountered upon the descent of the flight for landing. 
The appellate court concluded that the language, history and policy of the 
Warsaw Convention impose absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately 
caused by risks inherent to air travel. The Supreme Court concluded that 
because depressurization was a normal expected happening on flights, in such a 
situation and the loss of hearing was merely an internai reaction of the 
passenger, and thus there was no accident for the purposes of the Warsaw 
Convention. Consequently, the passenger was not eligible for compensation. 
While analysing Saks case, we find three major points that have to be taken in 
consideration. First, the French legal meaning is taken in consideration because 
the governing text of the Convention is the French version. Second, drafters of 
359 470 US 392 (1985),18 Avi 18.538. [hereinafter Saks] 
360 Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d (9th Cir. 1984) rev'd 470 US 392 (1985). 
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the Conventions used the term "accident" in Article 17 for passengers' damages 
while it used the term "occurrence" for destruction or loss of baggage. This 
demonstrates that the drafters of the Convention understood the word accident to 
mean something other than the word occurrence. Third, it is the cause of the 
in jury that must satisfy the definition rather than the occurrence of the in jury 
alone. 
On the basis of these three points, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the same case. 
The Circuit Court relied on the notion that the occurrence of in jury as a result of 
the flight is by itself enough to qualify as an accident in the context of Warsaw 
Convention. But the Supreme Court reversed this conclusion to establish that for 
an occurrence to qualify as accident, it must be "an unexpected or unusual event 
or happening that is external to the passenger". 
Despite the fact that the Saks decision has answered the question of what 
accident is in principle, there is no specifie methodology to be followed to decide 
whether an incident is an unexpected or unusual event or a happening that is 
external to the passenger. It is for this reason that we are still experiencing such 
variation amongst court decisions. For instance, in Wallace v. Korean Airlines, 
the Second Circuit decided that the sexual assault of a female passenger by a 
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male passenger is an accident for which an airline is liable. 361 The court based 
its decision on the grounds of seating arrangement, darkness of the cabin and 
failure of flight attendants to attend to the problem. On the other hand, the 9th 
Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeal, in the recent case of Rodriguez v. Air New 
Zealand Ltd. held that deep vein thrombosis (DVT) was not an accident in the 
context of Warsaw Convention despite the fact that the DVT was caused by the 
seating arrangements in the aircraft.362 
The author is of the opinion that both the Circuit Courts and Supreme Court are 
basing their rulings on a similar principle but emphasizing different words. Both 
courts took into consideration that defences available under Article 20 are no 
longer applicable since the Montreal Agreement of 1966. Accordingly, the 
carrier's liability is almost absolute unless it proves contributory negligence on 
the part of the passenger. 
The author suggests that Warsaw originally intended that the occurrence of the 
damage by itself should impose liability on the carrier who shall not be relieved 
unless it proves a defence articulated by Article 20 or 21 of the Convention. 
Accordingly, loss of hearing due to depressurization is an accident, but it may not 
be compensated if the airline proves that it was within the limits of the normal 
depressurization (Le it had taken ail necessary measures). But so long as this 
361 214 F3d 293 (2d Cir 2000), 27 A vi. 17,846. 
362 383 F3d 914,917 (9th Cir 2004). 
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defence is not applicable, the carrier is liable for the mere occurrence of an 
accident. 
The author is of the opinion that by admitting the approach of the Supreme Court, 
that is to say an accident is an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is 
external to the passenger, means that we are giving additional relief to the carrier 
to avoid its already limited liability. Depressurization itself, for instance, is not an 
unexpected or unusual happening of air transportation. Severe depressurization 
on the other hand, as occurred in the Saks case, is unexpected and an unusual 
occurrence in air travelo According to this methodology, DVT cases which do not 
involve any event or happening at the outset should in no circumstances be dealt 
with as accidents. 
The author therefore suggests that in future cases, courts should consider the 
cause of the damage and the defences available separately, instead of 
integrating both under the term accident. 
The Guatemala City Protocol tried to overcome the ambiguity of the term 
accident by amending the provisions of Article 17 and 20 as follows: 
Article 17/1 The carrier is liable for damages sustained in case of death or 
personal in jury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which 
caused the death or in jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course 
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier 
is not Hable if the death or in jury resulted solely from the state of health of 
the passenger. 
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Article 20/1 ln the carriage of passengers and baggage the carrier shall not 
be liable for damages occasioned by delay if he proves that he and his 
servants have taken ail necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it 
was impossible for them to take su ch measures. 
By adopting this text, the Guatemala City Protocol tried to solve the ambiguity by 
implementing a mild strict liability regime. Article 17 replaced the term accident 
with the term event. With this change, the Protocol tried to shift from cause of the 
damage to occurrence of the damage. Stressing this shift, the Protocol also 
limited the defence available under Article 20 to cases of damage caused by 
delay. 
Unfortunately the Guatemala City Protocol did not play the role it was supposed 
to play as it has never entered into force. 
7.4.3 "Accident" under the Montreal Convention 
Under the Montreal Convention, air carriers' liability for death or in jury sustained 
by passengers is stipulated in Article 17 as fOIlOWS: 
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily in jury of 
a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death 
or in jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the 
operations of embarking or disembarking. 
Thus, contrary to ail expectations, the Montreal Convention kept the term 
"accident" in its place without any further clarification. 
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The first draft of the Convention started with the suggestion that the term 
"accident" be replaced by the word "event".363 Sorne of the delegates contended 
that not changing the term would constitute a biased approach in favour of air 
carriers allowing them to exclude damages relating to the health of the 
passenger. 364 
Once again, insurance companies were able to influence the new text by 
suggesting that the move from accident to event would broaden the scope of 
claims.365 
The author suggests that for cases under the Montreal Convention, courts will 
revert to the history of the drafting of the Convention. This history will 
demonstrate that drafters of the Convention intended to retain the term "accident" 
and not to replace it with "event". The author, therefore, predicts that courts will 
interpret the term "accident", following in the footsteps of Saks case to conclude 
that it means an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger. 
7.4.4 "Accident" under Islamic-fiqh 
363 ICAO DCW Doc. NoA. dated 14/5/1999. 
364 ICAO DCW Doc. No.11. dated 25/5/1999. 
365 ICAO DCW Doc. No. 3. dated 13/5/99. 
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The Arabic version of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention translates the term 
"accident" into the Arabic term hadethah (~.lh). The term "occurrence" as found 
in Article 18 is translated to Arabic using the term waqe'ah (WIJ ). 
Unlike the English term, the Arabic hadethah gives clear reference to the cause 
of the damage rather than referring to the damage itself. Damage is usually 
referred to as ejarar (.Jy...::.). 
Islamic-fiqh compensates against qarar rather than compensating against the 
conduct itself. When ejarar is caused by an hadethah and the link between ejarar 
and hadethah is proven ('alaqatu-sababeiya), the aggressor is li able for the qarar 
resulting therefrom. 
The question is would Islamic-fiqh deal with hadethah and waqe'ah differently? 
Or, would it apply the same ru les to both indiscriminately? 
ln Arabic literature, the terms hadethah and waqe'ah have the same meaning. 
They both refer to an incident which brings about a new situation.366 The author, 
therefore, suggests that, the use of these two terms in itself necessarily does not 
imply any differences. 
366 See Almonjid Fi Allughah Wal-A 'alam (Dar Almashriq Beirut 1986) at 121 and 913. 
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According to Islamic-fiqh, the air carrier is a public hire, agir mushtarak. Public 
hire refers to the worker who deserves his pay for his efforts, rather than for the 
result he achieves. An air carrier's obligation in this context is therefore, to exert 
its due diligence to carry the passenger safely, rather than an obligation to attain 
a result. Accordingly, air carriers are requested to exert their best efforts to 
transport the passenger according to certain standards. Upon its failure to accord 
with these measures, an air carrier is considered to be performing negligently 
and, therefore, will be considered a muta'adi (aggressor). 
Thus, upon the occurrence of the damage due to the negligent performance of 
the carrier, the carrier would be deemed an aggressor and accordingly shall be 
liable. This obligation of the carrier is to be considered objectively. 367 Courts, 
therefore, would evaluate the conduct of the carrier in comparison to the 
standard norms and measures pertaining to the situation. Consequently, diligent 
performance of the carrier in accordance with the adopted aviation standards and 
its conduct as a diligent carrier would result in exoneration from liability the 
carrier not being liable with regard to the damage sustained by the passenger. 
The question becomes, how would Islamic courts deal with cases like Saks? 
Would the courts take the approach followed by the U.S. Supreme Court or 
would they prefer the approach of the Circuit Court? 
367 A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 28 part 6 at 95. 
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It is clear that Islamic-fiqh bases Iiability on the regular common and civil law 
tripartite test of damage, fault and causation. Accordingly, the occurrence of 
damage in itself does not ensure that the victim will be compensated. Rather, 
there has to be a proof that the damage is not caused completely or partly by the 
victim (contributory negligence) or any other foreign element. Moreover, there 
must be a link between the fault at the source of the harm and the damage itself. 
This link is the subject of various theories under Islamic-fiqh. 
Islamic-fiqh would nevertheless apply a slightly different approach than either the 
U.S Supreme Court or the Circuit Court to reach its final conclusion in such 
cases. An Islamic court would not require that the event or happening be 
unexpected or unusual. It would rather concentrate on the link between the event 
and the damage. This link is presumed so long as the passenger is under the 
custody of the carrier. Nonetheless, su ch liability under Islamic-fiqh is not strict. 
The carrier still has ways to avoid liability. These will be addressed in detail while 
discussing Articles 20 and 21 below. 
By way of summary, the author is of the opinion that the approach followed by 
Islamic-fiqh would result in finding an intermediate line between the extreme 
positions adopted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the Saks 
case. This intermediate approach would adopt an objective perspective. This 
objective perspective would guide the court to prevent applying strict liability. It 
would, on the other hand, not exonerate the carrier from its liability merely 
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because one passenger has the internai potential to react to an incident more 
severely th an others. Islamic-fiqh would always consider the action of the carrier 
in the context of the accident or event rather than concentrating on the reaction 
of the passenger as in the Supreme Court approach. 
7.5 Embarking and Disembarking 
According to Article 17 of Warsaw Convention, for an accident that has caused 
in jury to be actionable, it must be sustained by the passenger on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 
Here too, the terms of Article 17, which are meant to unify the law in relation to 
damages sustained by passengers, are at the root of vagueness and uncertainty 
in various court decisions. 
ln referring to the travaux préparatoires of the Warsaw Convention, courts found 
that it was not the drafters' intention to widen the scope of application of the 
Convention so as to start from the moment the passenger entered the aerodrome 
of departure to the moment they leave the aerodrome of destination. Nor was it 
the intention of the drafters to limit the applicability of the Convention to accidents 
occurring onboard the aircraft.368 
368 P. Dempsey & M.Milde, supra note 262 at 159. 
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The seminal case on this issue is Day v. Trans World Airlines, Ine. Passengers 
were standing in line to proceed to the aircraft when a terrorist attack took the 
lives of three of them and caused injuries to more than fort Y others. 369 The court 
was of the view that 
the words "in the course of the operation of embarking" do not exclude 
events transpiring within a terminal building nor do these words set forth 
any strictures on location. Rather, the drafters of the Convention looked to 
whether the passenger's actions were a part of the operation or process of 
embarkation. 
The court reached this view after reviewing the drafting history and minutes of 
the Warsaw Convention. It concluded that the language of Article 17 prompted a 
case by case inquiry into whether a passenger was in the course of embarkation 
or disembarkation when the in jury arose. To reach its conclusion, the Court 
adopted a three-part test: 
i. Location of the passenger's' activity; 
ii. Nature of passenger's' activity; and 
iii. Under whose control or at whose direction the passenger was performing 
it. 
This Day test was applied subsequently in a number of cases ln Sehmidkunz v. 
SAS, in which the court held that a passenger who was 500 yards away from the 
aircraft in a common passenger area of the terminal and who had not as yet 
received her boarding pass and was not under the airline's control, was not in the 
369(1975) 393 F.Supp. 217 (OC NY), 13 AVI. 17,647. 
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course of the operation of embarking. 370 Likewise, in Martinez Hernandez v. Air 
France, a passenger was at the immigration control when terrorists attacked. 371 
The court applied the Day test and refused to hold the air carrier liable because 
the airline was not in charge of the passenger, and the process of 
disembarkation had been completed. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention was 
therefore not applicable. 
Thus, in the case of disembarkation, the Day test implies that that the 
Convention's applicability terminates at the time when a passenger descends 
from the aircraft and reaches a safe point inside the terminal building.372 
No further amendments to this paragraph of Article 20 took place through the 
history of Warsaw System.373 
The Montreal Convention kept the same text with regard to the operations of 
embarkation and disembarkation. 
Islamic-fiqh would not de part from the rulings adopted in the context of the 
Warsaw Convention. As mentioned when discussing the term "accident" above, 
an Islamic-fiqh court would ask in whose custody the passenger was. It will then 
370 Schmidkunz v. SAS, 628 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Ciro 1980). 
37I Martinez Hemandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 Ost Cir.l976). 
372 McDonald v. Air Canada 439 F.2d 1042 (lst Ciro 1971). 
373 Paragraph 2 was de1eted under Hague Protocol. 
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consider the matter objectively to determine whether the one in charge took the 
necessary precautions to protect the passenger from suffering harm.374 
7.6 Documentation 
While revealing the importance of the passenger ticket, Article 3(2) of the 
Warsaw Convention makes it obvious that the ticket is not the contract of 
carriage. The contract of carriage is valid irrespective of the invalidity or even 
non-existence of a passenger ticket, which nonetheless, serves many important 
functions. It is prima facie evidence of the contract of carriage, a medium of 
communicating the notice of limits of liability, an authorization to travel 375 , an 
accounting document, a receipt and, not least, an important document for the 
immigration authorities. The following section of the thesis will scrutinize the legal 
issues arising from the passenger ticket in relation to the contract of carriage 
within the meaning of the Warsaw System and Montreal Convention. 
7.6.1 The Passenger Ticket: Definition and History 
The Warsaw Convention provides no definition of the term "ticket". However, the 
particulars of the ticket prescribed under Article 3 of the Convention reveals that 
"the ticket is a paper based document that contains certain particulars and 
374 See section 87.4.2 above. 
375 See R. D. Margo, "Legal Aspects of Electronic Ticketing" (1997) XXII:I, Annals of Air and Space Law 
177 at 180. 
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proves the existence of the contract of carriage".376 Nevertheless, neither 
Warsaw nor any of its subsequent amendments stipulate that the ticket must be 
a paper-based documene77. Rather, Warsaw and Hague asserted that the ticket 
should include the particulars prescribed under Article 3. Therefore, it is the 
author's point of view that it is more proper to say that the Guatemala Protocol of 
1971 intended expressly and more transparently to provide that a ticket may be 
in forms other than paper, rather than that is introduced this concept for the first 
time. 
As a general matter, however, it is often sufficient to adopt the definition 
provided by lAT A in Resolution 724, which provides that 'ticket' is "this passenger 
ticket and baggage check, of which these conditions and the notices form a part". 
Long before the adoption of Resolution 724, the International Air Traffic 
Association (the fore-runner of lAT A) adopted the first uniform Conditions of 
Carriage at the Vienna Meeting on 18th February 1927. 378 ln 1930, these 
Uniform Conditions of Carriage were amended to comply with the provisions of 
the then newly inaugurated Warsaw Convention 379. At the Rio de Janeiro 
Conference of 1947, the International Air Transport Association adopted new 
standard passenger tickets and baggage checks incorporating the contract of 
376 See P. Lyck & B.A. Dornic, "Electronic Ticketing under the Warsaw Convnetion: The Risk Of Going 
Ticketless on International Flights" (1997) XXII: 1 Annals of Air and Space Law 16. 
377 See P. Martin, supra note 298 at 190. 
378 See S. Tsai, supra note 270 at 36. 
379 Ibid. 
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carriage38o. This contract was redrafted and revised in Bermuda in 1949, Madrid 
in 1950 and Honolulu in 1953. Again in Honolulu in 1970, IATA adopted a set of 
conditions of carriage as recommended practices that were not applicable to 
travel to, from or via the United States or Canada. IATA members became 
obliged to use the standard form conditions of contract by virtue of the lAT A 
Resolution 275b which has been amended by resolution 724. However, starting 
in 1996, the lAT A Legal Advisory Council (LAC)381 took an active role in updating 
the IATA General Conditions of Carriage for both passengers and baggage.382 
The most recent set of lAT A Standard General Conditions of Carriage was 
adopted in July 1998383. These conditions specify inter alia that in interline travel, 
each carrier's conditions will be applicable to its own segment. Moreover, they 
contain sorne rules with regard to the situation of restraining or offloading unruly 
passengers and sorne conditions pertaining to code-shared flights.384 
Finally, this latest set of the GCC Pax provides that " 'ticket' means the document 
entitled 'Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check' or the electronic ticket in each 
case issued by or on behalf of the airlines concerned and includes the conditions 
of contract, notice and coupons" 385. Although this condition is clear in the context 
380 Ibid. at 37. 
381 Previously, the IATA Legal Advisory Group (LAG). 
382 See R. D. Margo, The Liability repon, 2:1 (Condon & Forsyth in association with IATA, 1999) at 12. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid. 
385 lAT A General Conditions of Carriage for Passengers and Baggage. See also T. Unmack, Civil Aviation: 
Standard and Liabilities, (London: Informa Legal Publishing, 1999) at 327. 
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of the standard paper-based ticket, it seems to be problematic in the context of 
electronic ticketing.386 
7.6.2 Particulars of the Ticket and their Impact on the Contract of Carriage 
Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention reads: 
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a 
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars: 
The place and date of issue; 
The place of departure and destination; 
The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right 
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity and that if he exercises that 
right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation 
of its international character; 
The name and address of the carrier or carriers; 
A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability 
established by this Convention. 
(2) The absence, irregularity or the loss of the passenger ticket shall not 
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which 
shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, 
if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been 
delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this 
convention which exclude or limit his liability. 
Article 3 establishes and emphasizes that the contract of carriage and the 
passenger ticket are two distinct things. Nevertheless, they are very closely 
connected and related to each other. This fact is emphasized in the Hague 
Protocol, in which Article 3(2) has been amended to read: 
The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of the conclusion 
and conditions of the contract of carriage. The absence, irregularity or the 
loss of the passenger ticket does not affect the existence or the validity of 
386 The author' s concerns with regard to e-ticketing will be illustrated in section 87.7 below. 
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the contract of carriage, which shall none the less, be subject to the rules of 
this Convention. Nevertheless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the 
passenger embarks without a passenger ticket having been delivered, or if 
the ticket does not include the notice required by paragraph 1 c of this 
Article, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of 
Article 22. 
The particulars prescribed in Article 3 are incorporated into the ticket for a 
number of reasons. The first particular (the place and date of issue) is important 
for the consideration of the jurisdiction (Article 28). The second and third 
particulars (place of departure and destination, and the agreed stopping places) 
determine whether the carriage is within the scope of the Warsaw Convention. It 
is not unusual to omit the stopping points in the ticket as they are usually 
mentioned in the tariffs of the carriers.387 The fourth particular is concerned with 
notifying the passenger that the transportation is subject to the limits of liability of 
the Warsaw Convention. 
The second part of the Article provides that the absence or irregularity of the 
passenger ticket does not negate the contract of carriage but it, rather, deprives 
the carrier of having the privilege of limited liability under Article 22. Thus, the 
validity of the contract of carriage is never affected by the absence or irregularity 
of the passenger ticket but only the validity of certain provisions of that contract, 
namely the limits of liability. 
387 Article III of the Hague Protocol requires an indication of the places of departure and destination in 
addition to at least one extraterritorial stopping point, if any, in the case where the points of departure and 
destination are within the territory of the same state. 
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The Hague Protocol makes it very clear that failure to submit or deliver a proper 
notice with regard to the limits of liability shall result in depriving the carrier of 
those limits. However, this point is not fully clear in the case of the Warsaw 
Convention. In Usi v. Alitalia-Unee Aeree Italiane, it was held by the court that 
delivery of a ticket containing a statement of applicability of the Convention which 
was printed in 4-point type was inadequate, and amounted to non-delivery of the 
ticket for the purposes of Article 3(2).388 
It was a long time before this judgment was reversed in Chan v. Korean Air 
Unes, Ltd., in which the Supreme Court he Id that "[n]on-delivery of the ticket 
cannot be equated with the delivery of a ticket in a form that fails to provide 
adequate notice of the Warsaw limitations. A delivered document does not fail to 
qualify as a passenger ticket".389 
The case of Ludecke v. Canadian Pacifie Air Unes Ltd. agrees with the opinion 
expressed in Chan, contra Usi where Mclntyre J., writing for the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that390 
The absence, irregularity, or loss of a passenger ticket will not affect the 
existence or the validity of the contract of carriage. The benefit of the 
limitation will be lost only where no ticket is delivered. The American cases 
referred to above which ho Id that delivery of a ticket with an irregularity, 
that is, a statement as required by Art. 1 (e) which is iIIegible, amounts to 
388 (1966) 253 FSupp 1002 (DC NY), 9 Avi 18, 374. The Lisi case was considered under the mIes of 
Warsaw Convention since the USA did not ratify the Hague protocol. 
389 (1989) 109 S.Ct 1676 (US SC), 21 Avi 18.22. 
390[1979] 2 S.C.R. 63,12 Avi 17,191. 
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no delivery of a ticket, ignore this plain language and fail to give effect to a 
precise statement of the law. 1 am unable, however harsh and 
unreasonable 1 may consider the limitation, to adopt the American test. It 
is clear in this case that the carrier delivered a ticket and thus preserved 
its right to the limitation. 
As expected the Montreal Convention introduced more up to date documentation 
requirements. Article 3 of the Montreal Convention provides as follows: 
1 . In respect of carriage of passengers an individual or collective 
document of carriage shall be delivered. 
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination; 
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory of a 
single State Party, one or more agreed stopping places being within the 
territory of another State, an indication of at least one such stopping place. 
2. Any other means which preserves the information indicated in paragraph 
1 may be substituted for the delivery of the document referred to in that 
paragraph. If any such other means is used, the carrier shall offer to deliver 
to the passenger a written statement of the information so preserved. 
3. The carrier shall deliver to the passenger a baggage identification tag for 
each piece of checked baggage. 
4. The passengers shall be given written notice to the effect that where this 
Convention is applicable it governs and may limit the liability of carriers in 
respect of death or in jury and for destruction or loss of, or damage to, 
baggage, and for delay. 
5. Non-compliance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs shall not 
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage, which shall, 
nonetheless, be subject to the rules of this Convention including those 
relating to limitation of liability. 
The first thing to observe is that, unlike Warsaw, Montreal combines the 
documentation requirements for passengers and luggage in one article. 
Paragraph (1) of this Article indicates the particulars to be included in the ticket. 
The ticket should indicate the places of departure and destination. If the places 
of departure and destination are within the territory of a single State Party with 
one or more agreed stopping places in the territory of another State, an indication 
261 
of at least one such stopping place shall be included in the ticket. This text 
seems to be more rigid than Warsaw's as it does not give the carrier the right to 
change the stopping place. Moreover, it does not require an indication of the 
place of contract. This potentially undermines the test in Article 33 of the 
Montreal Convention concerned with the determination of the jurisdiction of 
claims. One of potential locus of jurisdiction is the place where the carrier has the 
place of business through which the contract was been made. Thus, without 
identifying the domicile of the contract, this test may be rendered inapplicable, 
especially in the e-ticketing era. 
Paragraph (2) of this Article is the tool that has paved the way for e-ticketing, 
which was announced by lAT A in 2005 as a goal of international air 
transportation.391 
Paragraph (3) replaces Warsaw's luggage ticket with a baggage identification tag 
and simplifies the process as Montreal does not dictate any information to be 
included in the luggage ticket. Paragraph (4) of the Article requires that 
passengers be given written notice to the effect that where this Convention is 
applicable, it governs and may limit the liability of carriers in respect of death or 
in jury and for destruction or loss of, or damage to, baggage, and for delay. This 
language means that it is not necessary that such notice be printed on the ticket. 
The carrier may instead print the provision on a visible poster at its counter to 
391 P. Dempsey & M.Milde, supra note 262 at 88. 
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satisfy the provisions of this Article. It may also use the internet pop-up notice 
mechanism for those using electronic ticketing. 
As regards Paragraph (5) of this Article, unlike Warsaw, the Montreal combined 
documentation requirement for passengers and luggage is in a single provision. 
Accordingly, ail requirements indicated in the Article are illustrative rather than 
mandatory. With such language, Montreal has in essence cleared one of the 
biggest minefields for litigation under the Warsaw System. 
It is beyond doubt that Islamic-fiqh will require particulars in order to ensure the 
clarity of the contract, though not the existence of the contract. As detailed 
above, Islamic-fiqh would not deal with the matter of formalities as stringently as 
the Warsaw System. 3921n this context Islamic-fiqh would deal with the matter of 
particulars of the ticket in the same manner as the Montreal Convention manner. 
Islamic-fiqh would take another point into consideration, namely the matter of 
tadlees (misrepresentation). As explained in Part 1 above, tadlees has to be of a 
nature that the contracting party would not have entered had the other had not 
misled him. It is agreed amongst Islamic scholars that if one party to a contract is 
misled by the other by the means of tadlees, the contract can be void. 
Accordingly, the matter of effective delivery of a ticket may be considered by 
Islamic courts from this perspective rather than being considered as a matter of 
formality. 
392 See sections 2.2.4.1 above. 
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Finally, an Islamic court would take into consideration that the provisions of the 
particulars fall into two categories. One is the notice of limits of liability. The other 
is the rest of the particulars. The former is required by Warsaw and Hague for 
the benefit of the passenger with the intention of drawing the attention of the 
passenger in a way that would leave no doubt that he/she ought to read it or at 
least notice that it looks different and more important than other contract 
conditions. Moreover, the notice must be delivered to the passenger in a timely 
manner so that the passenger has the ability to decide upon reading the 
notice.393 Thus, as to this particular, the issues of irregularity and non-delivery 
would be dealt with without distinction. Both would amount to a failure to notify 
the passenger of the limits of liability and accordingly a court may decide to 
deprive the carrier of the limits of liability provided that they are lower than diyah. 
The other particulars are descriptive and informative in nature and are needed for 
the clarity of the contract of carriage. As such, they should not be dealt with as 
stringently as the notice, for they would rarely affect the rights of the passenger. 
However, the points of departure and destination, in addition to the median 
stopover points are important with regard to the issue of jurisdiction. 
Finally, as a general matter, owing to the fact that the Montreal Convention has 
basically canee lied Warsaw's limits of liability, Islamic courts may consider the 
393 See delivery of the ticket at section 87.6.3. 
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matter of the regulation of tickets with as much flexibility as the Montreal 
Convention. 
7.6.3 Delivery of the Ticket 
ln Chan v. Korean Airlines Scalia J. stated that: 
a delivered document does not fail to qualify as a 'passenger ticket', and 
does not cause forfeiture of the damages limitation, merely bec au se it 
contains a defective notice. When Article 3(2), after making this much 
clear, continues (in the second sentence) ((Nevertheless, if a carrier 
accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered, 
etc)) it can only be referring to the carriers failure to deliver any document 
whatsoever, or to its delivery of a document whose shortcoming are so 
extensive that it cannot reasonably be described as a ticket. 
Despite the various points of possible disagreement with the Chan decision, this 
paragraph exemplifies the unanimous judicial position respecting the non-
delivery of the ticket as a valid ground for forfeiting the limits of liability. Article 
3(2) of the Hague Protocol makes clear that proper delivery of the ticket to be a 
condition precedent for airlines to avail themselves of the limits of liability. 
However, physical delivery of the ticket does not mean that it has been effectively 
delivered. In other words, it does not mean that the Conditions of Contracts and 
consequently the Conditions of Carriage, including the notice of liability limits, will 
automatically be in effect. 
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Prior to the case of Chan v. Korean Airlines, Article 3(2) of the Warsaw 
Convention was interpreted to the same effect in several cases. For example, in 
Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Une inc., the New York District Court concluded: 
"[w]e read Article 3(2) to require that the ticket should be delivered to the 
passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable opportunity to take 
measures to protect himself against the limitation of liability.,,394 
Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention expressly deprives the carrier of relying on 
the provisions regarding limits of liability whenever it accepts a passenger without 
a ticket. 
However, whereas effective delivery is based on the time lag between delivery of 
the ticket and acceptance of the passenger, we need to know what constitutes 
acceptance by the carrier. 
Varying interpretations are given concerning the time of acceptance, none of 
which can satisfactorily be applied as a general rule. Practically every case is 
different from the others and has to be considered independently. The case of 
frequent fliers may be dealt with in a different way from the case of someone who 
flies for the first or second time. Similarly, some credit cards companies offer to 
their holders very high life insu rance coverage when the passenger buys the 
ticket using that credit cardo The question is, would the passenger be considered 
394 (1963) 35 FRD 196 (OC NY), 9 Avi 17,475. 
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ta have been aware of the issue of limited liability if, upon reservation, he was not 
been informed of the carrier's limited liability? 
Consider a case in which a passenger is on his way ta board the aircraft very 
shortly after being issued a ticket. Someone whispers into his/her ear that the 
liability of the carrier is limited for this flight and simultaneously, the passenger 
calls a life insu rance company by his cellular telephone and gets protection 
against the liability limits. Is this effective delivery despite the fact that the ticket 
was delivered in a time frame that would not permit a regular passenger without 
a cellular telephone ta take su ch protective methods? What about the language 
of the notice? ln the case of Mahmoud v. Alitalia Air Unes, the court held that 
liability was limited where the ticket stated in Dutch and in English that liability 
would be limited despite the fact that the passenger read neither language.395 
The rule established in Merten v. The Flying Tigers Une Ine. that the passenger 
should be able ta take protective actions against the limits of liability remains a 
solid test ta determine whether the ticket was delivered effectively. Nevertheless, 
it should be applied ta each case independently. 
ln relation ta the matter of delivery, it is important ta point out that the ticket is 
physically delivered ta the passenger when submitted, on his behalf, ta his 
395 17 Avi 17,589. See also T. Unmack, supra note 385 at 231. 
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agene96 Nevertheless, it is still undetermined whether delivery to a group leader 
would be a constructive delivery to eaeh passenger.397 
The aim of most of the litigation on delivery is to overcome the limits of liability, 
and thus the issue of non-existence or irregularity of a ticket is only a tool for 
plaintiffs to overcome those limits. Therefore, under Islamie-fiqh, the cases of usi 
and Chan would be looked at differently. 
As established previously, the limits under Islamie diyah are higher than the limits 
of Warsaw or Hague. As such, if the cases of Mertens, usi or Chan were raised 
byan Islamic Court, they may not have needed to repudiate the limits of Warsaw 
as they did in the original cases. 
Moreover, while having the presumption that the contract agreed on limits higher 
than diyah, the plaintiffs would have tried to prove the existence of limits rather 
than denying them as in the original cases. The methodology would be of a 
different nature. However, if such a higher level did not exist, the contentions of 
the plaintiffs and the grounds of judgment may be based on whether the 
passengers were allowed the chance to opt for higher limits of liability. 
3% See Ross v. Pan American Airways Inc, 85 NE 2d 880 (1949), 2 Avi. 14,556. 
397 See generally Manion v. Pan American World Airways Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 398, 405 (1982 ) 
16 Avi. 17,473, T. Unmack, supra note 385, at 229-231. 
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Nevertheless, in some Islamic courts where the Conventions were adopted in 
full, the author presumes that the courts would follow the le ad of Lisi v. Alitalia. 
However, this should not be taken in isolation from the circumstances associated 
with every individual case that may render the result in Chan more reasonable. 
Finally, under Islamic-fiqh, the ticket is deemed to have been physically delivered 
to the passenger if received, on his behalf, by his agent. In addition, most 
probably, delivery of the ticket to a group leader would be deemed as a 
constructive delivery to each passenger. This is so bec au se in Islamic teaching, 
a group leader is assumed to have been appointed by the group. 
By virtue of Article 3(5) of the Montreal Convention, the matter of effective 
delivery is no longer an issue to be addressed. Accordingly, an Islamic court 
would not payas much attention to effective delivery as it would for cases 
considered under the Warsaw System. 
7.7 New Provisions Introduced by Montreal 
ln addition to trying to close some of the loopholes of Warsaw, Montreal has 
introduced various new provisions. Some of these provisions were dictated by 
practices such as insurance, which is now compulsory under the Montreal 
Convention. Other provisions were inserted for reasons not related to prior 
practice, such as the fifth jurisdiction provisions. 
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These provisions will be addressed in brief in this section to the extent that they 
relate to the subject matter of the thesis. 
7.7.1.1 Electronic Ticketing 
The Montreal Convention does not introduce explicit provisions with regard to 
electronic ticketing. But its Article 3, discussed previously, paved the way for a 
legally sound use of such ticketing system without fear of the possible negative 
implications of the Warsaw Convention. Electronic ticketing is specifically 
addressed in this section because there are various aspects relating to Islamic-
fiqh that need to be considered. 
7.7.1.2 What is e-ticketing? 
Traditional international paper based-tickets are usually delivered to the 
passenger in advance of the departure along with various notices and 
advertisements. In addition, two copies of a flight coupon for every single 
segment of the travel are included. The ticket usually contains abbreviated 
details concerning the points of departure and destination, intermediate points, 
c1ass, fare paid, name of the passenger, permitted number or weight of pieces of 
checked luggage, date and time of departure and arrivai, and so on. Moreover, 
before the passenger receives the ticket, some other documents and coupons 
have been produced and detached from the ticket including the audit coupon.3g8 
398 R.D. Margo, supra note 375 at 178. 
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ln contrast, an electronic ticket is claimed to be a paperless ticket according to 
which the passenger communicates with the airline by means of internet or 
otherwise to make a reservation, and purchases the carriage on a specific flight, 
allegedly without receiving any paper-based document. The passenger will rather 
receive a number either orally or in an "itinerary receipt". The itinerary receipt is 
usually received by facsimile or bye-mail or any other similar means of 
communication. The boarding pass will be issued on the grounds of the itinerary 
receipt or the orally received number. Thus, the boarding pass will be delivered 
without having any ticket issued. 
7.7.1.3 Islamic-fiqh And The Notion of Electronic Contracts 
ln the case of Rolling v. Willann Investment, it was he Id that "[w]here 
technological advances have been made which facilitate communications and 
expedite the transmission of documents we see no reason why they should not 
be utilized ... ,,399 Islamic-fiqh, would agree with this perspective when considering 
the formation of click wrap contracts. As proposed in the Qur'anic verse of dayn 
quoted previously, contracts have to satisfy three qualities, including that "it is 
juster in the sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to 
prevent doubts among yourselves".400 
399 (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 578. 
400 Supra note 48. See also section 2.2.6 above. 
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This Qur'anic Verse provides that commercial transactions have to be dealt with 
in a flexible manner to accord with the nature of the transaction and would keep 
them trustworthy for it provides "but if it be a transaction which ye carry out on 
the spot among yourselves there is no blame on you if ye reduce it not to writing" 
The notion of maj/is al- 'aqd was introduced by Islamic Sharfa to assure the 
consistent and instantaneous exchange of the offer and acceptance to accord 
with the quality of "ye carry out on the spot" in the holy verse.401 However, for 
Islamic-fiqh, an offer (Ijab) may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance is 
communicated to the offeror. In other words, for an 'aqd to be formed, acceptance 
has to be received by the offeror. 
As such, fram the point of view of Islamic-fiqh, the main point to be investigated 
when considering the validity of electronic contracts is how to define the 
electronic maj/is AI- 'Aqd. 
From the author's point of view, at the click of the mouse or 'enter' button the 
acceptance should be deemed to have been delivered despite the practical 
differences between contracting through e-mails or online or, more accurately, 
between contracts that are handled manually and others that are handled 
electronically. 
40\ See section 2.2.4.1.2 above. 
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The reason behind this approach is that the offeree will be promptly notified if the 
other party did not receive the acceptance. If such a message does not appear, it 
is reasonable to presume that the other party has received the assent. 
Consequently, maj/is AI-Aqd would be deemed over on the dispatch of the 
consent and the offerer is not able to withdraw his offer. 
Of course, there must be some exceptions to such a rule. Among these 
exceptions is the case of dispatching the acceptance after the business hours of 
the recipient (but not for the automatically handled 'aqd). 
7.7.1.4 E-Ticketing And Islamic-fiqh 
Islamic-fiqh adopts the principle that was best expressed in the case of Rolling v. 
Willann Investment just mentioned. Of course modern technological usage must 
accord with the rulings of Shan .... a, which mandates that such advances should 
not expose any person (especially the weaker party in bilateral and multilateral 
transactions) to harm or put him/her in a position that is worse than the position 
he/she holds before the development of these advances. 
However, as mentioned above, because of the concept of diyah, Islamic-fiqh 
would handle the matter of air tickets and its impact on the carriers' liability 
inversely to the Warsaw System. 
273 
As the limits of the basic Islamic liability regime are higher th an those provided by 
the Warsaw Convention and the Hague protocol, Islamic courts would face less 
pressure to overcome contractually limited liability than the Lisi or Chan courts, 
since the latter both focussed on the issue of the validity of the limits of liability. 
Such cases may arise under the Montreal Agreement of 1966 under which the 
limits of liability are higher th an the limits under diyah. 
The Montreal Agreement of 1966 provides that402 
Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, provide to each 
passenger whose transportation is governed by the Convention the 
following notice, which shall be printed in types at least as large as 10 
points and in ink contrasting with the stock on (1) each ticket; (ii) a piece of 
paper either placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or attached to the 
ticket; or (iii) on the ticket envelope. 
Unlike in the case of Lisi v. Alitalia, which was decided before the existence of 
the Montreal Agreement of 1966, the case of Chan v. Korean Airlines took the 
agreement into consideration. 
Islamic courts, for their part, would look at the Montreal Agreement of 1966 in two 
possible ways. It could be looked at as an agreement between the airline and the 
Government of the United States of America, whereby the carrier undertakes to 
compensate the passenger in the event of bodily in jury or death. As such, the 
passenger would be a ghayr (third party) beneficiary of this contract. 
402 Montreal Agreement of 1966, section 76.1.6.1 above, Article 2. 
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Consequently, the court could decide to enforce the limits of the Montreal 
Agreement of 1966 irrespective of whether it was explicitly included in the 
contract with the passenger. 
From another perspective, Islamic Courts may interpret the Montreal Agreement 
of 1966 as an undertaking to contract with the passenger for a higher Iimit of 
liability as per the agreement itself. In such a case, the provisions of the Montreal 
Convention would have to be included in the Contract of Carriage in order for 
them to be enforced. 403 However, it is not possible to imagine that an airline 
would try to deny its adherence to the Montreal Agreement of 1966 due to the 
economic impact on the airline were it to be prevented from flying to the United 
States. 
However, in neither case should the airline be put in a better position for its 
mistakes if it did not deliver the notice in accord an ce with the provisions of the 
Montreal Agreement of 1966. 
Thus, although it is recommended that the carrier should strive to notify 
passengers of the limitations of liability as detailed in the Montreal Agreement of 
1966, the omission of such notice would not harm the passenger as Islamic 
courts would enforce it so long as the airline is signatory to the Montreal 
Agreement. 
403 The lAT A resolution No. 724 'C' amended the 'Ad vice to International Passengers on Limitation of 
Liability' to incIude the limits of Montreal Agreement of 1966. 
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7.7.2 Advance Payments 
Article 28 of the Convention provides as follows: 
ln the case of aircraft accidents resulting in death or in jury of passengers, 
the carrier shall, if required by its national law, make advance payments 
without delay to a natural person or persons who are entitled to claim 
compensation in order to meet the immediate economic needs of such 
persons. Such advance payments shall not constitute a recognition of 
liability and may be offset against any amounts subsequently paid as 
damages by the carrier. 
Despite the fact that this Article has adopted the provisions of EU Resolution No. 
2027/97, one if left to wonder about the reasoning behind it. It is meaningless to 
emphasize that it is necessary to obey national law without applying any 
sanctions to its violation. The concept of advance payment is problematic in itself 
as there are many questions to be raised with regard to quantum of payment, 
recipients of payments and means of recourse available to the carrier if the 
carrier is found not to be liable after such payment. 
The only benefit such an article may bring to the Convention is the stipulation 
that "advance payments shall not constitute a recognition of liability and may be 
offset against any amounts subsequently paid as damages by the carrier." This 
provision may be taken to unify of law especially in cases where the carrier is 
obliged by its national law to pay such advance payments while the passenger or 
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her/his heirs are bringing a case against the carrier in a different jurisdiction 
which does not require such advance payments. 
It may be outside of the scope of this thesis to reflect on the Islamic law of 
inheritance for it is purely local and can not be detached from its theological 
background. The author would like, however, to emphasize that Islamic 
inheritance law is weil detailed, thus facilitating the application of the article in the 
case of it being applied by any Islamic state. Although this area of law pays 
considerable attention to wills, it has a clear vision with regard to determination of 
ancestors and their shares without any need for testamentary evidence. The 
author would like to suggest that an independent research should be undertaken 
in this regard. 
7.7.3 Insurance 
Although the Warsaw System does not include any provisions in relation to 
insurance, it remains the key economic issue regarding carriers' liability under 
Warsaw. Insurance coverage was the main reason for the USA not ratifying the 
Hague Protocol. It also led to the Warsaw Convention being denounced by the 
USA in 1965.404 Moreover, Article 50 of the Montreal Convention dictates that 
States party to the Convention shall require their carriers to maintain adequate 
404 See The Law Offices of Countryman & McDaniel Homepage 
<http://www.cargolaw.comlpresentations_montreaLdi.html#montreaI30nvention> (date accessed 
Int2003). 
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insurance. The mandatory nature of insurance poses a number of questions 
regarding the compatibility between the Montreal Convention and Sharfa. It is 
necessary, therefore, that the thesis reflect on the subject of insurance. 
Insu rance is a contractual relationship that has been subjected to thorough 
studies and investigation by Islamic jurists and has produced a rich pool of 
research. In brief, the majority of Islamic jurists do not admit the contemporary 
conventional insurance formula adopted in the West. Some jurists accept it with 
reservations. However, they have ail adopted and created an Islamic insurance 
formula called al-ta'mïn al-ta'awoni (co-operative insurance). The adoption of 
such a formula of insu rance proves that insu rance in principle can accord with 
the intentions of Sharï'a and that it is permissible. It is the various practices of 
insu rance and the manner in which the contract of insu rance is concluded that is 
fact concern those Islamic jurists who do not admit the convention al practices. 
This chapter will shed some light on the matter of insu rance from the perspective 
of Islamic-fiqh. 
7.7.4 The Nature of Insurance 
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Textbooks on insurance law usually start with the question as to what exactly 
insurance iS.405 Although many commentators admit that insurance itself is not 
usuallY defined in the various regulatory statutes, they attempt to derive the 
appropriate definition from case law. Most of the definitions, such as the 
fOIiOwing, concentrate on the formai elements of the contract of insurance rather 
th an on the substance of the contract prestation. 
Insurance is a contract whereby one person, called the "insurer", undertakes in 
return for the agreed consideration, called the "premium", to pay to another 
person, called the "insured", a sum of money, or its equivalent, on the happening 
of a specified event.406 
This definition accords with the consensus that there are three basic elements of 
an insurance contract which are; the two parties "the insurer" and "insured", 
consideration "the premium", and an uncertain happening called "event". 
As regards the substance of the prestation, the contract of insurance is defined 
as a contract to indemnify the person insured for the loss which he might sustain 
in consequence of the peril insured against. Upon the peril having occurred, it 
follows, of course, that as it is only a contract of indemnity, i.e. it is only to pay 
405 See generally E. R. H. Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law (London Butterworth 1970) at 1-5, 
D. C. Jess, The Insurance Of Commercial Risks: Law And Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 3-9, R. 
Hodgin, Insurance Law: text and Materials, 2nd ed. (Cavendish, 2002) at 1 & 55, J. Birds and N. J. Hird, 
Birds' Modem Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 1-13. 
406 Clements v. London and North Western Railway Co., [1894] 2 Q.B 482, CA. 
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that loss which the assured may have sustained by reason of the peril that has 
occurred.407 
Jess finds this definition of insurance imprecise, and prefers to adopt the concept 
that insurance is a security contract where one party, in consideration of a priee 
paid to him adequate to the risk, becomes security to the other that he will not 
suffer loss, damage, or prejudice by the happening of the perils specified.408 Jess 
asserts that the first attempt at a comprehensive definition of a contract of 
insurance is the one stipulated in the case of Prudentiallnsurance Co v. Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, where it was determined that there are three elements 
necessary to constitute a contract of insu rance. 409 These three elements were 
more recently defined in Medical Defence Union Ltd v. Department of Trade 410 
as follows: 
i. The contract must provide that the insured will become entitled to 
something on the occurrence of some event; 
ii. The event must be one which involves some element of uncertainty 
(perhaps with the addition of the words "outside the control of the 
insurer"); and 
iii. The insured must have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the 
contract. 
407 Castellian v. Person [1883] Il Q.B.D. 380 at 386, CA. 
408 D. C. Jess, supra note 405 3-4. 
409[1904] 2 K.B. 658. 
410 (1979) 2 WLR 686. [herinafter Medical Denfence Union] 
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The author finds the definition provided by the Encyclopaedia Britannica very 
suitable and comprehensive. 411 It defines insurance as a device that has been 
developed to handle risk. Its primary function is to substitute certainty for 
uncertainty as regards the economic cost of disastrous events. Insurance may be 
defined more formally as a system under which the insurer, for a consideration 
usually agreed upon in advance, promises to reimburse the insured or to render 
services to the insured in the event that certain accidentai occurrences result in 
losses during a given time period. This definition of insurance does not differ from 
most of the other generic definitions of insurance.412 
There are various types of insurance, such as lite insurance, property insurance, 
liability insurance and social insurance. These various types of insurance usually 
share the same main objectives, though with sorne differences. 
However, because of the wide scope of insu rance contracts, and since this thesis 
is concerned with the liability of air carriers, the author will narrow this cursory 
investigation to the types of insurance related to aviation. Recall that Article 50 of 
the Montreal Convention of 1999 stipulates that State Parties shall require their 
carriers to maintain adequate insurance covering their liability under the 
Convention. A carrier may be required by the State Party in which it operates to 
provide evidence that it maintains adequate insu rance covering its liability under 
411 Encyclopedia Britanica Homepage <http://www.britannica.comleb/article?eu=109291> (date accessed 
22/07/2003). 
412 See R. Vardit, Insurance ln The World of Islam: Origins, Problems And Current Practice (Califomia: 
University of Califomia, 1985) at 1-2. 
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the Convention. Aviation insurance is categorised as liability insurance which 
does not include life insurance.413 
Insurance is in practice based on risk assessment and actuarial statistics. An 
insu rance company evaluates premiums to be paid for specific coverage on the 
grounds of the statistics it possesses. Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqui in his 
Insurance in an Islamic Economy describes this fact as the '1aw of large 
numbers", which Siddiqui links to the theory of probability.414 According to 
Siddiqui, although one cannot predict the chances of the actual occurrence of 
one particular result of an experiment, the relative chances of that particular 
result arising can be determined from a large number of experiments. This gives 
the measure of probability of the incidence of a particular result during one 
experiment.415 This fact is an asset for assessing the gambling factor proclaimed 
to be involved in insurance practice, as elaborated below. 
From an Islamic-fiqh point of view, despite the late evolution of the term ta'min 
(cooperative insu rance) in the contemporary Arabic and Islamic literature, the 
three characteristics of insurance outlined in Medical Defence Union are found in 
sorne Islamic historical practices. Sorne of these were conducted by the Prophet. 
Amongst these practices is f}iIf alfadool (alfadool pact), which the Prophet 
(PBUH) engaged in before Islam but mentioned to his companions as a virtue of 
413 See R.D. Margo, Aviation Insurance, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 1995) at 6. 
414 M.N. Siddiqui, Insurance In An Islamic Economy (The Islamic Foundation, 1985) at 17. 
415 Ibid. 
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Islamic nature. This pact was made between the people of Mecca to assist 
foreigner traders against the Meccans if the latter refused to grant the foreigner 
his right.416 This pact represented a sort of public indemnity to traders with Mecca 
though it was made gratuitously. Traders did not have to pay any amount to get 
the pact's coverage. Another practice which shares similar values with insu rance 
is diyah, especially where the 'aqila of the aggressor are responsible for paying 
the blood money on his/her behalf. 417 These two pieces of authentic historical 
evidence prove that the main intentions behind insu rance accord with the 
principles of Islam. This does not prove, however, that insurance in its 
contemporary convention al Western form is fully admitted by Islamic jurists. 
7.7.5 Insurance in Islamic-fiqh 
The Hanafi jurist Ibn 'Abidin (d. 1836) is weil known as the first Islamic jurist to 
mention insurance in his Hashiyat Rad A/-Muf]tar A/a A/-dur A/-Mukhtar.418 He 
did not, however, address insurance under its established contemporary Arabie 
term of ta'mïn. He addressed it rather under the term sukara, which is believed to 
be the Arabie transliteration of the Italian term siguare and the Turkish sigorta.419 
The Turkish Commercial Code of 1860 included the first comment regarding 
416 See sections 3.4 & 3.5 above. 
417 See section 2.1.5 above. 
418 Ibn Abdidn, Hashiyat Raad AI-MuhtarAla Al-dur AI-Mukhtar, 3 Vol., 3rd ed. (Almatba'aa AI-
Ameriaah AIKubrah, 1324-1903) at 275-258. 
419 See R. Vardit, supra note 412 at 27. 
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insurance by an Islamic State. 420 Insurance in its contemporary Arabic term 
"ta'mïn" was not addressed until the 20th century by the Egyptian jurist 
Muhammed Bakhit, who in 1906 considered it a prohibited transaction.421 Arabic 
secular and religious literature on the subject of insurance, however, has evolved 
and since t10urished rapidly, especially as the practice of insu rance became 
established in Arabic states. Amongst the most important religious references in 
relation thereto, are the works of Mustafa AI-zarka who considers insurance a 
permissible transaction. Another work that has gained a similar level of 
importance though in the opposite sense is the work of Shawkat 'Aliyan AI-
Ta'mïn Fi AI-shari'a Wal-Qanün. 
Contemporary Islamic jurists usually retlect on the matter of insu rance by 
comparison and analogy with sorne other weil established contracts in Islamic-
fiqh, such as partnership, profit sharing, agency, guarantee etc. Through such 
methodology, insurance is usually rejected since it does not fit any of the 
contracts with which it is compared.422 
Sorne scholars, on the other hand would consider insu rance as an independent 
new matter (nazi/a) that has to be considered despite its dissimilarity to such 
approved transactions. It should be investigated with direct consideration of 
Shan .... a precepts (Qur'an and Sunna) and in the light of its underlying objectives 
420 Ibid. at 31. 
421 Mohamoon Homepage <http://www.mohamoon-ksa.comlSubject.asp?DirID=1076&Status=2> (date 
accessed 24/4/2003). 
422 See M.N. Siddiqui, supra note 414 at 7. 
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purposes. One of the best articles written on the subject is by Mohammed 
Masum Bellah, in which he concludes that insurance is a stand alone issue that 
has to be considered separately from any other transaction. 423 
A variation in methodologies and conclusions is observed through the numerous 
studies and conferences conducted in the second part of the 20th century. The 
first high level conference concerning insurance took place in Damascus in 
1362H (1951), at which the famous Islamic jurist, Mustafa AI-zarka, declared that 
insu rance in its various forms is permitted. This opinion was not in agreement 
with the majority of scholars attending the conference, amongst whom some 
declared that there was a prohibition against ail the various types of insurance, 
and another group declared that property insu rance was permitted and life 
insurance prohibited.424 Three years later the meeting of the Council of Islamic 
Research in Cairo concluded with the same degree of variation of opinion. The 
Head of AI-Azhar, Shaikh Gad AI-liaq, ruled that insurance is prohibited for the 
riba (usury), ghara (speculation) and qimar (gambling) it involves. Shaikh Gad AI-
haq further confirmed this ruling in 1980.425 ln 1977, the Council of Senior Uluma 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia divided insurance practices into two types; 
collective co-operative insurance (al-ta'min al-t'awuni) which is permitted, and 
423 M. Masum Bellah, "Islamic Insurance: Its Origins And Development" (1998) 13:4 Arab Law Quarterly 
386. 
424 See Shaikh A. Bin Menai', "AI-Ta'min Bayn AI-Hazr Wal-Ibal1a" AI-Riyadh Newspaper (issue 12570 
date 18/9/1423). 
425 See Mohamoon Homepage <http://www.mohamoon-ksa.comlSubject.asp?DirID= 1080&Status=2> 
(date accessed 24nl2003). 
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the regular commercial insurance which is prohibited. 426 This conclusion was 
agreed with and approved by the decree of the Islamic-fiqh Council of the Muslim 
Warld League in the same year. These two rulings were further reiterated by the 
ruling of the International Islamic-fiqh Council in 1986. In 1991 the Islamic Audit 
Council of the Saudi national AI-Rajhi Group far Islamic Banking declared that ail 
types of insurance are permitted.427 
Despite the variation in their views, a quick overview of the Arabic and Islamic 
religious literatures about insu rance concentrates on four matters in arder to 
verify its permissibility. These four matters are as follows: 
i. Consideration of whether insurance involves any usury (riba). 
ii. Consideration of whether insurance involves any speculation (ghara & 
jahala). 
iii. Consideration of whether insu rance involves any element of gambling 
(qimar). 
iv. For those who ground their rulings pertaining to insurance on analogy, 
consideration of whether other Islamic transactions share one or more 
features with insurance. 
While this thesis has adopted the basic doctrine that ail transactions are 
permitted unless proscribed otherwise; and while there is no explicit provision of 
Sharfa in relation to insurance, the author is of the view that the afarementioned 
426 See Mohamoon Homepage <http://www.mohamoon-ksa.comlSubject.asp?DirID=1091&Status=2> (date 
accessed 24/4/2003). 
427 See Shaikh A. Bin Menai', supra note 424. 
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constraints ought to be investigated before concluding a final opinion with regard 
to insurance. Moreover, the author is of the opinion that insurance should be 
looked at from the angle of the welfare of the community as an obligation to be 
fulfilled by the Islamic government (siyasa sharriya). 
7.7.5.1 Insurance and Interest 
Usury is amongst the greatest sins a Muslim can ever commit. It is condemned in 
various verses of the Quran, and indeed usury is equated , to declaring war 
against the Almighty God and his Messenger. Muslims, therefore, deal with the 
matter of usury with great caution. The Quran never defines what exactly usury 
is. Even Sunna is not very explicit on the definition of usury. After thorough 
studies, however, jurists have unanimously concluded that usury is of two types: 
riba al-nasï'a and riba al-taC/l. To avoid the latter the Prophet (PBUH) ordained 
that the exchange of sorne specific items like gold, silver and food such as dates, 
should be conducted simultaneously in similar quantities. Jurists, nonetheless, 
interpret the provisions in relation to rioo al-nasi'a differently. Sorne jurists like Ibn 
Hazm AI-Andalusi narrow down the scope of riba al-nasi'a to the items and 
goods mentioned explicitly in the hadith. Other items and goods shall not be a 
subject of riba al-nasi'a. Others like Imam Abu Hanifa and ShafiT include 
additional items on the ground of qiyas.428 
428 See generally A. AI-Sanhori, supra note 29. 
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Riba a/-facj/ is mentioned by the Praphet (PBUH) in his farewell pilgrimage as 
riba a/-jahiliyah. Riba a/-facj/ is nothing other than what we contemporaneously 
cali interest.429 
The Council of Senior Ulama in Saudi Arabia on 4/4/1397 (1977) decided that ail 
kinds of insurance including life insurance, are prahibited for the main reason that 
interest is carried with insu rance. 430 Insurance companies usually use the 
amounts they collect fram the insured in usurious transactions. The insured is not 
involved in such transactions unless he/she decides to pay the premium on 
instalments where an interest rate is charged to coyer inflation and administrative 
expenses.431 
The fifth ruling of the first session of the Islamic-fiqh Council of the Muslim World 
League declared that insu rance involves riba in two ways: 
i. If the peril occurs and the insured gets covered then he/she is getting back 
more than what he/she pa id (rib a/-facj~. 
iL Because coverage comes after payment of the premium then riba a/-
nasï'a is involved. 
429 For further details on the matter of Riba, see the fatwa of Shaikh Al-Azhar dated April 15, 1981 at 
<http://www.mohamoon-
ksa.comlSubject.asp?SearchText=~\20%lu&Page= 1 &Search= 1 &DirID= 7950&Status= 1 > (date 
accessed 24nI2003). 
430 See the Council of Senior Ulamas in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (lO Session), Decree no. 51, Riyadh 
on 4/4/1397. 
431 See R. Vardit, supra note 412 at 48. 
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The author is of the view that this ruling may be right if the premium is paid by the 
insured as a loan to the insu rance company (i.e. if it is pa id with the intention to 
lend only). There would then not be any service whatsoever expected from the 
insurance company in exchange for the premium. However, the various legal 
definitions of insu rance postulated in section 3.1 above provide that the premium 
is consideration for the contract and not a loan. Moreover, none of the de facto 
circumstances associated with the transaction shows that the amount is pa id as 
a loan. 
Besides, if the premium is paid to the insurance company as a loan then it should 
be paid with the condition of returning the exact amount. Further, for ribti to exist 
there should be an interest rate applied to the loan. Insurance companies do not 
in fact pay back to the insured the money he/she paid. They actually cover the 
insured for the financial damages he/she may sustain if the peril occurs. 
Insurance case law, therefore, defines the contract of insurance as an indemnity 
or security contract. According to Vardit, insu rance companies extend to the 
insured a service, not a loan.432 
Besides, for ribti al-nasï'a, the money pa id back to the insured should be paid in 
exchange for the premium despite the occurrence of the covered risk, which is in 
fact not true. 
432 Ibid. 
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The author suggests that it is because of the misinterpretation of the premium as 
a loan from the insured to the insu rance company that some Islamic jurists have 
concluded that insurance involves riba. Although this may be true in some cases 
related to life insurance, it should be taken as a general basis for denying the 
legality of insurance. The author therefore adopts the opinion that insurance does 
not usually involve usury and should not, at the outset, be rejected on this 
ground. What should in fact be rejected are the specific practices through which 
insurance can involve rire rather than insurance as a whole. 
7.7.5.2 Insu rance and Gambling 
Gambling (qimar) or, as named in the Qur'an, (mayser) is roundly condemned by 
Sharfa. The Qur'an treats gambling and intoxication jointly.433 Gambling involves 
betting money in a pool for a chance of losing the stake or wining the whole 
amount bet by others on the occurrence of a specific event. This covers ail kinds 
of luck or risk-based bets like those related to horse races, blackjack, lotteries 
etc. 
Some Islamic jurists are of the view that insu rance is a form of gambling whereby 
the insured in effect bets his/her money (the premium) for an expected loss of the 
bet or a very much bigger gain on the occurrence of a specific event. In other 
words, insurance imitates gambling because of the disproportion between the 
433 The Holy Qur'iin, (2:219), (5:90) and (5:91). 
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amounts paid by the insured (premiums) and the compensation pa id back by the 
insu rance company on the occurrence of a peril. For jurists, the likelihood of loss 
and gain is similar on both sides where the insu rance company may lose by 
paying back a large am ou nt in exchange for a very much sm aller amount pa id by 
the insured, or it may, on the other hand gain the premium without any loss on its 
part.434 
Another group of jurists headed by Shaikh Mustafa AI-Zarqa and Shaikh 
'Abdullah Sin Menai' contest this view by arguing that insu rance does not involve 
gambling. As already noted, he concludes that insurance companies decide the 
premiums to be pa id on the grounds of the "Iaw of large numbers", according to 
which they conduct periodic thorough investigation and gather statistics on the 
risks they insure before fixing their premium rates. It is a cost-plus process 
through which the insu rance companiy usually charges an average that covers 
its probable costs in addition to its profits. 435 Shaikh 'Abdullah bin Menai' 
provides that for qïmar to exist there should be a loser and a winner. In insurance 
contracts, to the contrary, both parties are gaining. The insurer is gaining the 
premium and the insured is gaining security.436 Muhammed Nejatullah Siddiqui 
asserts that the loss or gain associated with gambling is based on chance and 
luck only and does not involve any labour, competence or service. He goes on to 
434 See the resolution of The Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League date 14/8/1398 A.H (1978) 
at <http://www.mohamoon-
ksa.comlSubject.asp?SearchText=~120%lu&Page= 1 &Search= 1 &DirID= 14060&Status=1 > 
(date accessed 241712003). 
435 See M.N. Siddiqui, supra note 414 at 17-18. 
436 See Shaikh A. Bin Menai', supra note 424. See contra R. Vardit, supra note 412 at 57. 
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argue that by contrast, a redistribution of wealth caused by loss and gain in 
gambling is a blind distribution, contrary to justice and fair play.437 Prima facie, 
insu rance premiums collected fram the insured who do not encounter a peril are 
transferred to those who encounter an accident and get pa id by the insurance 
company. Siddiqui concludes therefore that the comparison between insurance 
and gambling is unfounded. The redistribution associated with insu rance is 
actually a redistribution of risk rather than of money. The unpaid insured did not 
bet and the pa id insured did not gain, they both have shared together the 
financial burden of the peril. 
The author is of the view that the subject matter of gambling is money the subject 
matter of insurance is security or indemnity for consideration. Therefore, the 
analogy between gambling and insurance is not accurate. However, the link 
between gambling and insu rance is not easy to investigate without analyzing the 
matter of speculation, which some jurists contend is present in insu rance 
transactions. 
7.7.5.3 Insurance and Speculation (Gharar and Jahalah) 
The English term speculation combines the meaning of two corresponding Arabic 
terms. One is gharar, which means selling something whose availability is 
unknown, like selling birds in the air before they are captured or fish in the sea 
437 M.N. Siddiqui, supra note 414 at 33. 
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before they are caught.438 Jahalah is to sell something that really exists but in an 
uncertain or unspecified quantity or size. A good example of jahalah is to buy a 
car without knowing its model, type, mileage, condition or year of production. 
These two terms are, however, usually used interchangeably. According to ail 
Islamic jurists, a contract should be free from speculation to be valid. 
Some conservative jurists reject insurance because it involves speculation. Such 
speculation comes from the fact that the insured and the insu rance company do 
not know the consequences of the contract they are entering into. The insured 
may end up paying the premium without getting anything in return, and Iikewise 
the insu rance company may end up paying a huge amount to an insured party 
who has just started paying the insurance instalments.439 Such uncertainty at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract of insu rance is, for some jurists, 
speculation. 
Shawkat 'Aliyan, in his valuable book on insurance, provides that the insu rance 
contract is a contract of speculation as the insured and the insurance company 
are both entering into a contract of uncertainty. 
438 R. Vardit, R. Vardit, supra note 412 at 51. 
439 See the Resolution of The Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League date 14/8/1398 A.H 
(1978) at <http://www.mohamoon-
ksa.comlSubject.asp?SearchText=~'20%~.J&Page= 1 &Search= 1 &DirID= 14060&Status= 1 > (date 
accessed 24n/2003). 
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Shaikh AI-zarqa and Sahikh 'Abdullah Bin Menai', on the other hand, contend 
that insu rance contracts in general do not involve speculation. Their contention is 
based on the fact that insu rance companies usually possess databases and 
statistics on whatever risk they insure against. Such instruments enable them to 
predict the probability of the occurrence of the peril insured against. Shaikh AI-
Zarqa and Shaikh Ben Menai', moreover, provide that insu rance is a security and 
indemnity service which is an intangible product being sold to the insured. This 
service deserves the premium paid by the insured who is assured and secured 
(the service) that he/she will either get the insured thing or its value if a peril 
occurs. 
From the author's point of view, both the conservative view and its rebuttal are 
logical and have reasonable grounds. The difference between them is their 
perception of the insurance transaction. The conservative opinion denies that the 
security and indemnity services are valid objects for contracts. Its conclusion, 
therefore - that insu rance involve speculation and gambling - is trom that 
premise to a large extent valid. The opposing opinion, on the other hand, 
accepts security service as a valid object of value. Hence it finds no speculation 
involved in insurance. The author, however, accepts security service as a valid 
object ot a contract since the it does provide c1ear and valuable assistance to 
those facing perils. 
7.7.5.4 Insurance And The Analogical Approach 
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Jurists holding a conservative view in relation to insu rance consider it prohibited 
by the explicit provisions of Sharfa. They assert that it involves riba, qïmar and 
jahalah & ghara. Sharï'a explicitly considers null and void any contract involving 
one or ail of these factors.44o This group of jurists (the majority), therefore, does 
not accept what they cali commercial insu rance and does not accept any analogy 
or igtihad on the grounds of the welfare of the community. This is because the 
Islamic legal methodology (UsOI-fiqh), by consensus, does not accept such 
approaches if there is explicit guidance from the Qur'an and Sunna that the 
action is prohibited or permitted. In other words, ail other means of uSOI-fiqh 441 
are to be applied only if the Quran and Sunna do not provide an explicit ruling on 
the subject matter.442 These jurists, nonetheless, resort to analogy with other 
similar transactions of Sharfa and fiqh for the sake of proving their case against 
insurance.443 The most thorough study conducted in this regard is the one made 
by Shawkat Aliyan in which he compared insu rance to ten other Islamic practices 
to conclude that insu rance in general does not fit any of these and therefore shall 
not be accepted. 
The author nevertheless differs from Aliyan on whether insu rance can be 
rejected on the grounds of its dissimilarity to the other ten practices. Dissimilarity 
440 See section 2.2.4 above. 
441 See section 1.5.1.5 above. 
442 See the Resolution of The Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League date 14/8/1398 A.H 
(1978) at <http://www.mohamoon-
ksa.com/Subject.asp?SearchText=J,...;:.il120%4.J&Page= 1 &Search= 1 &DirID= 14060&Status= 1> 
(Date accessed 24n/2003). 
443 See generally S. Aliyan, AI-Ta'min Fi AI-SharI'i! Wal-quanÜll, 2nd ed.(Riaydh: Dar AI-Rashid, 1981). 
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should conclude in further investigation of the subject matter as a new 
independent occurrence (nazi/a) instead of rejecting it. This is particularly the 
case when the jurist does not see the involvement of usury, speculation or 
gambling with insurance. 
7.7.5.5 Cooperative insurance (AI-Ta'min AI-Ta'awuni) 
Although conservative jurists reject the contemporary Western practice of 
insu rance as a prohibited transaction, they did, on the other hand, appreciate its 
importance, especially in certain industries such as aviation and they therefore 
came up with what they cali "co-operative insu rance" (a/-ta'min a/-ta'awuni). 
The basic ide a behind co-operative insu rance is to create a framework to operate 
like regular commercial insurance but without the involvement of usury, 
speculation and gambling. This concept was adopted for the first time by the 
Council of Senior Ulama of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through its Resolution 
number 51 dated 4/4/1397A.H (1997). 
Co-operative insurance in its ideal form, as envisaged by Muslim scholars, is 
formed by a group of people each contributing a fixed amount to a general fund 
for a fixed time period. If calamity befalls any of those who contributed to the 
fund, the fund will indemnify them. If the fund runs out of capital, the deficit will be 
covered by additional equal sums collected from ail members. If the fund ends 
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the year with a surplus, it will distribute this surplus, in equal shares, among its 
members.444 
To avoid usury, members are perceived as either donors who do not expect 
profits or as shareholders. The members are, therefore, the insured and the 
insurer at the same time. Moreover the insu rance company does not invest the 
money it collects from the donors or the shareholders in any usurious 
transaction. Collective insurance thus has sorne analogy to what is known as 
"mutual insurance" in the West. 
The uncertainty associated with this type of insurance is not addressed as 
speculation where the premium is pa id at the outset as a donation Le. the insured 
is not paying the amount for an uncertain probable exchange. This type of 
insurance is, therefore, free from speculation and gambling as weil as usury. 
Managers of such co-operative insu rance companies may elect do so for reward. 
Cooperative insurance had been put into practice in Saudi Arabia until the 
Council of Senior Ulama of Saudi Arabia decided very recently that current co-
operative insurance companies have deviated from the idealistic theory adopted 
in the past. They are therefore prohibited, for the same reasons as the prohibition 
of commercial insurance. Subsequently these companies have been requested 
444 R. Vardit, supra note 412 at 108. 
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to reform their practices so as to be in accordance with what had been decreed 
before.445 
Shaikh Mustaf AI-Zarqa characterized the differentiation between regular 
commercial insurance and cooperative insurance as a mystery. Shaikh 'Abdullah 
Bin Menai' also argues that commercial insu rance is no different from co-
operative insurance. The theory of co-operative insurance proclaims that the 
insured are paying the premiums as donations with the intention to cooperate 
with their fellow insured. For Bin Menai', this is not true. The insured are paying 
the amounts because they need to be insured. It is beyond doubt that the overall 
result of such a payment is co-operation, but a less overt form of co-operation is 
also the case for commercial insurance. As Shaikh Bin Menai' asserts, it is 
untrue that the premiums are paid as donations, since donors should have the 
right to decide the value of their donation, which is not the case in the so-called 
co-operative insurance. They should have the right, furthermore, to stop giving 
the donation at any time. However, if the insured does so, his/her insurance 
coverage will be terminated. This means that it is not a donation. 
Shaikh Bin Menai' adds that profit (as opposed to interest) is not prohibited by 
Islam. Therefore, the claim that co-operative insurance companies do not seek 
profit and are therefore Islamic is not valid. Shaikh Bin Menai' concludes a long 
discussion dismissing the differences between the commercial and co-operative 
445 See Shaikh A. Bin Menai', supra note 424. 
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insu rance with the assertion that insu rance is either permitted or prohibited 
without discrimination between the two types. 
The author stands by the opinion adopted by Shaikh Bin Menai' and further 
asserts that insurance should be seen as a service of value. In fact, if the 
insurance company is not providing any service other than the creation of a base 
where the premiums are collected and the management of compensation, it 
would still deserve any profit it makes out of such a service. Insurance in general 
ought to be viewed as an acceptable practice consistent with Islamic-fiqh. 
Nevertheless, the author still agrees with the conservative point of view that there 
are sorne insurance practices that may not be accepted by Sharfa. For instance, 
as gambling is prohibited by Sharfa, an insurance company should not accept 
the provision of any coverage to gambling houses. Insurance companies also 
should not invest their money in prohibited fields or in a manner that involves 
usury. There may indeed be Iife insu rance policies taken out on the lives of 
persons unrelated to the payer of premiums as a matter of pure speculation. 
However, more to the point of the thesis, the author is of the opinion that it would 
have been almost impossible for the aviation industry to evolve in the way it has 
done without insurance. This is so for the very basic reason that the huge 
liabilities an airline may be faced with following damage caused by an aircraft or 
damage done to it would overburden individual carriers if they cou Id not spread 
risk. In addition, aviation insu rance is a Iiability insurance, which does not, by 
299 
definition, fall into the contentious life insu rance category. The author thus 
concludes that aviation insu rance is an acceptable form of insurance consistent 
with Islamic-fiqh, provided that it does not include any prohibited transaction. 
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Conclusion 
The main contribution to legal knowledge that this thesis has sought to make is to 
apply the methodology associated with Islamic Sharra to the context of the weil 
known and established international Conventions on air carrier liability. The key 
constellation of applicable Islamic concepts is found in the diyah system, which 
addresses civil liability with regard to personal in jury and death under Islamic 
Sharra. As described in Chapter Il of the thesis, diyah is in principle a limited 
liability extra-contractual system which can be enhanced or altered by contractual 
terms. In other words, according to diyah, limited liability is a default rule which 
can be changed by virtue of contract. In the Islamic context, the limits of diyah 
are defined by virtue of hadith to the effect that the value of diyah is one hundred 
camels. At first blush, this measure of compensation may seem far removed from 
anything that could be relevant to air carrier liability. Indeed, in the current Islamic 
legal systems adopted by Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the 
limits of diyah are calculated in a superficial, mechanical manner: the value of a 
camel according to the current value of currency multiplied by one hundred. The 
author suggests in the thesis that the value of diyah should be considered on the 
basis of the economic value of camels at the time of diyah's inception. This would 
result in translating diyah into a much higher, and much more relevant, currency 
value. As detailed in Chapter Il, if diyah is taken on grounds of the economic 
value of camels at the time of the Prophet, it would equal to a three years' 
income of a middle class family composed of 6 people. The GOP as reported by 
the United Nations provides a rule of thumb for such calculations. In practical 
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terms, this would currently set a limit of approximately five hundred thousand US 
Dollars if upper income countries serve as the benchmark. While an international 
Convention to which Islamic and non-Islamic countries were ail parties would not 
be based on diyah explicitly, this thesis proposes establishing a methodology 
similar to and consistent with diyah. Most industrialized countries keep statistics 
on family income - something unavailable at the time of the Prophet (PBUH). For 
example, Statistics Canada reports census information on income of couple 
families with children. Three times the top quintile average family income of a top 
GPD country would provide a high and automatically adjusting limit which airlines 
could choose to exceed in their own contracts. If Canada were taken as a 
benchmark, that would have been $432,000 in 2000. 446 Although this is not 
precisely a methodology yet adopted by any of the Islamic states or by Islamic 
scholars, the author suggests such a detachment of diyah from its specific 
historical background as an alternative to the methodologies adopted by the air 
carrier liability Conventions. 
Part 2 of the thesis explores the various aspects of the interplay between the 
diyah system and the air carrier liability Conventions. Chapter VI analyses air 
carrier extra-contractual liability as prescribed by the Rome Convention and 
shows that there are no major points of conflict with the basic principles of 
Islamic-fiqh. However, the Rome Convention has major problems which make 
states reluctant to ratify it. The first is the low compensation limits prescribed by 
446 See <http://www.ccsd.ca/prl2003/censusincome.htm.> (date accessed August 31,2006). 
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the Convention. The second is the methodology of distribution of compensation 
as it gathers ail plaintiffs in a pool and distributes the limited compensation 
accordingly. FinallY' in an attempt to overcome the uncertainty that may result 
from an unexpected number of claims, the Rome Convention fixes the liability at 
certain arbitrary weight limits despite the number of fatalities and whatever the 
nature of injuries sustained by survivors. This methodology unnecessarily 
discriminates between those injured onboard an aircraft and those injured in the 
same accident on the ground. 
The author suggests that applying a methodology derived from the diyah system 
would enhance the Rome Convention in several ways. To begin with, recourse to 
a diyah methodology is appropriate since the Rome Convention is also premised 
on fixing limited but absolute liability. However, while the Rome Convention does 
this by erring on the side of protecting the carrier against claimants, diyah seeks 
to strike a balance more favourable to the claimant. It has nothing of arbitrary 
methodology adopted under the Rome Convention, which fixes liability on the 
grounds of weight of aircraft whatever the number and nature of causalities. By 
contrast, diyah would mandate the air carrier to compensate for each of the 
casualties of an accident whatever the weight of the aircraft or the number of 
causalities. Ali that really matters while determining the amount of compensation 
is the nature of the in jury actually sustained by the person on ground. The limits 
of such extra-contractual liability as proposed through the diyah system are equal 
to the limits proposed by diyah for contractual liability. Thus diyah provides no 
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basis for any discriminatory treatment as between those injured on the ground 
and those injured onboard. 
As to air carrier contractualliability towards passengers on board, in Chapter VII 
the thesis examines the various aspects of the Warsaw System and Montreal 
Convention covering contractual formalities and compares them to the general 
principles of Islamic-fiqh. The Warsaw System has adopted astringent rule of 
formalities according to which if a ticket fails to contain certain contents or to 
have been delivered in a prescribed manner, the carrier shall be deprived of 
limits of liability. This rule adopted by the Warsaw System created a battlefield 
for litigants. Plaintiffs sought to use the matter of formalities as an escape hatch 
against low liability limits while air carriers did their utmost to preserve the limits. 
Plaintiffs' arguments would usually be around not adhering to the formalities of 
the ticket or not delivering the ticket in timely manner. The author suggests that 
main problem in this regard is not only the stringency of formalities but also the 
conditional nature of limited liability, which can turn to the other extreme of 
unlimited liability if formalities are unfulfilled. This has created unnecessary 
constraints on business practice. Despite the fact that technologies have long 
been available for e-ticketing, the link between limits to liability and adherence to 
contractual formalities delayed its introduction markedly. 
The Montreal Convention has successfully solved this problem by not linking the 
limits of liability to formalities of the ticket. Unfortunately, however, there is no 
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initial liability limit. Moreover, it is going to take some more time before airlines 
will be eager to implement electronic ticketing in full as there are still states which 
have not ratified the Montreal Convention. 
A diyah-inspired regime could overcome these difficulties. To begin with, its 
liability limits do not turn on adherence to formalities. With this proposition 
claimants would have no incentive to challenge contractual formalities. On the 
contrary, in cases where the air carrier agrees to a contractual stipulation 
providing compensation beyond ordinary liability limits, liability claimants would 
want to prove the existence of the agreement. The author argues such an 
approach, if generally applied, would encourage air carriers to adopt electronic 
ticketing and indeed whatever form of ticket made most business sense. In short, 
Islamic-fiqh would not only admit and adopt the concept of electronic contracts 
and electronic ticketing, but in fact could help in spreading the practice. 
Chapter VIII addresses the central issue for the thesis, namely what light diyah 
can shed on the key controversy besetting the Warsaw System and Montreal 
Convention: limited vs. unlimited liability. The Warsaw Convention adopted the 
res ipsa loquitur principle in lieu of a fault standard but in exchange limited the 
liability of air carriers. This methodology did exactly what was intended by 
preserving air carriers from being exposed to uncertain liability burdens when the 
aviation sector was still an infant industry and subject to a very high factor of risk. 
Limited liability helped air carriers to evolve and allowed the industry to grow to 
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its current economic significance. Nevertheless, what was salutary for the 1950s 
faced obsolescence after a relatively short period of time since the Warsaw 
Convention could not keep pace with the devaluation of currencies, which 
rendered the monetary limits as prescribed by the Warsaw Convention 
unacceptable. The true reason why Warsaw has become unacceptable is that 
Article 22 of the Convention fixed the liability limits in numbers rather than in a 
formula. 
After sorne seve nt y years of struggle against the limits of liability adopted by the 
Warsaw System, the Montreal Convention went to the other extreme. It adopted 
the so called a two tier liability regime, which in its totality results in unlimited 
liability. The solution that diyah may provide to overcome problems of these two 
extremes of Warsaw and Montreal is that it suggests a limited liability regime 
according to which limits are described by formula rather than numbers. This 
means that air carriers would not be exposed to the uncertainty that may result 
from the unlimited liability regime adopted by the Montreal Convention. In other 
words, they would not be subject to the whims of particular juries and the 
expense of mercenary litigation. Simultaneously, the formula system as provided 
by diyah would also have enabled the Warsaw Convention to keep pace with 
economic fluctuations in a manner that would always keep the liability regime 
within a generous but acceptable level of compensation. 
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If one takes together the arguments presented in this thesis about the interaction 
of diyah with air carrier liability Conventions, the result could be a single, 
integrated instrument regulating contractual and extra-contractual liability. 
Through the application of a diyah methodology, contractual and extra-
contractual liability towards persons would be placed on a parallel footing. For 
both, the same level of default liability would apply. In both situations, there 
would be no exposure to unlimited liability unless contracted for. The principal 
difference between contexts is that the limits of diyah can be raised by virtue of a 
contract. But on a practical level, the author presumes it would be difficult for the 
air carrier to offer this without asking the passenger to pay for the difference 
through a premium. This actually applies currently to cases where passengers 
declare special value of luggage. Additionally, the integration of the two aspects 
of liability in a single integral instrument would relieve air carriers from the 
uncertainty associated with the adoption of two different regimes. 
ln addition to the above, the author would like to note, finally, that the interplay 
between the principles of diyah and the air carrier liability Conventions discussed 
in this thesis constitutes but one example of how Sharra can interact with other 
legal traditions including Common Law and Civil Law traditions. It also reflects 
how Islamic states applying Sharra can benefit from the norms and principles 
adopted within other legal traditions which are not contradictory to Sharra in 
principle. There are many other subjects that could be addressed through what 
could be called, using somewhat diplomatic language, a constructive dialogue 
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among legal traditions - a dialogue in which Sharï'a has a notable part to play. 
For example, the thesis itself points to further work on the subjects of insurance 
daims based on air carrier liability and to how the Islamic law of inheritance 
would apply to the advanced payment adopted under Article 28 of the Montreal 
Convention. 
Of course, most of the views and contentions concerning Sharï'a and fiqh 
provided throughout this thesis reflect the author's point of view. The thesis 
should therefore be read and understood as "a" perspective on Sharï'a; it does 
not and cannot daim to be "the" perspective on Sharï'a. It is thus acknowledged 
that the specifie conclusions drawn here about how air carrier liability 
Conventions can benefit from an Islamic-fiqh methodology could fail to gain 
endorsement among either Islamic or non-Islamic scholars and experts. 
Nevertheless, the deepest ambition of the thesis is to show that a constructive 
dialogue among legal traditions, to which Sharï'a makes significant contribution, 
is possible and practicable. Those who disagree with the conclusions of the 
thesis are thus invited to offer better accounts of the interplay between Islamic-
fiqh and internationallaw and not to turn their backs on that endeavour. 
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